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ABSTRACT 
Television policy has been viewed historically as posing an 
irreconcilable conflict between static and dynamic efficiency.  Static 
efficiency requires that the price for television programming be set at 
marginal cost, which in the case of television programming is 
essentially zero.  Dynamic efficiency dictates that the price be set 
high enough to allow the program to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover its fixed costs.  Truly optimal (i.e., first-best) pricing was 
regarded as impossible, with any pricing decision necessarily 
reducing to a tradeoff between these two considerations.  In this 
Article, Professor Yoo combines the insights of public good 
economics and monopolistic competition theory to advance a new 
approach to the regulation of television that brings these two 
seemingly contradictory forces into alignment.  He then explores this 
framework by using it to evaluate one of the most longstanding and 
central commitments of U.S. television policy—the promotion and 
preservation of free, local television—which he argues is better 
viewed as being comprised of four subcommitments.  Application of 
this framework reveals that these subcommitments have actually had 
the effect of impeding rather than promoting free, local television.  
Abandonment of these subcommitments would likely cause the 
quantity, quality, and diversity of television programming to 
increase.  The analysis also shows how attempts to foster free, local 
television have induced secondary distortions in markets for other 
spectrum-based communications and has slowed the deployment of 
new technologies, such as third-generation wireless devices. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) have long recognized the critical role that television plays 
in providing the news, entertainment, and public affairs programming upon 
which our society depends.1  In recent years, the industry has undergone a 
 
 1 See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,   
§ 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (finding that television “continue[s] to be an important source of local news 
and public affairs programming . . . critical to an informed electorate”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 
U.S. 180, 194 (1997) (recognizing that television “is an important source of information to many Americans    
. . . . by tradition and use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national discourse on subjects 
across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and expression”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
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fairly radical transformation.  It has played a starring role in a number of the 
recent megamergers and spinoffs that have buffeted the communications 
marketplace.2  Even more important is the emergence of new television 
technologies that promise to revolutionize the U.S. media environment.  After 
years of somnolence, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems,3 such as 
DirecTV and the Dish Network, have emerged as significant media platforms 
offering innovative programming options and greatly increasing the 
competitiveness of the overall industry.  In addition, broadcasters are in the 
process of deploying digital television, with over 563 stations now 
operational.4  And looming over the entire industry is the prospect of video-on-
demand provided over the Internet.  Together these technologies promise to 
transform the way that U.S. households receive information, which in turn will 
have a dramatic impact on democratic processes and economic efficiency 
alike. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the drastic changes in the technological 
and business environment surrounding television have yet to effect 
corresponding changes in the regulatory approach taken by Congress and the 
FCC.  Quite the contrary, television policy has continued to adhere to the same 
core commitment that has governed the industry since its infancy: the 
 
U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (acknowledging that television “‘is demonstrably a principal source of information and 
entertainment for a great part of the Nation’s population’”) (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 
392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968)); Review of Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., Report & Order, 
14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,912 ¶ 18 (1999) (finding that television is “the primary source of news and entertain-
ment programming for Americans” and “play[s] a leading role in shaping democratic debate and cultural atti-
tudes”). 
 2 The most significant mergers include Time Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System and 
the subsequent acquisition of that combined entity by America Online, AT&T’s acquisition of the cable prop-
erties owned by TCI and MediaOne and the subsequent sale of those properties to Comcast, Disney’s acquisi-
tion of ABC, Viacom’s acquisition of CBS, EchoStar’s failed bid for DirecTV, and Vivendi’s pending sale of 
its media properties to Universal. 
 3 DBS was first envisioned by science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke in 1945.  Arthur C. Clarke, Extra-
Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 
305.  The FCC would not authorize DBS service until 1982.  See Application of Satellite Television Corp. for 
Authority to Construct an Experimental Direct Broad. Satellite Sys., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 91 
F.C.C.2d 953 (1982).  DBS would not be commercially deployed until 1994.  See Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming, Third Annual Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 
4377-78 ¶ 40 (1997). 
 4 Fed. Communications Comm’n, DTV Stations on the Air (Oct. 15, 2003), at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
mb/video/files/dtvonair.html. 
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promotion and preservation of free, local television.5  This regulatory inertia 
cannot be explained by widespread satisfaction with the status quo.  A long 
line of high-profile commentators from a wide variety of perspectives have 
issued a steady stream of criticism condemning the quality and diversity of 
television programming that has emerged under the current regime as wholly 
inadequate.6 
These developments have convinced me that a comprehensive reevaluation 
of the commitment to free, local television is long overdue.  In particular, I 
propose reevaluating this commitment in light of two economic features 
commonly thought to distinguish the market for television programming from 
markets for more conventional goods.  The first is the fact that television 
programming exhibits the lack of rivalry associated with public goods.  The 
second is the fact that the market for television programming is comprised of 
differentiated products.  Although I am not the first to explore the intersection 
between these two approaches,7 no previous work has taken into account the 
full complexity of either approach or explored the full range of policy options 
available. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(16), 106 
Stat. 1460, 1462 (identifying preservation of “the economic viability of free local broadcast television” as one 
of the statute’s goals); Turner, 520 U.S. at 191 (identifying “preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local 
broadcast television” as an important governmental interest); Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (same); H.R. REP. NO. 
887, Part 2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988) (regulating satellite television so that it “do[es] not undermine the 
base of free local television service upon which the American people continue to rely”); Amendment of 
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. 
for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and Order, 
38 F.C.C. 683, 699-700 ¶¶ 44-48 (1965) (justifying cable regulation by the need to preserve free, local 
television). 
 6 See, e.g., BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 220-21 (1987); C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING 
AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-70 (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
59-65 (paperback ed. 1995); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of 
Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1093-1107 (1990); Reed Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the 
Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089 (1996); Newton N. Minow, Address 
to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in NEWTON M. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, 
ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND 185-96 (1995); Ralph Nader & Claire Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A 
Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 24-46, 55 (1988). 
 7 Of particular note is the work of C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 20-40 (2002).  
Although we reach widely divergent conclusions, his analysis will undoubtedly be of help to anyone interested 
in these issues.  For other leading analyses integrating public good economics and monopolistic competition, 
see STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 134-47, 160-64 
(1991); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 
Q.J. ECON. 103 (1977). 
 
2003] RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION 1585 
A more complete understanding of the insights provided by public good 
economics and product differentiation theory helps to explain why previous 
attempts to promote free, local television have proven so ineffectual.  Indeed, it 
reveals how current policy has exacted a terrible toll on all types of television 
programming.  The commitment to localism has prevented television providers 
from realizing the available economies of scale, while attempts to foster free 
television have reduced the responsiveness of the market by depriving viewers 
of the ability to use prices to signal the intensity of their preferences.  Equally 
problematic is the manner in which current policy has stifled the emergence of 
competition from new television platforms and impeded providers’ ability to 
promote both static and dynamic efficiency through price discrimination.  The 
net effect is not only a reduction in the total amount of television 
programming, but also a degradation in its quality and diversity.  Furthermore, 
the key decisions in promoting free, local television have had the collateral 
consequence of forestalling the development of new nontelevision 
communications technologies, such as third-generation wireless devices (3G), 
that depend upon the electromagnetic spectrum as their means of transmission. 
What emerges is an analytical model of considerable generality that has 
implications for a number of other fields.8  It should also be of interest to 
anyone interested in television policy from an economic perspective.  Even 
those who reject economic analysis as the basis for defining the ends of 
television policy will still appreciate the importance of understanding what 
economic analysis can teach us about the relative efficacy of the various means 
for effecting the ends chosen.  Ignoring the economic underpinnings of the 
various policy instruments available can drastically increase the costs 
associated with the remedial measures chosen.  Even worse, it can even cause 
government intervention to have the perverse effect of frustrating the very 
goals sought to be promoted. 
Part I of this Article introduces the basic economics of product 
differentiation and public goods.  Although there are other ways to model 
product differentiation, this Article builds on the principles of monopolistic 
 
 8 My argument should have considerable applicability to all kinds of intellectual property, because most 
intellectual property goods are similarly nonrival and differentiated.  For an argument applying this model to 
copyright law, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2004). 
   
1586 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
competition first advanced by Edward Chamberlin9 in order to facilitate the 
combination of insights provided by product differentiation with the analysis 
of public goods.  Part II evaluates the applicability of the analysis that I 
develop to the market for television programming. 
Part III employs the economic model to evaluate past efforts to promote 
free, local television.  It begins by introducing the major television 
technologies and traces the role that the commitment to free, local television 
has played in shaping regulatory policy with respect to each.  In particular, I 
argue that the overarching commitment to free, local television should be 
disaggregated into four, more discrete subcommitments: 
(1) the preference for local programming over national programming, 
(2) the preference for free television over pay television, 
(3) the preference for incumbent television providers over new 
entrants and emerging television technologies, and 
(4) the preference for single-channel television technologies over 
multi-channel television technologies. 
I then employ the basic economic principles developed in Part I to critique 
each of these subcommitments.  The analysis indicates that adherence to these 
subcommitments has been a policy disaster that has reduced the quantity, 
quality, and diversity of television programming. 
Part IV explores the secondary distortions that the commitment to free, 
local television has imposed on emerging technologies, paying particular 
attention to the impact on 3G.  It concludes that the commitment has further 
harmed overall welfare by imposing static inefficiencies in the pricing of 
related markets and by imposing dynamic efficiencies by delaying and 
forestalling the emergence of new communications technologies. 
 
 9 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956). 
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE ATYPICAL ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC GOODS AND 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
Deciphering why previous efforts to promote free, local television have had 
the perverse effect of stripping the market of local programming and of 
degrading the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of television 
programming requires an appreciation of two qualities that cause the economic 
analysis of the market for television programming to deviate from the 
principles suggested by standard neoclassical economics.  The first is that 
television programming exhibits a quality known as “lack of rivalry” 
commonly associated with public goods.  The second is that the market for 
television programming involves differentiated products that do not serve as 
perfect substitutes for one another. 
Section A opens by providing a description of the standard model of 
perfect competition that will serve as the baseline case for comparison.  
Section B describes the economic complications that arise when a product 
exhibits the characteristics of a public good.  Section C reviews the insights 
provided by monopolistic competition theory.  Section D explores the welfare 
implications of the interaction of these two concepts, paying particular 
attention to the standard argument that the welfare calculus necessarily 
requires striking a balance between the opposing forces of static and dynamic 
efficiency.  Section E extends the existing theories and explores the extent to 
which price discrimination can resolve this seemingly intractable dilemma. 
A. Perfect Competition Among Undifferentiated Products as a Baseline Case 
The discussion of how public good economics and product differentiation 
can lead to market failure requires an appreciation of the ways that it deviates 
from the standard model of perfect competition.  Therefore, at the risk of some 
tedium,10 this section sketches the basic model of perfect competition. 
A perfectly competitive market is generally assumed to consist of a large 
number of producers selling undifferentiated products for purchase by a large 
number of consumers.  In addition, entry and exit by producing firms is 
assumed to be easy.  Under this model, consumers and producers use prices to 
 
 10 The analysis that follows can be found in any basic textbook on microeconomics.  Those familiar with 
the basic theory of perfect competition may prefer to skip directly to Part I.B. 
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reveal the intensity of their preferences.  The fact that a consumer is willing to 
pay a particular price for a product indicates that consuming the product would 
provide that consumer with benefits that equal or exceed the price paid for it.  
The prices at which all consumers would be willing to purchase that product 
can be aggregated and represented by an industry demand curve, which, in 
accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal returns, is presumed to 
be downward sloping.  Conversely, the fact that a particular producer is willing 
to sell a product at a particular price reveals that the price charged equals or 
exceeds the marginal cost of producing an additional unit.  The costs incurred 
by producers can be aggregated into an industry supply curve, which, again in 
accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal returns, is presumed to 
be upward sloping. 
1. Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition 
Equilibrium price and quantity are established at the industry level where 
the industry demand curve intersects with the industry supply curve.  If the 
industry produces at a level that falls short of the equilibrium quantity, there 
will necessarily be consumers who are willing to pay more for the product than 
it costs to make it.  This in turn induces the existing firms to expand their 
production and sell to these customers.  As this occurs, the firms’ costs rise, 
and the benefits derived by the additional purchasers fall.  As quantity 
increases, the spread between the two narrows until all of the unsatisfied 
demand is met, which occurs when the benefits derived by the marginal 
consumer no longer exceed the costs to the marginal producer. 
The equilibrium price in turn determines the behavior of individual firms.  
Under this model, individual firms are assumed to be trying to maximize their 
profits.  A firm seeking to maximize its profits will sell additional units of the 
product so long as the benefits it derives from doing so exceed the costs.  In 
other words, it will expand its production until it reaches the point where its 
marginal cost curve intersects with its marginal revenue curve. 
Because perfect competition assumes that there are a large number of 
producers each selling undifferentiated products, any firm that attempts to 
charge a price that exceeds the prices charged by its competitors will 
immediately lose all of its sales, as its customers transfer their purchases to 
other producers offering the same product at a lower price.  Individual firms 
are thus said to be “price takers” who lack any “power over price,” because 
they must accept the prices dictated by the overall market and cannot raise 
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their prices without losing their entire market share.  As a result, the marginal 
revenue curve confronting individual firms is simply a horizontal line drawn at 
equilibrium price set at the industry level. 
Figure 1 
Short-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition 
Perfect competition also presumes that the relevant cost curves are U-
shaped.  Production of most goods requires the incurrence of both fixed and 
variable costs.  At relatively low volumes, the existence of fixed costs yields 
significant returns to scale as those fixed costs are spread over increasingly 
large volumes.  Technological economies of scale also generally cause variable 
costs initially to decline as the quantity produced increases.  Each of these ef-
fects cause both the average cost curve (AC in Figure 1) and the marginal cost 
curve (MC in Figure 1) to slope downward when production volumes are low, 
and the presence of fixed costs initially causes the average cost curve to lie 
above the marginal cost curve. 
As production increases, the impact of the amortization of fixed costs on 
average cost decays exponentially.  With respect to variable costs, the principle 
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of diminishing marginal returns eventually exhausts all of the available 
economies of scale.  In addition, when consumption by different individuals is 
rivalrous (i.e., consumption by one person necessarily reduces the supply 
available to others), the demand for scarce factors of production causes the 
variable costs associated with producing additional quantities to rise.  After 
production reaches a certain level, the emerging diseconomies of scale 
dominate the available economies of scale, and the marginal cost curve begins 
to curve upward.  Once the increase in marginal costs more than offsets the 
ever-decreasing downward pressure caused by the amortization of fixed costs, 
the average cost curve begins to curve upward as well, after which point it lies 
below the marginal cost curve.  The marginal cost curve necessarily intersects 
the average cost curve’s lowest point. 
Figure 2 
Long-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition 
If the equilibrium price lies below a firm’s average cost curve, the firm will 
go out of business and exit the market.  As a result, under this model, firms 
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only produce output at levels in which the average cost curve lies at or below 
the marginal cost curve, and every producer is necessarily able to generate suf-
ficient revenue to cover all of the costs associated with producing the goods. 
If the equilibrium price lies above the firm’s average cost curve, basic 
principles of profit maximization suggest that the firm will increase its 
production until marginal cost equals the equilibrium price.  To the extent that 
the equilibrium price exceeds the firm’s average costs at the level of 
production chosen by a particular firm, the firm may earn some economic 
profits in the short run.  In the absence of any barriers to entry, the presence of 
these economic profits eventually attracts other producers into the market.  The 
arrival of these new producers causes the market supply curve to shift outward, 
which in turn causes the equilibrium price to drop.  Such entry occurs until the 
firms participating in the industry no longer earn any profits.  When this point 
is reached, all firms produce where average cost is at its minimum.11 
2. The Welfare Characteristics of the Equilibrium Under Perfect 
Competition 
The long-run equilibrium under perfect competition has a number of 
socially beneficial characteristics that have particular significance for the 
analysis presented in this Article.  The first is the manner in which the 
equilibrium maximizes both productive and allocative efficiency.  Productive 
efficiency is achieved when a particular good is produced using the fewest 
resources.  Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing goods are 
allocated to those buyers who value them the most (i.e., are willing to pay the 
most for them).12  Because both of these approaches take the goods to be 
produced as given and simply focus on the proper distribution of the goods on 
both the supply side and demand side respectively, they can both be subsumed 
within the concept of static efficiency. 
 
 11 Conversely, if the price established by the interaction of supply and demand causes the incumbent 
firms to lose money (i.e., if equilibrium price falls below average cost), one would expect firms to exit the 
market.  This in turn causes the supply curve to shift backward and the equilibrium price to rise until it allows 
the firms participating in the market to cover their average costs.  Again, this occurs at the point where average 
costs are the lowest, which is the point that maximizes allocative efficiency. 
 12 For an accessible discussion of the difference between productive and allocative efficiency, see Joseph 
F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Process, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025-27 (1987). 
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Because the long-run equilibrium occurs at the point that minimizes the 
average costs of each firm, perfectly competitive markets can be said to 
achieve productive efficiency.  In addition, the equilibrium under perfect 
competition also maximizes allocative efficiency by allowing sales to every 
consumer who would derive net benefits from doing so (i.e., whenever the 
benefits that they would derive from consuming the good would equal or 
exceed the costs of producing an additional unit of the good).  It should be 
noted that this allocative efficiency requires that firms set price along the 
marginal cost curve, which in turn requires that the firms’ marginal revenue 
curve coincide with a horizontal line positioned at the equilibrium price.  In 
other words, firms must be price takers.  If that is not true, marginal revenue 
will no longer accurately reflect the benefits to the marginal consumer.  As a 
result, the price mechanism will not bring the marginal benefits to consumers 
and the marginal costs of producers into balance. 
The absence of supra-competitive profits over the long run is also 
significant.  As discussed above,13 the absence of profits follows directly from 
the assumption that there are no barriers to entry.  So long as that is the case, 
free entry by new competitors dissipates any supra-competitive profits that 
may exist in the short run.  Because both the long-run and short-run equilibria 
occur at a point on or above the average cost curve, it is necessarily true that 
the equilibrium price will be sufficient for producing firms to cover both their 
fixed and variable costs. 
Finally, the equilibrium maximizes both consumer and total surplus.  Con-
sumer surplus is created whenever consumers find bargains.  It is the excess 
value that they are able to enjoy whenever the price they actually pay falls be-
low the maximum price they would be willing to pay (called their “reservation 
price”).  Conversely, producer surplus is the excess value enjoyed by producers 
whenever they are able to sell their products at prices that exceed their costs of 
producing the product.  The sum of the value created for both consumers and 
producers (i.e., consumer surplus + producer surplus) is called the total surplus. 
Because firms in perfectly competitive markets compete solely on the basis 
of price, some form of surplus represents an appropriate welfare criterion for 
perfectly competitive markets.  There is considerable disagreement, however, 
 
 13 See supra p. 1590. 
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over whether the goals of competition policy should be defined in terms of 
total surplus (which would focus on the net benefits to all of society) or 
consumer surplus (which would focus on the net benefits to consumers).  
Economists generally view the maximization of total surplus as the preferred 
measure of economic performance.14  Under this perspective, generation of the 
highest level of social benefits that could possibly be created by a particular 
product is all that matters.  Although transfer of surplus from consumers to 
producers may have important distributional consequences,15 it has no impact 
on efficiency.16  Other commentators have argued that the competition policy 
should maximize consumer welfare.17  The debate between these two measures 
of welfare remains unresolved.18  In fact, one can find authority supporting 
either perspective.19 
The equilibrium reached under perfect competition obviates the need to 
resolve this dispute.  By setting price and quantity at the point where the 
demand and supply curves intersect, the equilibrium simultaneously allows 
every consumer who would derive net benefits from consuming a product and 
every producer who would derive net benefits from producing a product to do 
so.  As a result it maximizes both consumer and total surplus.  Producing at 
any quantity less than the equilibrium quantity would reduce consumer surplus 
by preventing some consumers from purchasing the product even though they 
would derive net benefits from doing so.  In addition, it would reduce producer 
 
 14 See, e.g., Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 104; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust De-
fense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
 15 In asserting that wealth transfers are competitively neutral, I follow the Marshallian tradition of hold-
ing income effects constant.  I recognize that acknowledging income effects may give wealth transfers greater 
significance from a welfare standpoint.  For a useful discussion comparing these two approaches, see HAL 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160-68 (3d ed. 1992). 
 16 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 24-25 (3d ed. 1990); Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and Telecommu-
nications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 33 (1999); 
Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, ANTITRUST, Summer 
1997, at 12, 14. 
 17 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
 18 See Brian A. Facey et al., The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Right, ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 
70, 70 & n.2 (noting the debate between consumer and total surplus perspectives); Mark R. Patterson, Coer-
cion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 41 n.186 
(1997) (same). 
 19 See Werden, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting the existence of cases supporting the use of total surplus 
while also noting that the 1997 revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines leaned toward consumer surplus). 
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surplus by preventing some producers from selling their products 
notwithstanding the existence of unsatisfied buyers willing to purchase them.  
Together these reductions in surplus are known as “deadweight loss.” 
B. Nonrivalry and the Economics of Public Goods 
The model of perfect competition sketched above is firmly ensconced as 
the foundation of economic analysis.  It is, however, based on a number of 
assumptions that tend not to hold in many real-world markets.  One key feature 
for our purposes is that perfect competition theory fails to provide a useful 
model for products that exhibit the characteristics of a public good, the analysis 
of which is most strongly associated with the work of Nobel Laureate Paul 
Samuelson.20 
1. The Definition of a Public Good 
The most common definition of a public good posits that public goods 
possess two distinctive qualities: the “lack of excludability,” which occurs 
when producers cannot restrict the benefits provided by their products only to 
those consumers who are willing to pay for them, and the “lack of rivalry,” 
which occurs when consumption by one person does not subtract from the 
supply available for consumption by others.21  One oft-cited example of a 
public good is national defense, which is simultaneously nonexcludable, in that 
national defense cannot be provided to one household without also providing it 
to all others in the same geographic area, and nonrivalrous, in that one 
 
 20 Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 335-36 
(1958) [hereinafter Samuelson, Aspects]; Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955) [hereinafter Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition]; Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) [hereinafter 
Samuelson, Pure Theory].  For a useful overview of public good economics, see William H. Oakland, Theory 
of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 486 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1987).  For a more extended and technical treatment, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY 
OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996). 
 21 The concepts of nonrivalry and nonexcludability appear as distinct concepts in Samuelson’s work.  
Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335.  This terminology appears to originate with R.A. Musgrave, 
Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS 124, 126 (Julius Margolis & Henri Guitton eds., 1969).  It 
now appears in many textbooks on microeconomics, public economics, and law and economics.  See, e.g., 
DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 749 (2002); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42, 106, 126 (3d ed. 2000); CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 20, at 8-9; ROBERT 
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 638 (1989); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 87, 99-103 (1986). 
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household can enjoy the benefits provided by the protection without affecting 
the ability of any neighboring household to do so as well.22  Another 
commonly cited example are lighthouses, which are said to be nonexcludable, 
in that it is impossible to provide the services of the lighthouse to one ship 
without providing it to all, and nonrivalrous, in that consumption of the 
warning services by one ship has no effect on the availability of warning 
services to other ships.23 
Theoretical developments since that time have placed increasing pressure 
on this classic definition of a pure public good.  Although nonexcludability 
does tend to give rise to the collective action problems associated with free 
riding,24 the seminal works by Ronald Coase25 and Garrett Hardin26 suggest 
that the government could eliminate many of these problems through the use of 
well defined property rights rather than through more intrusive forms of 
regulatory intervention.27  As a result, a number of public good theorists have 
questioned whether nonexcludability is a necessary part of the definition of a 
public good.28  Indeed, Samuelson himself suggested as much.29 
 
 22 See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 638; STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 100, 102; 
Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 334. 
 23 See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (3d 
ed. 2000); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 159 n.1 (6th ed. 1964); STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 102.  For a 
classic critique of the lighthouse as an example of the need for government intervention, see Ronald H. Coase, 
The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974), reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 32-
48 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002).  See also David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse: 
“Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1993). 
 24 In fact, many microeconomic texts discuss public goods solely in terms of the problems associated 
with free riding.  See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 362 (1995); PINDYCK & 
RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 641. 
 25 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Coase, supra note 23, 
at 375 (recounting the history of private provision of lighthouses in Great Britain in which government 
involvement was limited to the establishment and enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse). 
 26 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 27 James M. Buchanan & Milton Z. Kafoglis, A Note on Public Goods Supply, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 403 
(1963); see also SHMANSKE, supra note 7, at 17-20 (observing that many public goods are in fact excludable 
and that property rights can often be developed to solve nonexcludability problems).  It should be noted that 
situations involving goods that create negative externalities are not necessarily symmetrical with situations 
involving goods that create positive externalities, because it is difficult to conceive of a legal regime that 
would give the recipient of the external benefit the legal right to force the person creating the benefit to in-
crease consumption of the activity that generates the external benefits.  Oakland, supra note 20, at 513. 
 28 See, e.g., SHMANSKE, supra note 7, at 7; David J. Brennan, Fair Price and Public Goods: A Theory of 
Value Applied to Retransmission, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 347, 350 (2002); J.G. Head, Public Goods and 
Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197, 215 (1962); Oakland, supra note 20, at 487. 
 29 SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335. 
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It is thus far from clear whether nonexclusion can be properly regarded as 
an essential part of the theory of public goods.  Fortunately, the argument 
presented in this Article does not depend upon resolution of this dispute, as it is 
the economic implications stemming from the lack of rivalry that carry the 
greatest implications for television. 
2. Static Efficiency and Declining Average Costs 
The lack of rivalry changes the cost structure of public goods in ways that 
cause market outcomes to deviate significantly from the results indicated by 
the standard model of perfect competition.  As noted earlier,30 the cost curves 
for firms engaged in perfect competition are U-shaped, as depicted in Figures 1 
and 2, in that they initially slope downward before eventually sloping upward.  
Once the average cost curve begins sloping upward, it necessarily lies below 
the marginal cost curve, and any firm setting price along the marginal cost 
curve necessarily generates sufficient revenue to break even. 
A different situation obtains when goods are nonrivalrous.  Because 
consumption by one person does not affect the supply available for 
consumption by others, providing the product to an additional person does not 
cause variable costs to increase.  Under such conditions, variable costs have no 
effect on marginal cost whatsoever, and the sole determinant of marginal cost 
is the amortization of fixed costs.  As a result, the classic analyses of public 
goods assumed that the variable costs of producing another unit of output are 
zero and constant.31  This assumption does not reduce the generality of the 
analysis, as cases involving pure nonrivalry have been shown to be 
indistinguishable from cases when marginal costs are nonzero so long as they 
are sufficiently small relative to fixed cost.32 
 
 30 See supra pp. 1588-90. 
 31 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-
Samuelson Debate, 10 J.L. & ECON. 193, 195 (1967); Head, supra note 28, at 213; Jora R. Minasian, Televi-
sion Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J.L. & ECON. 71, 74 (1964); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 
20, at 335. 
 32 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
301-02 (rev. ed. 1988). 
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Figure 3 
Efficient Pricing of a Nonrival Product 
This causes average cost to decline across all volumes, as the fixed costs 
are amortized over increasingly large volumes.33  The presence of constantly 
declining average costs carries with it two relevant implications.  First, it 
creates inexhaustible economies of scale that naturally lead nonrival goods to 
seek the broadest market possible.34  Indeed, if the product is a uniform 
commodity, the presence of constantly declining average costs inevitably leads 
markets involving nonrival goods to become natural monopolies,35 making it 
 
 33 See Head, supra note 28, at 211-15; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335. 
 34 See BAKER, supra note 7, at 226. 
 35 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 47 (1982); SHMANSKE, supra 
note 7, at 26-27, 193 n.5 (collecting sources); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 311, 411 (1997); Head, supra note 28, at 211-15; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also 
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 20, at 348-49 (noting that for pure public goods, “[t]he entire population is in 
a single provision association”); Dagobert L. Brito & William H. Oakland, On the Monopolistic Provision of 
Excludable Public Goods, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1980) (noting that “scale economies in . . . production 
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appropriate to model demand,36 average cost, and marginal cost at the industry 
level.  In addition, any attempt to limit the size of the market that any firm can 
reach can only serve to force production below equilibrium levels.  This has 
the inevitable effect of making the products sold by that firm more expensive.  
It also increases the minimum volume needed for the firm to be viable. 
Second, the fact that the average cost curve slopes downward throughout 
its entire range gives rise to an intractable pricing problem.  Recall that pricing 
along the marginal cost curve represents one of the basic criteria for 
maximizing allocative efficiency.37  The problem stems from the fact that the 
marginal cost curve always lies below the average cost curve.  As a result, 
marginal cost pricing is economically infeasible, because any price set along 
the marginal cost curve will not allow the firm to cover its costs.  Indeed, if 
marginal costs are zero as suggested by public goods theory and depicted in 
Figure 3, pricing along the marginal cost curve would lead firms to charge 
nothing at all for their products.38  Although this price would maximize 
allocative efficiency by allowing every person who would derive net benefits 
from consuming a product to do so, it would also prevent the producer from 
generating any revenue whatsoever.  Consequently, the producers would be 
unable to recover the fixed costs needed to create their products in the first 
place.39 
Allowing producers of nonrivalrous goods to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover fixed costs necessarily requires permitting them to charge a positive 
price for their products.  If left to their own devices, producing firms will act as 
monopolists and produce at the level where marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, as depicted in Figure 4.40  Unfortunately, charging a positive price creates 
 
as well as a uniqueness arising because of locational considerations” would lead the provision of many public 
goods “[i]f left in the private sector . . . to be characterized by monopoly elements”). 
 36 As a technical matter, it would be more accurate to represent consumer-side effects with a marginal 
rate of substitution curve (MRS) rather than a demand curve.  Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra 
note 20, at 353-54.  The eventual integration of this model with monopolistic competition theory obviates the 
need to parse the similarities and differences between these two types of curves. 
 37 See supra p. 1591. 
 38 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also BAKER, supra note 7, at 9. 
 39 These polar cases provide a particularly effective illustration of the pricing problem.  That said, the 
basic problem is general and is not limited to these restrictive assumptions.  So long as average cost is decreas-
ing, the average cost curve will lie above the marginal cost curve even if marginal cost is nonconstant and 
nonzero.  As a result, marginal cost pricing will be impossible.  See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 32, at 18-22. 
 40 For a more detailed discussion of monopoly pricing, see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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deadweight loss by denying some consumers access to the product even though 
the benefits that they would derive from consuming it would exceed the 
marginal cost of allowing them to do so.  Moreover, to the extent that 
equilibrium price exceeds average cost, it permits the producing firm to earn 
supra-competitive profits.  The natural monopoly characteristics created by a 
downward sloping average cost curve dictate that such profits would be 
sustainable over the long run. 
Figure 4 
Monopoly Pricing of a Nonrival, Differentiated Product 
Consumer surplus would be maximized and profits would be eliminated if 
regulators were to turn to the device usually employed in declining-cost 
industries and require that prices be set along the average cost curve.  This 
approach would also reduce, but not eliminate, deadweight loss.  The fact that 
the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve prevents its complete 
elimination. 
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Figure 5 
Regulated Pricing of a Nonrival, Differentiated Product 
The basic principle of marginal cost pricing thus suggests that any price 
charged for a nonrival good is too high from the standpoint of allocative or 
static efficiency. 
3. The Unresolved Conundrum of Dynamic Efficiency 
Taken to its logical extreme, this line of reasoning suggests that the optimal 
policy from the standpoint of static efficiency would be for the nonrival good 
to be priced at marginal cost (i.e., at zero).  The resulting revenue shortfall 
could be covered through a system of publicly financed subsidies41 of the type 
first conceived by Pigou.42 
 
 41 See, e.g., SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1; Brennan, supra note 28, at 351; Samuelson, Aspects, 
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This analysis has been criticized for begging an important question: by 
taking the existing supply of nonrival goods as given and simply focusing on 
the most efficient way to produce and allocate that good, it fails to provide an 
endogenous basis for determining which and how many goods should be 
produced in the first place.43  In other words, setting price as close to marginal 
cost as possible maximizes static efficiency without shedding any light on 
considerations of dynamic efficiency. 
The suggestion that the government could use subsidies to determine which 
goods should be produced is similarly problematic.  What would make sense is 
to calibrate the subsidy to reflect the aggregation of individuals’ preferences 
for the public good.  The problem is that any system of taxation that is 
calibrated in such a manner will itself create substantial distortions.44  
Furthermore, as Samuelson himself recognized, calibration of such a subsidy 
would require the government to obtain accurate information about the utility 
that every person would derive from every possible product.45  Such a task has 
been criticized as insuperable even with respect to rivalrous goods.  Both tasks 
become even more intractable when nonrivalrous goods are involved, because 
the possibility that another consumer might fund the fixed costs needed to 
create the good makes it even less likely that any consumer would accurately 
reveal his or her true preferences.46 
 
supra note 20, at 335-36; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 122.  Samuelson later emphasized that he was sim-
ply using the example to illustrate the intractability of the pricing problem and did not intend to suggest that 
was the preferred policy outcome.  Paul A. Samuelson, Public Goods and Subscription TV: Correction of the 
Record, 7 J.L. & ECON. 81, 81-82 (1964). 
 42 A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 30-34 (3d ed. 1947). 
 43 Minasian, supra note 31, at 73, 79; see also Brennan, supra note 28, at 354-55 (noting Samuelson’s 
tendency to focus on static efficiency at the expense of dynamic efficiency); Janusz Ordover & William Bau-
mol, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries, 4 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 13, 14, 32 (1988) (noting 
the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency). 
 44 See A.B. Atkinson & N.H. Stern, Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 119 
(1974); Joseph E. Stiglitz & P.S. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency, 38 
REV. ECON. STUD. 151 (1971).  See generally Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal 
Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 21, at 61 (reviewing the literature). 
 45 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 336. 
 46 Head, supra note 28, at 208-09; Oakland, supra note 20, at 513-14, 520; Samuelson, Aspects, supra 
note 20, at 336; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 20, at 355; Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra 
note 20, at 389.  Demsetz challenged this conclusion by arguing that consumers of nonrivalrous goods are no 
less likely to disclose their preferences accurately than are consumers of rivalrous goods.  Harold Demsetz, 
The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 299, 303-04 (1970).  Subsequent experimental 
work has confirmed that the free riding predicted by the theory does in fact occur, although at lower levels 
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C. Product Differentiation and the Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
One can resolve this unanswered question of dynamic efficiency by 
integrating public good economics with the insights of another intriguing and 
unusual approach to economic analysis known as “monopolistic 
competition.”47  First advanced by Edward Chamberlin48 and extended by 
subsequent scholars, including most notably by Avinash Dixit, Joseph Stiglitz, 
and Michael Spence,49 monopolistic competition retains the key assumptions 
of the standard model of perfect competition while relaxing the assumption 
that all products are undifferentiated.50  Relaxation of this assumption allows 
 
than might have been expected.  See generally DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 317-80 (1993) (reviewing this literature); John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experi-
mental Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 
1995) (same). 
 47 For an excellent survey of the literature on monopolistic competition, see Curtis Eaton & Richard G. 
Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 728-34, 759-65 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).  Useful discussions of monopolistic competition theory can be 
found in most leading textbooks on microeconomics and industrial organization.  See, e.g., BESANKO & 
BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 584-89; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 23, at 201-15; JEFFREY CHURCH & 
ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 369-76 (2000); CLEMENT G. KROUSE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS 128-32, 179-80, 198-214 (1990); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 421-26; JEAN TIROLE, 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 298-300 (1988); HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 92-
98 (2d ed. 1984). 
 48 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9; see also JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT 
COMPETITION (1933) (offering a similar analysis). 
 49 See Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 
67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 
407, 408 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product Differentiation]; Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed 
Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 234 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product 
Selection]. 
 50 It should be noted that monopolistic competition theory represents only one of several established 
methods for analyzing competition among differentiated products.  Another line of economic research has built 
on a seminal article authored by Harold Hotelling to offer models in which producers compete by positioning 
their products at particular locations in a product space.  See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 
ECON. J. 41 (1929).  Two lines of commentary have emerged applying these principles to television 
programming.  The better established of the two limited the product space by dividing various television 
stations into pre-identified categories of program formats.  This greatly simplified the welfare calculus by 
allowing it to be determined by voting.  See, e.g., Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices 
in Television Markets, 91 Q.J. ECON 15 (1977); Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the 
Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).  A second line employed 
models that allowed particular programs to vary across the product space in a manner more consistent with 
Hotelling’s original conception.  See, e.g., Harold J. Barnett & Edward Greenberg, TV Program Diversity—
New Evidence and Old Theories, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 89 (1971); Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice 
Model of Broadcasting, 55 PUB. CHOICE 163 (1987); Alessandro Vaglio, A Model of the Audience for TV 
Broadcasting: Implications for Advertising Competition and Regulation, 42 INT’L REV. ECON. & BUS. 33 
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monopolistic competition to explore the effect of a ubiquitous feature of our 
economy.  For example, cars come in a wide range of styles and combine 
features in ways that are not immediately comparable.  Restaurants vary 
widely in terms of cuisine, pricing, atmosphere, service, and quality.  Even 
different brands of commodities such as bread, soap, and soft drinks differ in 
ways that lead people to prefer particular brands over others. 
Allowing for the possibility of product differentiation changes the 
economic analysis in profound ways.  What is most interesting for our 
purposes is the ease with which the insights of monopolistic competition can 
be combined with those of public good economics.  The resulting combination 
offers a unified framework that permits a richer understanding of the 
economics underlying products exhibiting both of these qualities.  In addition, 
the combined framework yields a possible resolution to the conflict between 
static and dynamic efficiency that proved intractable under public goods 
theory. 
1. Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition 
Under Chamberlin’s classic formulation, all products in a monopolistically 
competitive industry serve as imperfect substitutes in equal competition with 
one another.  The fact that the substitution among these products is imperfect 
allows individual firms to raise their prices without losing all of their sales to 
their rivals.  As a result, product differentiation prevents the market from 
devolving into a natural monopoly just because average costs are decreasing.  
The differences in customer preferences can allow multiple declining cost 
firms to survive by targeting different segments of the overall customer base.51 
 
(1995); David Waterman, Diversity and Quality of Information Products in a Monopolistically Competitive 
Industry, 4 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 291 (1990); Steven S. Wildman, A Note on Measuring Surplus Attributable 
to Differentiated Products, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 123 (1984).  The difficulty of integrating these analyses into a 
framework that also reflects public good economics has led me to rely on monopolistic competition theory as 
the method for modeling competition between differentiated products.  I do not mean to suggest that I regard 
spatial models as unimportant.  On the contrary, it is my hope to offer a more comprehensive analysis of these 
models in later work.  For my initial thoughts on the first of these two lines of scholarship, see Christopher S. 
Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1936-42 (2000). 
 51 Edward Chamberlin’s work provides the seminal analysis of how competition among differentiated 
products can yield an equilibrium in which multiple declining-cost firms exist.  See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 
9.  See also WILLIAM F. BAXTER ET AL., RETAIL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 101-20 (1977).  For 
applications of this principle to the television industry, see BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO 
TELEVISION 32 (1999), and Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic 
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Product differentiation also causes the equilibrium to deviate from the equi-
librium reached under perfect competition in a number of interesting ways.  
These deviations result from the fact that firms selling differentiated products 
are no longer price takers who face perfectly elastic (i.e., horizontal) demand 
and marginal revenue curves.  Instead they possess some degree of power over 
price, with the extent of that power determined by the degree of substitutability 
among the products. 
Figure 6 
Short Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition 
 
Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1355-56, 1368-70 (1986).  This is the 
supply-side analog to the manner in which customer heterogeneity can mitigate the demand-side economies of 
scale resulting from network economic effects.  See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization and 
Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network 
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 106 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice 
Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 (1996).  See generally Daniel F. Spulber & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885  
(2003) (discussing this literature); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New 
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 272, 280-81 (2002) (same). 
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The fact that monopolistically competitive firms each face downward 
sloping demand curves indicates that equilibrium price and quantity are 
modeled at the firm, rather than the industry, level.  It also causes the marginal 
revenue curve for firms selling differentiated products to lie somewhere below 
the demand curve.  The intuition underlying this result is quite simple.  A firm 
that already is charging the maximum possible for a given level of production 
can only attract new customers by lowering its price.  If the firm could offer 
the lower price only to new customers without also having to offer that price to 
its existing customers, the marginal revenue curve would coincide with the 
demand curve over the relevant range.  However, most firms have trouble 
reducing prices for new customers without also reducing prices for their 
existing customers.  Any revenue gained by moving farther down the demand 
curve must be offset by the revenue lost by giving the lower price to existing 
customers.  If that is the case, the marginal revenue curve is represented by the 
demand curve minus the revenue lost by offering the price reduction to the 
existing customers.52  This causes the marginal revenue curve to lie below the 
demand curve.53 
Like any firm seeking to maximize its profits, a firm selling a differentiated 
product  increases its production until the marginal revenue it obtains from 
selling an additional unit no longer exceeds the marginal cost of producing the 
additional unit (i.e., where the marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal 
cost curve).  Having identified the profit maximizing level of production, the 
firm then charges the maximum that it can receive for that quantity, which is 
represented by where that quantity falls along the demand curve faced by that 
firm.  Because the price charged by the firm is not set along the marginal cost 
curve, monopolistic competition necessarily gives rise to some degree of 
deadweight loss. 
 
 52 This analysis changes somewhat if the firm is able to lower the prices charged to customers who place 
a lower value on the product without offering the same price discount to all of its customers, including those 
who value the product the most highly.  I discuss below the effect that price discrimination can have on the 
analysis infra Part I.E. 
 53 In fact, when the demand function for a particular product is linear, the marginal revenue curve is 
represented by a straight line with twice the slope of the demand curve intersecting the vertical axis at the same 
point as the demand curve.  See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 16, at 21 n.13 (offering a simple proof of this 
relationship). 
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Figure 7 
Long-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition 
One of the distinctive features of the short-run equilibrium is that some 
firms engaged in monopolistic competition can earn supra-competitive profits 
in the short run, in the event that the demand curve facing the firm lies above 
the average cost curve (depicted by the shaded area in Figure 7).  The 
possibility of free entry posited under monopolistic competition ensures that 
any such profits should not persist in the long run.  As was the case under the 
standard model of perfect competition,54 the presence of supra-competitive 
profits attracts entry by new firms.  Because the classic model of monopolistic 
competition presumes that firms are in equal competition with one another, 
entry by new firms affects incumbents symmetrically and causes their demand 
 
 54 See supra p. 1590. 
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curves to shift backwards uniformly until the demand curve is tangent to the 
average cost curve.55 
Because the principle of diminishing marginal returns requires that the 
demand curve be downward sloping, this long-run equilibrium necessarily 
occurs where the average cost curve is also downward sloping and above the 
marginal cost curve.  As a result, the seminal analyses of classic 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition have assumed that marginal costs are 
constant, which increases mathematical tractability without losing the key 
characteristics of both the average and marginal cost curves.56  This renders the 
shape of the cost curves contained in the key monopolistic competition models 
identical in shape to the cost curves for nonrival goods.  This simplifying 
assumption does not cause any loss of generality because the important aspects 
of the monopolistic competition equilibrium would remain unchanged even if 
the marginal cost curve were assumed to have the more typical U-shape.57 
Another key difference between the equilibrium reached under 
monopolistic competition and the equilibrium reached under public good 
economics is the absence of supra-competitive profits.  Unlike under public 
good economics, the fact that products produced by different firms are 
imperfect rather than perfect substitutes allows additional firms to enter the 
market.  As was the case under perfect competition,58 such entry will occur 
until all supra-competitive profits are dissipated. 
There are, however, a couple of noteworthy caveats to the zero-profit result 
under monopolistic competition.  The first occurs when firms must incur a 
large, indivisible fixed cost to enter the market.  The “lumpiness” caused by 
large fixed costs can give rise to what has become known as the “integer 
problem,” in which n firms might earn small profits while n+1 firms would run 
losses.  In such cases, the equilibrium would consist of n firms each earning 
 
 55 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 83-85.  Interestingly, contestability theory suggests that actual 
entry need not occur for prices to remain at competitive levels.  So long as entry and exit are easy, potential 
competition can discipline price just as effectively as actual competition.  See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 32, 
at 288-301. 
 56 See, e.g., Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 299; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 
411. 
 57 CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 23, at 208; see also Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, 
at 409 (using the constantly declining cost case as analogous to the decreasing average cost equilibrium under 
monopolistic competition). 
 58 See supra pp. 1590-91. 
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some degree of sustainable profits.  If n is sufficiently large, any such profits 
would be relatively small.59 
The zero-profit result also depends in large part on the symmetry 
assumption, which posits that the differentiated product offered by any 
particular firm is engaged in equal competition with all similar products 
offered by other firms.60  The symmetry assumption thus ensures that new 
entrants will take business equally from all of the incumbent firms until no 
firm earns profits.61  Although such an assumption may be appealing when 
product differentiation is spurious, such as might occur if created by brand-
image advertising, it is less appealing when product differentiation results from 
real differences in product attributes.62  When the latter is the case, one would 
expect that some products would serve as better substitutes than others.  As a 
result, it may be more realistic to assume that a new entrant will not take 
business equally from all incumbent firms, but will instead compete more with 
some businesses than others.  Under this view, each product can be conceived 
as occupying a certain position along a scale, with any particular product 
participating more with those products that are close by and less with those that 
are farther off.63  In this way, asymmetric preferences create the possibility of 
the emergence of localized competition, which in turn gives rise to the 
possibility that the integer problem could arise with respect to subsegments of 
the market rather than just with respect to the market as a whole.  This could 
result in the emergence of “overlapping oligopolies” each earning supra-
competitive profits that entry by new firms is unable to dissipate.64 
 
 59 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 733-34, 749.  The seminal statement was offered by Nicholas 
Kaldor, Market Imperfections and Excess Capacity, 2 ECONOMICA 33, 42-43 (1935). 
 60 The seminal analysis was again offered by Kaldor, supra note 59, at 38-39.  Chamberlin ultimately 
accepted this criticism.  Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition Revisited, 18 ECONOMICA 343 
(1951). 
 61 See supra pp. 1590-91. 
 62 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 734. 
 63 Kaldor, supra note 59, at 38.  This approach is similar to the location models mentioned above, supra 
note 50. 
 64 G.C. Archibald et al., Address Models of Value Theory, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
MARKET STRUCTURE 3, 29 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); Kaldor, supra note 59, at 
39.  Note that this approach does not allow for the type of clean segregation that would justify treating any one 
segment of the overall range of product offerings as a discrete market.  This is because, although relaxation of 
the symmetry assumption does suggest that products compete more strongly with their near neighbors, it does 
presume that a weaker form of competition will continue to exist with their more distant neighbors.  It is this 
overlapping nature of localized competition that inhibits treating each segment as a separate market.  The 
extent to which this is true will depend on the degree of product differentiation. 
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There are, however, considerations that mitigate some of the concerns 
associated with the existence of sustainable profits.  Such profits would be 
minimized in “large economies,” in which each subsegment of the overall 
market is populated by a relatively large number of firms.  When this occurs, 
each subsegment is sufficiently competitive to drop any profits to de minimis 
levels and to drive prices fairly close to marginal cost.  The sustainability of 
profits thus depends on the factors that tend to make economies large, i.e., 
relatively weak product differentiation and fixed costs that are small relative to 
the overall size of the market.65 
2. Static Efficiency and the Proper Allocation of Goods That Are Produced 
Given the similarity of the relevant demand and cost curves, it should come 
as no surprise that goods in monopolistic competition experience the same 
types of allocative inefficiency as that associated with public goods.  Like 
nonrival goods, monopolistically competitive goods face downward sloping 
demand curves, albeit for different reasons.66  Because such firms tend to set 
price above marginal cost, they will inevitably incur some degree of 
deadweight loss.  If the number of firms is sufficiently numerous, the demand 
curve facing each firm should be relatively flat and the deadweight losses 
relatively small. 
Monopolistic competition also gives rise to productive efficiency loss.  As 
noted earlier, monopolistically competitive markets reach long-term 
equilibrium at the point where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost 
curve.  The fact that the principle of diminishing marginal returns requires that 
the demand curve be downward sloping necessarily implies that this 
equilibrium will occur where the average cost curve is downward sloping as 
 
 65 Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities, 46 
REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1979); Larry E. Jones, The Efficiency of Monopolistically Competitive Equilibria in 
Large Economies: Commodity Differentiation with Gross Substitutes, 41 J. ECON. THEORY 356 (1987); see 
also B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16 
RAND J. ECON. 282 (1985) (deriving similar results in a spatial competition model in the tradition of 
Hotelling). 
 66 The presence of constantly decreasing average costs inevitably causes markets for nonrival goods to 
become natural monopolies that, like any monopoly, have power over price.  See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text.  In the case of monopolistic competition, the downward slope of the demand curve results 
from the assumption that all competing products serve as imperfect rather than perfect substitutes for one 
another.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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well.  Thus, unlike perfectly competitive markets, which reach long-term 
equilibrium at the point at which average costs are minimized, 
monopolistically competitive markets do not minimize average cost.67  This 
indicates the presence of unexploited gains from trade that would allow the 
same products to be produced with fewer resources if the total number of firms 
were reduced and the firms that remained in the market expanded production.68  
As a result, many theorists have concluded that monopolistically competitive 
industries operate with “excess capacity” stimulated by excess entry.69  Any 
attempt to restrict the size of the market commanded by any particular firm 
would only cause these inefficiencies to worsen. 
In addition, the fact that monopolistically competitive markets reach 
equilibrium on the declining portion of the average cost curve gives rise to the 
same pricing problem identified with respect to nonrival goods.70  Because the 
presence of declining average costs necessarily implies that the marginal cost 
curve lies below the average cost curve, any price that maximizes total surplus 
would necessarily prevent the producing firm from covering its costs.  
Conversely, any price that allows the firm to break even would necessarily 
impose some degree of deadweight loss.71 
3. Dynamic Efficiency and the Number of Goods Produced 
As noted earlier,72 the key problem associated with the analysis of 
deadweight loss and marginal cost pricing is that it focuses solely on static 
efficiency without taking dynamic efficiency into account.  By taking the 
existence of the relevant goods as given and focusing on the proper allocation 
of those goods, this approach fails to provide a way to determine the amount of 
resources that should be devoted to the production of the goods in the first 
place.  The perspective of monopolistic competition allows a particularly 
 
 67 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 104-10. 
 68 The situation is somewhat different for nonrival goods.  Because the cost curves for monopolistically 
competitive firms are U-shaped, producing at minimum average cost is feasible.  The fact that the average cost 
curves associated with nonrival goods are constantly declining makes such an outcome impossible.  In 
addition, the fact that nonrival goods tend to be natural monopolies eliminates any possibility of gains from 
trade resulting from having one firm benefit another firm by reducing production. 
 69 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 104-10. 
 70 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 71 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408-09. 
 72 See supra Part I.B.3. 
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insightful characterization of this concern.  In recognizing that each product 
can in essence constitute its own market, monopolistic competition implicitly 
recognizes that more than one way exists to increase total surplus.  Not only 
can surplus increase through the reduction of deadweight loss with respect to 
any one product; it can also increase through the creation of additional 
products. 
In addition to providing a useful way to reconceptualize this problem, at-
tempts by monopolistic competition theorists to solve the problem of optimal 
diversity offer a potential metric for measuring dynamic efficiency.  The 
maximization of total surplus requires the production of a product whenever 
the total benefits created by it exceed the total costs needed to produce it.  The 
total benefit created by any one product is represented by the area under the 
demand curve that it faces.  In the case of nonrival goods, marginal cost is 
zero, and the only relevant costs are the fixed costs associated with producing 
the good.  Therefore, subject to an important caveat that will be discussed 
later,73 the maximization of total surplus requires that a good be produced 
whenever the area under the demand curve exceeds the fixed costs associated 
with production.  Monopolistic competition theorists have pointed out that this 
condition would be satisfied in equilibrium if each firm were able to capture 
the entire surplus created by the goods it produces.  Any slippage in the firm’s 
ability to capture the entire surplus causes some number of surplus-enhancing 
products not to be produced.74  The smaller the proportion of the total surplus 
captured by producers, the more severe this effect becomes. 
The point can be illustrated with the following example.  Assume the 
existence of two products that each create $10 million in benefits.  The first 
would require the incurrence of $3 million in fixed costs, and the second would 
require the incurrence of $6 million in fixed costs.  Assume further that, in 
accordance with Samuelson’s vision, the unit price is set relatively close to 
marginal cost so that the product generates only $1 million in revenue.  From 
the standpoint of maximizing total surplus, society would be better off if both 
of these products were created, because the total benefits associated with 
 
 73 See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
 74 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 407-08; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, 
at 218-20, 224, 230; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 110-11; see also Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 297; 
Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, Product Differentiation, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 
12 BELL J. ECON. 217, 226 (1981). 
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creating each would exceed the costs of doing so.  Because the $1 million in 
revenue captured by the producer is insufficient to cover fixed costs associated 
with creating either product, neither will be produced despite the fact that 
production of each one would be socially beneficial. 
The situation changes if the firm is allowed to set prices so that it 
maximizes its own profits.  Assuming linear demand and zero marginal costs, 
the producing firm is able to capture half of the total benefits created by its 
product.  In that event, each product could generate $5 million in revenue.  
This would be sufficient to cover the $3 million in fixed costs needed to 
produce the first product, and therefore, the first product would be produced.  
The $5 million in revenue would be insufficient to cover the $6 million needed 
to produce the second product.  This second product will not be created unless 
the producer is able to capture at least sixty percent of the total benefits 
created.75 
The severity of this effect is thus likely to weigh particularly heavily 
against products with high fixed costs, because the presence of such costs 
increases the proportion of the total surplus that must be captured if the product 
is to break even.76  It also appears that this effect will have a particularly strong 
impact on products with steep inverse demand functions.77  As Figure 8 
illustrates,78 producers of products that face demand curves that are convex to 
the origin are able to capture a smaller percentage of the total surplus than are 
producers of products facing demand curves that are concave to the origin, 
even when the total benefits created by each product are identical.  Because 
these products are typically those whose benefits are concentrated in a 
 
 75 This example reveals the flaw with the regulated pricing solution depicted in Figure 5.  Maximizing 
consumer surplus inevitably reduces the amount of surplus appropriated by producers.  Thus, although it 
promotes static efficiency, it detracts from dynamic efficiency and reduces the total variety of products further 
below optimum. 
 76 Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 224. 
 77 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 409-10; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, 
at 224, 230; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 111-12; see also Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 307 
(identifying the same effect and arguing that it explains why the market is biased against opera relative to 
football). 
 78 Figure 8 is adapted from BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 112 figs.4.5 & 
4.6 (1992), and Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 409 fig.1. 
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relatively small group of consumers with particularly intense preferences, these 
products have been dubbed “special interest” or “minority taste” products.79 
Figure 8 
Bias Against Special Interest Products 
Put another way, producers are unable to appropriate two different types of 
surplus.  The first is the triangular-shaped area located to the right of the pro-
ducer surplus, which represents the deadweight loss identified by the previous 
discussion of nonrival goods.  The second is the triangular-shaped area located 
above the producer surplus, which represents the amount of the surplus cur-
rently captured by consumers. 
Conceiving the problem in this manner reveals how dynamic efficiency dif-
fers from static efficiency.  Static efficiency would be satisfied as long as the 
 
 79 See Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 111-12; see also Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, 
at 410; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 225. 
Q (units)
P ($/unit)
D
Q (units)
P ($/unit)
PPC
PS
PPC
PS D
MC MC
   
1614 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
deadweight loss were eliminated.  It does not matter if it were appropriated by 
either producers or consumers.  It also does not matter if consumers retain the 
surplus represented by the triangular-shaped area above the producer surplus.  
Dynamic efficiency similarly requires the elimination of deadweight loss.  The 
key difference is that it requires producers, not consumers, to be the ones to 
appropriate the surplus generated through the elimination of deadweight loss.  
It also requires that the surplus represented by the triangular-shaped area above 
the producer surplus currently captured by consumers be transferred to produc-
ers.  Anything less would leave the producer unable to appropriate part of the 
surplus created by its products and would cause a surplus-increasing product 
not to be created. 
This result differs profoundly from the situation that obtains under perfect 
competition.  Because perfectly competitive markets reach equilibrium at a 
point where the average cost curve is nondecreasing, policymakers need not 
concern themselves with whether producers capture enough surplus to cover 
their fixed costs of production.80  Under perfect competition, the transfer of 
surplus from consumers to producers has no impact on total surplus.81  In 
contrast, when markets reach equilibrium on the downward sloping portion of 
the average cost curves, as occurs under monopolistic competition and in the 
case of nonrivalrous goods, transfer of surplus from consumers to producers is 
far from immaterial.  It instead becomes a necessary condition for promoting 
dynamic efficiency.82  In addition, it lacks even distributional consequences in 
the long run, because free entry will dissipate any profits that initially accrue to 
the producer.  Any rents initially captured by producers will eventually accrue 
to the benefit of consumers in the form of increased product diversity. 
Interestingly, there is another consideration that tends to mitigate any 
shortfall resulting from the producers’ inability to appropriate the entire 
surplus.  The argument that an additional product should be created whenever 
the total surplus it creates exceeds the fixed costs associated with creating it 
implicitly presupposes that the entire surplus captured by the new entrant 
consists of incremental surplus generated by consumers who were not 
 
 80 See supra p. 1588. 
 81 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 82 For a related argument, see Steven S. Wildman & Bruce M. Owen, Program Competition, Diversity, 
and Multichannel Bundling in the New Video Industry, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION 244, 266 (Eli M. Noam 
ed., 1985). 
 
2003] RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION 1615 
previously purchasing other products.  It is quite possible, however, that some 
of the surplus captured by the new product will not result from attracting new 
customers into the market, but rather from stealing customers from incumbent 
producers.  To the extent that the surplus captured by the new entrant results 
from the transfer of surplus from other firms already in the market, it does not 
represent an increase in total surplus, but rather simply a transfer of surplus 
from one producer to another.  The problem is that firms seeking to maximize 
profits will enter without regard for whether the surplus results from 
incremental sales or mere cannibalization.83  The inability to distinguish 
between the two causes some entry to be profitable even when the addition of 
another product does not generate sufficient benefits to cover the additional 
fixed costs.  The result is the stimulation of excess entry, which in turn causes 
the wasteful incurrence of fixed costs.84 
The balance between these two forces is well illustrated by a metaphor 
coined by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence, who suggested that a 
monopolistically competitive industry could be analogized to a pie.85  
Introduction of a new product simultaneously expands the pie and causes it to 
be sliced into more pieces, with the addition of a slice creating additional costs 
(i.e., the fixed costs of creating a new product).  The desirability of adding a 
slice depends on whether the increase in the size of the pie exceeds the costs of 
adding the slice. 
The dynamic efficiency of the monopolistic equilibrium thus depends on a 
balance of two opposing factors.  On the one hand, the producers’ inability to 
capture the entire surplus tends to cause products not to be produced even 
when doing so would increase total surplus.  On the other hand, the fact that 
the surplus captured by any one firm includes both incremental surplus 
generated by new sales and surplus cannibalized from other suppliers tends to 
encourage excess entry.86  Whether the total number of products offered 
 
 83 Koenker & Perry, supra note 74, at 226-27; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410; 
Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 230-31.  This tendency is illustrated even more clearly by spatial 
competition models.  For an overview, see Yoo, supra note 50, at 1936-42. 
 84 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 
230-31.  This provides an analytical explanation for the excess capacity result noted above.  See supra note 69 
and accompanying text.  It also corresponds to the analysis of differentiated public goods that are subject to 
congestion.  See Oakland, supra note 20, at 504-05. 
 85 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410. 
 86 Interestingly, a person who values diversity for its own sake would not be concerned by this tradeoff.  
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exceeds or falls short of surplus-maximizing levels cannot be determined a 
priori.87  The most that can be said is that the market tends to provide too much 
product diversity when product differentiation is weak relative to scale 
economies and too little when the opposite is true.88  Whether there is too 
much or too little product diversity is ultimately determined, as an empirical 
matter, by which of these two effects dominates. 
D. The Complexity of the Welfare Tradeoffs 
The foregoing discussion has led a number of scholars to frame the welfare 
analysis of nonrival goods as a conflict between static and dynamic 
efficiency.89  Static efficiency concerns about setting price at marginal cost 
counsel in favor of lowering price as close to zero as possible.  Dynamic 
efficiency concerns about the appropriation of total surplus point in the other 
direction and instead support allowing producers to increase prices until they 
maximize their profits.  To these scholars, the policy decision is a simple 
matter of calibrating price so that it balances these two irreconcilable 
considerations.  If they have drawn any conclusions at all, they have simply 
suggested that to the extent that dynamic efficiency gains can be sustained 
indefinitely, the powers of compounding strongly suggest that long-run 
dynamic considerations should dominate any short-run static ones.90 
 
Diversity would be maximized by allowing the producer to capture the entirety of the surplus.  Although this 
would cause efficiency losses resulting from excessive duplication of fixed costs, such a consideration would 
give a person who wanted to promote diversity simpliciter little pause. 
 87 G.C. Archibald, Chamberlin Versus Chicago, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 6-14 (1961); see also Eaton & 
Lipsey, supra note 47, at 751. 
 88 Koenker & Perry, supra note 74, at 226-27; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408, 
410-13; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 233-34. 
 89 Brennan, supra note 28, at 355; Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43, at 14, 32; Gideon Parchomovsky & 
Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1500-01 
(2002); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1018 (1987). 
 90 Brennan, supra note 28, at 355; Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43, at 14, 32; see also 3 PHILLIP 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720a, at 255 & n.3 (2d ed. 2000); Phillip Areeda, 
Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make It?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 29, 31 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (1962); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in 
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 119, 122; Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price 
Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 
112 YALE L.J. 681, 781 (2003); Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse 
Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 485 (1985). 
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Although this would appear to be a fairly straightforward tradeoff, upon 
closer inspection it becomes clear that the proper welfare calculus is somewhat 
more involved.  When the possibility of cannibalization is acknowledged, the 
implications for dynamic efficiency become ambiguous, because it is equally 
possible that the number of products produced in equilibrium will either 
exceed or fall short of the optimum. 
In addition, determining the welfare implications for differentiated products 
is considerably more complicated than determining the welfare implications 
under perfect competition.  When products are undifferentiated, firms can only 
compete in terms of price and quantity.  As a result, the welfare calculus is 
relatively simple and focuses solely on the extent to which the price charged 
diverges from buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices as reflected in total 
surplus.  Allowing for product differentiation adds an additional level of 
complexity to the welfare calculus.  In such a world, firms also compete in 
terms of how close a particular product comes to an individual consumer’s 
ideal combination of product attributes, which is a factor that is not represented 
in the conventional two-dimensional space of price and quantity depicted in the 
figures above. 
It thus remains possible that any reductions in total surplus resulting from 
inefficient pricing may be offset in whole or in part by welfare gains derived 
from satisfying consumers’ taste for variety and vice versa.  Consequently, 
modern theorists have largely abandoned the simplistic conclusions that argued 
that the excess capacity and deadweight loss endemic to monopolistic 
competition indicated that such markets were inherently inefficient.91  Instead, 
modern scholars have now acknowledged that any welfare implications are 
ambiguous and that losses may or may not be offset in whole or in part by 
welfare gains derived by the availability of a wider range of products.92  Most 
analyses stop short of resolving the issue, however.  Determining whether the 
equilibrium configuration maximizes welfare would require a welfare function 
that identifies the relative utility that individuals derive from each dimension of 
 
 91 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 92 See Robert L. Bishop, Monopolistic Competition and Welfare Economics, in MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION THEORY: STUDIES IN IMPACT 251 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967); Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, 
at 301-02; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 411.  For an application of this argument to 
television programming, see Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 110-13. 
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competition.  Needless to say, an infinite number of such functions can be 
derived that would support any number of conclusions. 
Fortunately, monopolistic competition theory makes it possible to combine 
both static and dynamic efficiency concerns into a single, total surplus 
calculation that represents a useful proxy for total welfare.  Indeed, if utility is 
linear in the composite commodity, maximization of welfare and maximization 
of total surplus are one and the same.93  Even more interestingly, monopolistic 
competition theory suggests the existence of a policy instrument that can 
address the problems of both static and dynamic efficiency simultaneously.  
The skeleton key that promises to unlock both of these contradictory forces is 
one of the classic solutions to both deadweight loss and nonappropriability: 
price discrimination. 
E. Price Discrimination as a Way to Maximize Both Static and Dynamic 
Efficiency 
The use of a device known as price discrimination may allow markets to 
increase static and dynamic efficiency simultaneously.  In many cases, 
producers can only employ linear, single-part pricing in which every potential 
consumer is offered the same price.  Under price discrimination, producers use 
multi-part pricing to charge different prices to different consumers.  One of the 
most familiar examples of price discrimination occurs when airlines charge 
different amounts to various passengers flying in the same class of service.  It 
functions by identifying passengers who are likely to be more price-sensitive 
(such as vacation travelers) and charging them less, while identifying other 
passengers who are likely to be less price-sensitive (such as business travelers) 
and charging them more. 
Ever since the pioneering work of A.C. Pigou94 and Joan Robinson,95 
policymakers and regulatory authorities have viewed price discrimination with 
considerable suspicion, regarding it as evidence of market power.96  
 
 93 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 729 (citing Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408-
09). 
 94 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932). 
 95 ROBINSON, supra note 48. 
 96 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 498-99 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977); 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD 
F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 5.14, at 342 (1978).  For an example applying this reasoning to the television 
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Monopolistic competition reveals that such concerns may well be overstated.  
The power over price necessary to support price discrimination may simply 
reflect the fact that the relevant market involves differentiated products, 
because all products competing within such markets face downward sloping 
demand curves even when confronted with competition.97  Furthermore, the 
ability to price discriminate may simply reflect the existence of joint costs 
shared among different purchasers that are inevitable when consumption is 
nonrival.98 
The model developed in this Article offers another reason for adopting a 
more hospitable stance toward price discrimination.  When single-part pricing 
is the only policy option available, static and dynamic efficiency become 
opposing considerations that must be traded off.  Price discrimination can 
obviate the need to mediate the conflict between these two competing forces.  
Far from being an indicator of anticompetitive behavior, price discrimination 
may be a necessary condition for the maximization of total surplus. 
 
industry, see Harry Boadwee, Note, Product Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
1210, 1219-25 (1986). 
 97 The seminal contribution on competitive price discrimination is Daniel F. Spulber, Non-Cooperative 
Equilibrium with Price Discriminating Firms, 4 ECON. LETTERS 221 (1979).  For subsequent work, see 
DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 544-48 (1989); Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 
Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J. ECON. 579 (2001); Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in 
Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON. 380, 381, 394 (1985); Kenneth S. Corts, Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment, 29 RAND J. ECON. 306 (1998); 
Peter C. Coyte & C. Robin Lindsey, Spatial Monopoly and Spatial Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part 
Pricing, 55 ECONOMICA 461 (1988); Thomas J. Holmes, The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in 
Oligopoly, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 244 (1989); Michael L. Katz, Price Discrimination and Monopolistic 
Competition, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1453 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis 
After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 74-78 & nn.59-60 (1993); Daniel F. Spulber, Competition and 
Multiplant Monopoly with Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 25 INT’L ECON. REV. 425 (1984); Daniel F. Spulber, 
Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1981); and Lars Stole, Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly, 4 
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 529 (1995).  For recent surveys, see Elhauge, supra note 90, at 732-43, and 
LARS A. STOLE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS (Univ. of Chi. Grad. Sch. of Bus. 
Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2001) (forthcoming in the new HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION), available 
at http://gsblas.uchicago.edu/papers/hio.html.  For discussions in the context of antitrust law, see Symposium 
on Competitive Price Discrimination, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (2003). 
 98 When joint costs are being divided among multiple purchasers, it is rational for a producer to take into 
account different purchasers’ price elasticities when setting prices, thereby reflecting the same considerations 
that go into Ramsey and Lindahl pricing.  See Demsetz, supra note 46, at 301-02; Michael E. Levine, Price 
Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2002).  But see Paul A. Samuelson, Contrast 
Between Welfare Conditions for Joint Supply and for Public Goods, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 26, 26 (1969) 
(arguing that the theory of public goods was analogous to the theory of joint production). 
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1. Perfect Price Discrimination 
To see how price discrimination helps maximize total surplus, it is 
important to recall that any single-part pricing scheme (such as the one 
depicted in Figure 9) necessarily gives rise to two forms of efficiency loss.  
The first is the impairment of static efficiency represented by the market’s 
failure to cover the triangular area located to the right of the producer surplus.  
Because neither producers nor consumers are able to capture this surplus, it is 
properly regarded as a deadweight loss.  The second is the impairment of 
dynamic efficiency associated with the producers’ inability to capture the 
consumer surplus represented by the triangular area in the upper corner of the 
demand curve. 
Figure 9 
Single-Part Pricing of Nonrivalrous Product Under 
Monopolistic Competition 
The ideal case is known as perfect, or first-degree, price discrimination.  
Under perfect price discrimination, the producer is able to charge each 
consumer the maximum that consumer is willing to pay.  Figure 10 illustrates 
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how perfect price discrimination would simultaneously solve the problems 
associated with static and dynamic efficiency.99  It would promote static 
efficiency by eliminating the deadweight loss in the lower right corner of the 
area under the demand curve.  By allowing firms to charge each customer the 
absolute maximum amount that they would be willing to pay, the firm is able 
to offer lower prices to new customers without having to suffer the decrease in 
revenue associated with offering the same discount to its existing customer 
base.  As a result, the firm is able to expand its production until every person 
who values the product more than marginal cost is able to consume it.100 
Figure 10 
Perfect Price Discrimination 
 
 99 Note that the graphical representation is identical to Figure 4, except that producers rather than con-
sumers capture the entire surplus. 
 100 See Buchanan, supra note 31, at 195; Demsetz, supra note 46, at 301-03; Spence & Owen, supra note 
7, at 121-22; Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods, 50 REV. ECON. 
STAT. 1, 3-5 (1968). 
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At the same time, perfect price discrimination allows producing firms to 
appropriate the surplus located in the upper corner under the demand curve that 
was previously captured by consumers.  Because perfect price discrimination 
allows producers to capture the entire surplus, there is no slippage between the 
total benefits created by the product and the revenue available to cover the 
fixed costs associated with creating it.101  Perfect price discrimination also 
eliminates the bias against special interest goods with steep inverse demand 
functions.102 
Stated in terms of the numerical example discussed above,103 assume that a 
range of products exists that each generates $10 million in benefits and that 
requires anywhere from $1 to just under $10 million in fixed costs to create.  
The principles of surplus maximization would imply that society would be 
better off if all of these products were produced.  As noted earlier, a firm 
facing a linear demand employing single-part pricing would only be able to 
capture fifty percent of the total surplus created by its product.  As a result, 
every product that costs more than $5 million to create would not exist even 
though producing them would increase total surplus.  The situation changes if 
the producer can use multi-part pricing to increase the proportion of the total 
surplus that it captures.  The degree of slippage will be reduced, but not 
eliminated, if price discrimination allows it to capture seventy-five percent of 
the total surplus, because doing so would allow all products that cost less than 
$7.5 million to be produced, but would still exclude those products that cost 
between $7.5 million and $10 million.  Only if producers are able to employ 
perfect price discrimination to capture the entire surplus created by their 
products would every surplus-enhancing product be created. 
2. Imperfect Price Discrimination 
Perfect price discrimination would thus appear to be a panacea designed to 
cure the reductions in total surplus identified above (subject to the caveat 
discussed above of the possibility of excess entry induced by 
cannibalization).104  The problem is that perfect price discrimination is a 
practical impossibility.  It requires knowing the maximum amount each 
 
 101 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 218-20. 
 102 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra pp. 1611-12. 
 104 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
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consumer would be willing to pay for the product, which is information that 
would be impossible to ascertain accurately.105  Perfect price discrimination 
becomes even more problematic when nonrivalrous goods are involved.  
Because viewers realize that, once created, the programming can be provided 
to everyone without incurring any additional costs, they have no incentive to 
give anyone an accurate indication of their true preferences in the hope that 
some other person would be willing to finance the first copy costs.106 
As a result, producers who seek to mitigate welfare losses in this manner 
must resort to some form of imperfect price discrimination that, while unable 
to extract the maximum price from each and every customer, is able to sort 
customers into groups that place different values on the products and to charge 
higher prices to those groups who place a higher value on the goods.107 
Imperfect price discrimination can reduce the efficiency losses caused by 
deadweight loss by making it possible for the producer to expand production 
by offering discounts to some consumers who would not purchase the product 
at the price the producer would charge were it limited to charging a single 
price.  Admittedly, it is theoretically possible that imperfect price 
discrimination would cause the deadweight loss to grow by causing overall 
production to decrease.108  The general consensus is that imperfect price 
discrimination is more likely to have the former effect than the latter.109 
 
 105 See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10 J.L. & ECON. 199, 201, 203 
(1967). 
 106 Demsetz, supra note 46, at 303; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 334, 336; Samuelson, supra 
note 105, at 201, 203-04; Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 20, at 388-89. 
 107 The classic analysis offered by Pigou divides imperfect price discrimination into two classes.  In 
second-degree price discrimination, the producer holds out certain purchase options designed to appeal 
differently to different classes of customers and allows customers’ individual purchasing decisions to sort 
themselves into the appropriate group.  The key element in second-degree price discrimination is that all 
buyers have the opportunity to purchase in any of the available options.  In third-degree price discrimination, 
the producer again holds out certain purchase options, but instead only makes one option available to any 
particular purchaser.  As a result, that buyer has the choice of purchasing the proffered option or forgoing 
purchasing altogether.  See PIGOU, supra note 94, at 275-89. 
 108 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz, Non-Uniform Pricing, Output and Welfare Under Monopoly, 50 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 37, 51 (1983); Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1981); Jun-ji Shih et al., A General Analysis of the 
Output Effect Under Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 98 ECON. J. 149, 152-54 (1988). 
 109 See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 241 (8th ed. 1987); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 16, 
at 495. 
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Figure 11 
Imperfect Price Discrimination 
Placed in the concrete context of the airline example discussed above,110 
the airlines’ ability to use the Saturday-night stay requirement to distinguish 
price-sensitive leisure travelers from price-insensitive business travelers can 
help reduce the deadweight loss associated with nonmarginal cost pricing.  It 
brings the airlines’ output closer to efficient levels by allowing them to offer to 
the former group fares that are closer to marginal cost without having to suffer 
the decrease in revenue that would result from having to offer the same 
discount to the latter group as well.  The result is that price discrimination 
allows flights to carry more passengers.  This has the effect of allowing a 
greater percentage of the passengers who would derive net benefits from taking 
the flight to do so.  This brings output closer to surplus-maximizing levels, 
 
 110 See supra p. 1619. 
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which in turn allows the creation of additional flights that would not otherwise 
exist.111 
To the extent that it also allows producers to raise prices for infra-marginal 
customers, imperfect price discrimination will also reduce the reductions in 
total surplus caused by the producing firm’s inability to appropriate the entire 
surplus created by its product.  The net effect would be to increase both static 
and dynamic efficiency.  The bias against special interest goods112 would still 
exist, although it would be substantially mitigated. 
Thus, far from being an indicator of a policy problem in need of redress, 
price discrimination can help bring the total number and distribution of goods 
produced closer to the optimum in terms of both static and dynamic 
efficiency.113  By definition, however, imperfect price discrimination does not 
allow producers to capture the entire surplus created by their products.  This 
will be offset to some degree by the tendency toward excess entry stimulated 
by the fact that some of the surplus captured is simply the transfer of surplus 
from other producers rather than incremental surplus generated by sales to new 
customers.114 
 
 111 It should be noted, however, that there is one way in which the airline example deviates from the 
model developed in this Article.  In contravention of the free-entry assumption embodied in monopolistic 
competition, the lack of availability of airport landing slots can make the addition of new flights expensive or 
impossible.  This in turn changes the equilibrium in ways that allow the existing firms to earn supra-
competitive profits and to operate at different points along the average cost curve than permitted under 
monopolistic competition.  The airline example is thus offered only to illustrate how charging different prices 
to different groups of customers can allow producers to capture a greater percentage of the surplus. 
 112 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 218-20. 
 114 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.  Not everyone supports the idea of making it easier for 
television providers to price discriminate.  For example, although C. Edwin Baker recognizes that facilitating 
price discrimination promises to improve economic welfare, he warns that it will benefit those media most 
susceptible to price discrimination, such as television, to the relative detriment of those media which are less 
susceptible to price discrimination, such as print.  BAKER, supra note 7, at 37-40.  I find Baker’s worries to be 
unfounded.  The fact that print may not benefit from price discrimination to the same extent as television does 
not provide a justification for refusing to use all the available means for improving the efficiency of television.  
Even if the effects are uneven across media, facilitating price discrimination still creates economic benefits 
with respect to television while simultaneously reducing the magnitude of the regulatory intervention with 
respect to print.   
Baker suggests that the differential impact of price discrimination nonetheless remains a concern 
because the increased efficiency of television will allow it to crowd out print.  Id. at 38.  This argument 
necessarily presumes that newspapers and television serve as substitutes for one another and that consumers 
will not respond to the relative changes in price by increasing or decreasing their purchases of any other goods.  
The problem is that courts that have considered the issue have typically not regarded television and print to be 
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3. Price Discrimination and Free Entry 
Application of price discrimination in the context of monopolistic 
competition does raise an interesting theoretical conundrum.  Specifically, the 
free-entry assumption embodied in the classic model of monopolistic 
competition poses serious questions about the sustainability of any price 
discrimination scheme.  If free entry is possible, it is likely that other firms will 
enter and offer products that will destroy the market power that is necessary for 
any system of price discrimination to work.  The resulting competition for 
those customers threatens to destroy the ability to capture surplus by creating 
price competition that beats price down to marginal cost. 
The solution to this conundrum lies with the relaxation of the assumption 
that products are homogenous.  As noted earlier,115 introducing product 
differentiation can give each firm power over price sufficient to price 
discriminate.  This is particularly the case if one relaxes the symmetry 
assumption and allows for the possibility that differentiated products compete 
more strongly with some products than with others.116 
 
substitutes for one another.  See H. Peter Nesvold, Note, Communication Breakdown: Developing an Antitrust 
Model for Multimedia Mergers and Acquisitions, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 781, 824-31 
(1996) (collecting cases).  This perspective is echoed in the complaints appearing in the literature that 
consumers rely almost entirely on television as their sole source of information, which suggests that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to induce them to turn to other sources.  See Owen Fiss, The Censorship of 
Television, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1215, 1216-17 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 499, 529-31 (2000). 
It should be acknowledged, however, that the FCC has at times suggested that newspapers may act as 
substitutes for television.  See, e.g., Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations 
Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 217-20          
¶¶ 123-28 (1985); Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, & 73.636] of the 
Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, Report and 
Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 25-27 ¶¶ 25-30, 54 ¶ 108 (1984); Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, & 73.636 of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM & Television Broad. Stations, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 387 ¶ 45 (1983); see also Nesvold, supra, at 841 (noting that the 
Justice Department has argued that newspapers and television serve as substitutes for one another). 
To the extent that this is true, it would substantially weaken the argument for intervention, since anyone 
unable to obtain carriage via television should have available a large number of other effective media options.  
In addition, because consumers purchase a wide range of products beyond print and television, the tangential 
effects resulting from the greater efficiency of television markets would be dispersed over a broader range of 
purchasing decisions rather than being concentrated in the print industry. 
 115 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 116 Borenstein, supra note 97, at 380, 387-89, 394. 
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*  *  * 
The overall thrust of these results is profound.  It transforms the 
fundamental policy problem from a world in which static and dynamic 
efficiency must be traded off one against the other into one in which 
simultaneous promotion of both metrics of efficiency is possible.  Unlike under 
perfect competition, the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers is 
anything but neutral.  On the contrary, some degree of transfer appears to be a 
necessary condition for efficiency.  Furthermore, such transfers do not raise the 
distributional concerns that occur in other contexts.  This is because free entry 
will dissipate any supra-competitive profits earned by producers.  Indeed, over 
the long run the existence of such profits will eventually accrue to the benefit 
of consumers in the form of increased product variety. 
There are admittedly a number of considerations that may cause the 
resulting equilibrium to fall short of the optimum.  Some productive 
inefficiency inevitably results from the fact that the equilibrium under 
monopolistic competition does not minimize average cost.  The deadweight 
losses that follow from the fact that demand is downward sloping make some 
degree of allocative inefficiency endemic.  To the extent that fixed costs are 
high and product differentiation is strong, some firms may be able to earn 
sustainable profits, which in turn will create some degree of static inefficiency 
as price is forced farther from marginal cost.  The impossibility of perfect price 
discrimination suggests that there may be some tendency toward systematic 
underproduction.  At the same time, the fact that the surplus captured by a new 
entrant may include business cannibalized from existing producers can impair 
dynamic efficiency by inducing excess entry.  How close it will come to the 
optimum is an empirical question that depends on the structure of demand, the 
relative efficacy of the mechanism for price discrimination, the magnitude of 
the fixed costs, and the degree of product differentiation.  The ultimate 
resolution of the policy issue will thus depend upon a second-best comparison 
of the outcome under the approach I am suggesting and the outcome that will 
result under the other possible solutions to the problem.  As we shall see, the 
available empirical evidence suggests that the approach I am proposing will 
come closer to the efficient solution than the alternative institutional solutions 
embodied in current television policy. 
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II. APPLYING PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
TO TELEVISION PROGRAMMING 
The integrated model that I have developed thus offers the promise of 
reconciling the divergent efficiency considerations that other analyses have 
found so insoluble.  This Part will examine the fit between the model and the 
market for television programming.  Section A will examine how well 
television programming fits with the definition of nonrival good.117  Section B 
will evaluate the fit between the market for television programming and 
monopolistic competition.  Section C modifies the classic approach taken in 
these analyses by arguing in favor of using networks rather than individual 
programs as the proper unit of analysis. 
A. Television Programming as a Nonrival Good 
As Samuelson noted, at first blush television programming appears to 
represent a classic example of a public good.118  As is the case with any 
information good, the production of television programming requires the 
incurrence of significant up-front, fixed costs (often termed “first copy costs”).  
In addition, once those first copy costs have been incurred, the costs associated 
with transmitting the program to viewers approach zero and do not vary with 
audience size.  The combination of positive fixed costs and zero marginal costs 
thus gives television programming all of the characteristics of a nonrival good.  
It is of no consequence that eighty-five percent of U.S. households receive 
their television programming via cable, DBS, or some other multi-channel 
video program distributor (MVPD) technology that is fully excludable.119  Nor 
 
 117 For preliminary discussions of this effect, see Yoo, supra note 51, at 213-17, 232-37; Christopher S. 
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 247, 
275-77 (2003). 
 118 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335.  For other scholars identifying television programming as a 
nonrival good, see, for example, BAKER, supra note 7, at 8-10; BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 
749-50; STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 22, 25, 164 (1984); BRUCE M. OWEN, 
ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 18-20 (1975); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 23-38, 131-
35; Buchanan, supra note 31; Demsetz, supra note 46; Jora R. Minasian, Public Goods in Theory and Practice 
Revisited, 10 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1967); Minasian, supra note 31, at 74; and Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43, 
at 14 n.4. 
 119 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,975, app. B, tbl.B-1 (2002) [hereinafter Ninth 
Annual Report on Television Competition]. 
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does it matter that the development of scrambling technology has even 
rendered broadcast television programming fully excludable.120  As noted 
above,121 the relevant features of this analysis do not turn on the ability or 
inability to exclude anyone from the benefits of any product.  The mere fact 
that television programming is nonrival in consumption is sufficient by itself to 
bring it into conformity with the analysis I am advancing.122 
The classic solution to the problem of lack of rivalry discussed above 
combines pricing the product at zero and having the government make a direct 
payment to the producer of the nonrival good sufficient to fund its creation.123  
The interesting wrinkle with respect to television is the availability of over-the-
air broadcasting as a means for distribution.  The availability of this option 
created the possibility that much of the funding might be provided by 
advertising revenue.  This would allow television programs to continue to be 
efficiently priced while possibly obviating the need for subsidies. 
This section evaluates the extent to which advertising support represents an 
efficient solution to the problems of nonrivalry.  Subsection 1 examines the 
extent to which advertising-supported television is in fact efficiently priced.  
Subsection 2 explores whether the marginal costs of producing an additional 
unit of television programming are really zero. 
1. The Problem of Equating Advertising Support with Efficient Pricing 
Samuelson’s case in favor of advertising-supported television hinges on the 
assertion that advertising-supported television allows for first-best pricing from 
the standpoint of static efficiency.  As discussed above,124 this follows from the 
 
 120 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also, e.g., BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 
750; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 638; Head, supra note 28, at 207.  It should be noted that some 
commentators have focused on noneconomic externalities.  They in turn argue that the fact that television 
programming creates benefits to the democratic process that are not fully captured by viewers leads to the 
systematic underproduction of certain types of programming.  BAKER, supra note 7, at 41-62; SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 6, at 19-20, 73-74.  Discussion of these arguments exceeds the scope of this Article.  For my critique of 
attempts to justify the regulation of television in terms of its impact on the democratic process, see Yoo, supra 
note 117, at 306-46. 
 121 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
 122 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1. 
 123 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 124 See supra pp. 1588-89. 
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basic allocative principle that price should be equated with marginal cost.  A 
closer inspection reveals reasons to question the accuracy of this assertion. 
As noted earlier, previous analyses posited that advertising-supported 
television was “free” and thus avoided the deadweight loss associated with 
charging a positive price.  Upon further inquiry, it is far from clear that this 
claim is true.  On the contrary, there are two countervailing considerations that 
raise serious doubts as to whether advertising-supported television is in fact 
efficiently priced.  On the one hand, these analyses failed to take into account 
that advertising-supported television is not “free,” because the audience must 
in effect pay for programming through willingness to watch advertisements.125  
Although such transactions obviously do not involve cash payments, a more 
comprehensive economic analysis would treat the imposition of advertising as 
endogenous to the model and regard the nuisance aspects of advertising as 
extracting an implicit price from viewers that can create deadweight loss.126  
On the other hand, advertising contains content that may have beneficial value 
that is distinct from the program itself,127 demonstrated most dramatically by 
the existence of infomercials and home shopping networks, which in essence 
constitute programming devoted entirely to advertising.128  The fact that 
advertising can create benefits as well as extract implicit prices makes the 
effective price associated with advertising support ambiguous.  It may be too 
high or too low.  Only in the unlikely event that these two effects exactly offset 
each other would it be proper to regard advertising-supported television as 
efficiently priced. 
 
 125 There is another way that “free” television is not truly free.  The broadcast industry’s ability to offer its 
programs without exacting direct payments is the direct product of the regulatory decision not to require tele-
vision stations to pay for their spectrum, because without such an arrangement it is unlikely that advertising 
support would be sufficient to cover all of the expenses.  As I will discuss later, dedicating this spectrum to 
broadcasting has the secondary effect of making other spectrum-based technologies more expensive.  In a real 
sense, then, viewers pay for free television indirectly by facing higher prices for cellular telephony and other 
spectrum-based technologies.  See infra Part IV. 
 126 For examples of more recent analyses that attempt to incorporate direct cash payments and the implicit 
price associated with advertising support into a single, integrated pricing model, see Suchan Chae & Daniel 
Flores, Broadcasting Versus Narrowcasting, 10 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 41, 45-46 (1998); Claus Thustrup 
Hansen & Søren Kyhl, Pay-Per-View Broadcasting of Outstanding Events: Consequences of a Ban, 19 INT’L 
J. INDUS. ORG. 589, 590 (2001); and Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 264-72. 
 127 See Chae & Flores, supra note 126, at 52-53 (recognizing that advertising provides benefits to viewers 
at the same time that its nuisance value exacts an implicit price). 
 128 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 
135 (1994). 
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As a result, the policy choice between advertising-supported and pay 
television is more properly framed not as a choice between first-best, efficient 
pricing and second-best, inefficient pricing, but rather as a choice between 
second-best pricing schemes.  In addition, acknowledging that both 
mechanisms potentially involve second-best pricing arrangements allows for 
consideration of mixed regimes in which the networks generate revenue 
through both advertising and direct payments.129  Taking all of these 
complexities into account reveals the latent ambiguities lurking beneath the 
tidy logic supposedly supporting exclusive reliance on advertising support.  In 
fact, once all of these considerations are taken into account, it becomes 
theoretically conceivable that reliance on advertising support could lead to too 
much program diversity as well as too little.130 
2. The Dangers of Assuming That Marginal Costs Are Zero 
Equally questionable is Samuelson’s assumption that the marginal cost of 
distributing television programming to additional viewers is zero.  Such an 
assumption should be approached with some caution, because positing 
constant marginal costs makes the economies of scale inexhaustible.  As a 
result, unless this assumption is empirically valid, the constantly decreasing 
average costs may be nothing more than an artifact of the assumptions built 
into the model. 
A closer analysis provides good reason to question this assumption.  It 
appears to have been based on the fact that the costs incurred by a local 
broadcast station were constant regardless of whether the audience consisted of 
one hundred or one hundred thousand viewers.  It does not necessarily hold 
with respect to cable, because the extension of cable to additional households 
does require the incurrence of significant costs.  In addition, this reasoning 
ignores the fact that television distribution takes place in two stages, not one.  
Specifically, transmitting television programming requires that programs be 
transmitted from the network to the local broadcast affiliate or cable headend 
 
 129 See id. at 54-55; Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 253-55.  The possibility is also mentioned 
without much elaboration in Minasian, supra note 31, at 77, and Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 124. 
 130 See SIMON P. ANDERSON & STEPHEN COATE, MARKET PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE OF 
BROADCASTING 3, 6, 16-19 (NBER Working Paper 7513, Jan. 2000) (offering a formal model indicating that 
reliance on advertising support may lead to too much as well as too little program diversity), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513. 
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before it can be transmitted to homes.  When this initial distribution stage was 
accomplished through microwave relay systems, it was difficult to argue that 
the marginal cost of conveying television programming to additional viewers 
was in fact zero.  Rather, it would be more appropriate to view the cost 
function as a step function, in which no costs are associated with adding a 
single marginal viewer, but substantial costs may be involved in adding a block 
of viewers. 
Technological developments have largely mitigated both of these concerns.  
First, the buildout of the cable infrastructure is now largely complete, with 
cable now passing over ninety-seven percent of all U.S. television 
households.131  This has caused the marginal costs associated with adding an 
additional viewer to drop precipitously.132  In addition, satellites have replaced 
microwave relay systems as the primary means for distributing programs from 
networks to local broadcast stations and cable headends.133  Because satellites 
tend to be able to reach relatively large geographic areas without any 
appreciable increase in cost, the shift to satellite distribution effectively 
eliminates the marginal costs associated with the two-stage transmission of 
television programming. 
In any event, the possibility that marginal costs may be nonzero does not 
substantially change the results.  As noted earlier,134 the same analysis applies 
without loss of generality so long as marginal costs remain below average 
costs.  The available empirical evidence indicates that that tends to be the case 
for television.135 
 
 131 See Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,910 ¶ 19, 26,911 tbl.1 
(2002).  The FCC noted that the manner in which this number is calculated is not without controversy and 
cautioned that it is more reliable as a trend indicator than as an absolute assessment.  Even under the more 
conservative measures, cable still passes over seventy-eight percent of U.S. households.  Id. at 26,910 ¶ 17. 
 132 Hazlett, supra note 51, at 1348 (citing Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 
126 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 133 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 10; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 20, 54, 197. 
 134 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Bruce M. Owen & Peter R. Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Television 
Franchising, 4 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 69, 76-78 (1986) (reporting empirical results indicating that marginal 
costs fall below average costs); see also DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN 
CABLE TELEVISION 61 (1997) (reporting estimates that in 1992 programming costs represented seventy-four 
percent of cable networks’ total operating expenditures). 
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B. The Applicability of Monopolistic Competition Theory to Television 
Television programming would also seem to make a good fit with 
monopolistic competition theory.  Indeed, so good is the fit that Spence’s 
seminal analysis invited readers to regard it as a particularly trenchant example 
of a monopolistically competitive good.136  Spence subsequently joined with 
Bruce Owen, who is perhaps the leading authority on the economics of the 
television industry, to offer some initial thoughts applying monopolistic 
competition to the television industry.  Although Spence and Owen were able 
to offer some initial analyses of the welfare impact of their theories,137 they 
never empirically validated the applicability of their models to television, nor 
did they explore the relative efficacy of the various means of price 
discrimination available to the television industry.  A reexamination and 
extension of their work thus seems to be in order. 
The relevant products are clearly differentiated.  Although there is some 
degree of substitution among programs, viewers do not regard them as perfect 
substitutes for one another and clearly have preferences for some programs 
over others.  In addition, the substitution appears to be driven more by real 
differences in product attributes than by spurious product differences.  
Consequently, it appears more appropriate to analyze this market through the 
lens of the localized competition associated with asymmetric substitution than 
that of the equal competition associated with the symmetry assumption. 
For the most part, moreover, the market for television programming also 
satisfies the requirement of monopolistic competition theory that entry by new 
products be relatively easy, although this observation is subject to a caveat.  As 
I have laid out in more detail elsewhere,138 the television programming 
 
 136 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408; see also Spence, Product Selection, supra note 
49, at 234 (drawing conclusions under monopolistic competition theory with respect to television); Spence & 
Owen, supra note 7, at 106 (noting that “study of program selection under pay TV is formally 
indistinguishable from the analysis of product selection under monopolistic competition”).  C. Edwin Baker 
also invokes monopolistic competition as a concept.  A close inspection suggests that his work really focuses 
on the decreasing cost structure caused by the lack of rivalry rather than product differentiation, in which 
decreasing costs are a result of the model rather than an assumption.  See BAKER, supra note 7, at 9-10, 22-24, 
222-26. 
 137 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 411-13; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 118-19. 
 138 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 182-83, 220-21.  For related arguments, see JONATHAN LEVY & FLORENCE 
SETZER, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS 39-
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industry is best viewed as consisting of the same three-stage chain of 
production that exists with respect to most goods.  The first stage is the 
manufacturing stage, in which the actual products to be sold are created.  In the 
television industry, the manufacturing stage is occupied primarily by the movie 
studios.  The second stage is the wholesale stage, occupied in the case of 
television by the networks, which acquire the rights to these products directly 
from manufacturers and assemble them into complete product packages.  The 
third and final stage is occupied by retailers, who are responsible for final 
delivery of the products to end-users.  In the case of television, the retail stage 
is occupied by local broadcast stations, cable operators, and DBS providers. 
Entry into each of the first two stages of production appears to be easy.  
The factors of production needed at the manufacturing stage, i.e., talent and 
video production equipment, are readily available and already well organized 
to supply these same inputs to other industries.139  Recent history has 
demonstrated the ease with which new firms can enter the wholesale stage.  
Over the last decade, the number of broadcast networks has grown to the point 
that A.C. Nielsen now collects data on what it regards to be the seven major 
broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, UPN, WB, and PaxTV).  In recent 
decades, cable, DBS, and the other MVPDs have surpassed broadcasting as the 
primary means of receiving television programming, now serving over eighty-
five percent of all U.S. television households.140  The concomitant increase in 
channel capacity caused a spectacular proliferation of television networks 
offering a dizzying array of increasingly diverse programming.  Since 1990, 
the number of television networks has skyrocketed from 70 to 308, with 
another 60 networks currently in the planning stages.141 
Entry into the retail distribution stage is somewhat more constrained.  This 
is a matter of some concern, because any imperfections in the markets for 
 
40 (1982), and Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie 
Channel as a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, supra note 82, at 338, 347-48. 
 139 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 222.  A notable exception is some sports programming which is 
both subject to widely divergent local preferences and which is protected against entry at the factor level by 
sports leagues.  Two prominent examples are the battle between the New York Yankees and Cablevision as 
well as Comcast’s attempts to use its control over the Philadelphia 76ers and Flyers to forestall the emergence 
of competing MVPDs. 
 140 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,959 ¶ 134, 26,960 ¶ 137 
(2002); Yoo, supra note 51, at 231 & tbl.5. 
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inputs into television program production may cause surplus to be captured as 
rents at the factor level rather than being reinvested into programming.142  That 
said, recent technological developments have made entry into the retail 
distribution stage of the television industry easier than ever before.  The 
number of broadcast stations has increased dramatically, with the number of 
over-the-air signals that reach the average U.S. household soaring from 3.9 to 
13 between 1980 and 2000.143  Cable television has emerged as the primary 
system for delivering television programming to the home, now being 
available to over ninety-seven percent of all U.S. households144 and having 
captured sixty-five percent of all U.S. television households.145 
In addition, since its deployment in 1994, DBS has emerged as “one of the 
most successful new consumer electronics product introductions in history.”146  
Currently available to any household with a clear line of sight to the southern 
sky,147 the most recent data collected by the FCC indicate that DBS has 
captured thirteen percent of all U.S. television households and twenty percent 
of the MVPD market,148 surpassing the penetration levels identified by federal 
law as representing effective competition.149  In addition, DBS subscribership 
has been growing at a rate roughly twenty times that of other MVPDs.150 
 
 142 The possible retention of rents that may exist if factor markets are imperfect is analogous to the well-
known “double marginalization” that can occur when successive levels of a chain of distribution are 
monopolistic or oligopolistic.  See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 347 (1950) (offering the seminal statement of this insight).  Interestingly, the presence of imperfect 
factor markets arguably provides an efficiency justification for allowing greater vertical integration, because 
vertical integration would help ensure that such rents were available to finance the fixed costs.  See Yoo, supra 
note 51, at 192-93, 213-14, 234-35. 
 143 Yoo, supra note 51, at 212. 
 144 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 145 Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. at 26,911 tbl.1. 
 146 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Third Annual Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4377-78 ¶ 40 (1997); accord Paul Farhi, Dishing Out 
the Competition to Cable TV, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1996, at H1 (calling DBS “the most successful new 
consumer electronics product ever marketed”). 
 147 Yoo, supra note 51, at 208. 
 148 Ninth Annual Report on Television Regulation, 17 F.C.C.R. at 26,975 tbl.B-1. 
 149 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (2000) (providing that a cable operator faces effective competition if another 
MVPD is available in at least fifty percent of the cable operator’s service area and if the MVPD actually serves 
at least fifteen percent of MVPD households in that area). 
 150 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 208 tbl.1, 228-29. 
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In addition, the industry is in the process of deploying digital television, 
with 563 stations already transmitting a digital signal.151  It has long been 
apparent, moreover, that rather than using these digital channels to transmit a 
single stream of high definition television (HDTV), broadcasters could use the 
same amount of spectrum to multicast five or more signals of standard 
definition television (SDTV) at the same level of resolution currently used in 
analog television.152  Thus, although the retail level of the television industry 
remains rather concentrated, it does appear to be sufficiently competitive to 
justify the application of monopolistic competition theory. 
C. Networks vs. Programs as the Proper Unit of Analysis 
Public good and monopolistic competition theory would thus seem to 
provide apt frameworks for analyzing the market for television programming.  
This basic model would benefit from one additional refinement.  Although 
they are not completely clear on this point, the leading authorities seem to 
analyze this market in terms of individual programs.153  By taking individual 
programs as the proper unit of analysis, it posits that all transactions for 
programs occur in a spot market. 
This presumption ignores the fact that television programs tend not to be 
distributed on an individual basis.154  The reason that programs tend not to be 
offered individually stems from the fact that program producers are able to 
achieve substantial cost efficiencies by offering programs in integrated 
packages spanning extended blocks of time.  Some of the efficiencies related to 
network distribution are technological.  Currently networks distribute programs 
 
 151 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 152 See, e.g., Carriage of Digital Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2621 n.158 (2001) (citing news reports indicating that FCC Commissioners 
and industry leaders became aware of the option to multicast SDTV as early as 1992); Richard E. Wiley, The 
Challenge of Choice, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 401 (1994). 
 153 See, e.g., Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 103. 
 154 There are, of course, some notable exceptions.  Recently released films, which tend to be valued higher 
than conventional television programs, are often initially offered individually on a pay-per-view basis.  
Another exception is syndication, in which individual shows are sold to stations on a city-by-city basis.  
Syndicated programming is dominated by reruns of television series that first appeared on network television 
(called “off-network syndication”).  It also encompasses some programs produced specifically for syndication 
(called “first-run syndication”), including daytime talk shows (such as Oprah and The Rosie O’Donnell Show), 
certain game shows (such as Jeopardy and Wheel of Fortune), and certain original series (with the most 
successful example being Star Trek: The Next Generation). 
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to local broadcast stations via satellite.  Because satellites tend to be able to 
reach relatively large geographic areas without any appreciable increase in 
cost, transmitting to large numbers of networked stations leads to dramatic 
reductions in the per-station costs of satellite transmission.155 
Other reasons that programs are typically distributed through networks are 
related to transaction costs.  Filling a broadcast schedule requires an 
extraordinary number of transactions, with the weekly prime time schedule 
alone being comprised of forty-two half-hour slots.  If all of the approximately 
two hundred television stations affiliated with the major networks were to 
attempt to fill their schedules in a spot market for particular programs, those 
stations would have to negotiate more than eight thousand transactions with 
program producers and complete tens of thousands more negotiations with 
advertisers.  In addition, the transaction costs associated with assembling a 
broadcast schedule are further exacerbated by a phenomenon known as 
“adjacency effects,” which arise from the fact that the value of a particular 
program depends as much on the character of the programs broadcast 
immediately beforehand and afterward as it does on the character of the 
program itself.  Local broadcast stations attempting to purchase programs in a 
spot market would confront a seemingly insuperable joint maximization 
problem, as the value of any particular program would depend upon the 
outcome of a large number of other negotiations.  Network control of 
significant blocks of time substantially reduces the total number of transactions 
that must be consummated and vastly simplifies what might otherwise be a 
nearly intractable joint maximization problem.  It also makes it easier to spread 
risk of program failure and provide greater flexibility in compensating 
advertisers should a particular program fail to do as well as expected.156 
 
 155 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 10; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 20, 54, 197.  A similar bias 
toward full-time networking existed prior to the advent of satellite distribution of television programming 
when programs were distributed primarily through wireline distribution systems or through networks of 
microwave relays.  That bias was a result of regulatory policy, in that the FCC permitted AT&T, which held a 
monopoly over video interconnection services, to charge a higher rate to part-time than to full-time networks.  
The arrival of private microwave systems and purchasing of relay services by intermediaries eventually 
mitigated the bias inherent in this differential tariff.  Ultimately the FCC required AT&T to establish a tariff 
that no longer discriminated between part-time and full-time networking.  See BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 
10-11. 
 156 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 53-54; see also BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 6-7. 
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Furthermore, network distribution allows program producers to mitigate the 
danger of strategic behavior that arises whenever fixed-cost investments are 
required.  The ideal situation for a particular television station arises when 
other stations cover all of the fixed costs associated with creating the network.  
Once a producer sinks the fixed costs needed to create a network, individual 
stations have the incentive to attempt to free ride on the willingness of other 
stations to bear the costs associated with creating and maintaining the network 
by holding out in an attempt to force the producer to charge no more than 
marginal cost.157  Furthermore, to the extent that the quality of programs is 
difficult to determine ex ante, program producers face the problems associated 
with adverse selection, in which television stations attempt to take advantage 
of the better information available post hoc to accept only those programs that 
are the most profitable.  Networks allow producers to eliminate these risks by 
providing them with a guaranteed national distribution system for the programs 
that they create.158 
These considerations suggest that the appropriate unit of analysis may be 
individual networks, rather than individual programs.  Fortunately, such a shift 
would not cause any dramatic change in the relevant analysis.  Fixed costs 
dominate variable costs in the same manner regardless of whether the problem 
is analyzed in terms of networks or programs, because after the fixed costs of 
assembling a package of network programming have been incurred, the 
marginal costs associated with distributing it to additional viewers remain low.  
As a result, shifting the unit of analysis from programs to networks may be 
made without causing any significant alteration to the core analysis. 
III.  ANALYZING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION THROUGH A 
PUBLIC GOOD AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION LENS 
In this Part, I would like to explore the insights provided by the economic 
analysis I have developed by applying it to what has perhaps represented the 
central commitment in U.S. television policy: the desire to protect free, local 
television.  Although other policy considerations have emerged,159 localism has 
 
 157 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 194-200. 
 158 See id. at 214-17. 
 159 It should be noted that television policy has also focused on two other goals: the promotion of diversity 
and competition.  The model advanced in this Article has significant implications for both of these 
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remained the touchstone underlying the regulatory approach adopted with 
respect to every television technology that has emerged since that time.160 
Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the overarching commitment 
to free, local television should be disaggregated into four, more discrete policy 
commitments.  Specifically, these include: 
(1) the preference for local programming over national programming, 
(2) the preference for free television over pay television, 
(3) the preference for incumbent television providers over new 
entrants and emerging television technologies, and 
(4) the preference for single-channel television technologies over 
multi-channel television technologies. 
Applying the economic analysis developed above helps to explain one of 
the great conundrums of television policy, which is why such longstanding 
attempts to promote free, local content have proven to be such a dismal 
failure.161  Careful application of the model reveals how each of these 
subcommitments has reduced the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of 
television programming and in the process made it increasingly difficult for 
free, local television to survive.  If anything, it appears that U.S. television 
policy might well have been improved if Congress and the FCC had adopted 
precisely the opposite presumptions. 
 
considerations as well.  I plan to offer a more comprehensive analysis of these other two policies in later work.  
For my initial views of the FCC’s attempts to promote competition in the television industry, see infra Part 
III.D.1 and Yoo, supra note 51, at 181-248.  For an exploration of diversity-based justifications for television 
regulation, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 263-66, 306-46. 
 160 See infra Part III.A.1.b-d. 
 161 Empirical studies indicate that broadcasting carries precious little local content.  E.g., Thomas W. 
Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 179-
80 (2000); Eli M. Noam, Public-Interest Programming by American Commercial Television, in PUBLIC 
TELEVISION IN AMERICA 145, 173 (Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann eds., 1998); see also supra note 6 and 
accompanying text (documenting scholarly criticism of the diversity and quality of television content). 
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A. Decreasing Average Costs and Economies of Scale: Locally Oriented vs. 
Nationally Oriented Programming 
The first policy subcommitment that I would like to examine is the attempt 
to promote locally oriented programming over nationally oriented 
programming.  Subsection 1 introduces the basic television technologies and 
describes how the preference for local content has shaped the regulation of 
those technologies.  Subsection 2 employs the analysis developed above to 
assess the economic impact of the commitment to local content.  Subsection 3 
then employs the analysis I develop to critique specific regulatory attempts to 
promote local content.  My overall conclusion is that the commitment to 
locally oriented programming has reduced the overall quantity, quality, and 
diversity of television programming by preventing television networks from 
realizing the existing economies of scale made available by the lack of rivalry. 
1. The Regulatory Commitment to Locally Oriented Programming 
a. Analog Broadcasting 
The commitment to locally oriented television programming first emerged 
when the FCC made its initial decisions with respect to conventional broadcast 
television.162  For example, it helped to shape one of the first major regulatory 
initiatives launched by the FCC known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules,163 
which were designed to limit the power of the triopoly of networks that had 
 
 162 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing that 
the FCC “historically has followed a policy of ‘localism’ as a sound means of promoting the statutory goal of 
efficient public service”); Competition, Rate Deregulation & Comm’n’s Policies Relating to Provision of Ca-
ble Television Serv., Report, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 5039-40 ¶ 149 (1990) (acknowledging that localism has been a 
driving force in FCC policy for the previous fifty years); Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved 
Households for Purposes of Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654, 2659 ¶ 11 (1999) 
(“Localism has been a central principle of broadcast policy since the Radio Act of 1927.”); Amendment of 
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. 
for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Systems, First Report & Order, 38 
F.C.C. 683, 699-700 ¶¶ 44-48 (1965) [hereinafter CATV First Report & Order]; see also Quincy Cable TV, 
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that one of the cardinal objectives of the 
FCC was “the development of ‘a system of [free] local broadcasting stations,’ such that ‘all communities of 
appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression’”) (quoting 
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968)). 
 163 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2003).  See generally Yoo, supra note 51, at 181-219 (reviewing the Chain Broad-
casting Rules). 
 
2003] RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION 1641 
come to dominate broadcasting.164  Enactment of the rules was motivated in 
part by a desire to ensure that local stations retained control over programming 
decisions.165  The Supreme Court invoked the same rationale when upholding 
the Chain Broadcasting Rules in NBC v. United States,166 which remains the 
seminal case on broadcast regulation.  In the words of the Court, “[l]ocal 
program service is a vital part of community life,” and the rules were needed to 
help ensure that stations stand “ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of 
the local community by broadcasting . . . outstanding local events.”167 
The desire to promote locally oriented content also underlies the principles 
followed by the FCC when allocating television frequencies to particular 
communities.  The basic policy issue followed from the fact that only so many 
stations could operate within any geographic region without interfering with 
one another.  On the one hand, the FCC could have established a handful of 
relatively high-power stations that reached large regions.  This would have 
increased the number of signals that each household could receive, but would 
have restricted broadcast facilities to only the biggest cities.  On the other 
hand, the FCC had the option of creating a large number of stations operating 
at relatively low power.  This would allow the FCC to increase the number of 
communities that enjoyed the services of their own station.  It also meant that 
any particular community would receive only a limited number of broadcast 
signals. 
When it came time to establish the basic table of allocations that would 
govern television broadcasting, the FCC adopted the latter approach and 
allocated stations so as to ensure that as many communities as possible had at 
least one television station.168  As the Supreme Court has noted,169 the FCC did 
 
 164 See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 30-34 (1941).  Although 
initially developed for radio in 1941, it was extended to television shortly thereafter.  See Amendment to Part 3 
of the Comm’n’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (1946).  The FCC has subsequently abolished the Chain Broadcasting 
Rules with respect to radio, so as a practical matter their only remaining relevance is with respect to television.  
See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Regarding Television Broad., Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 
4539 ¶ 5 (1995). 
 165 See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 164, at 63, 65, 66. 
 166 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 167 Id. at 203. 
 168 Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. 
148, 167-72 ¶¶ 63-82 (1952) [hereinafter Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order].  For a discussion of 
the impact that this allocation policy has on the level of competition in the television industry, see infra Part 
III.C.2.a. 
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so because it believed that placing television stations in a larger number of 
communities would provide “local outlets that will be responsive to local 
needs.”170  In so ruling, the FCC rejected a proposal submitted by the nascent 
DuMont Network that would have made it more likely that a fourth television 
network would survive.171  This action was based in part on the belief that it 
was more important to maximize the number of communities receiving 
television allocations in order to ensure that “as many communities as possible 
should have the opportunity of enjoying the advantages that derive from 
having local outlets that will be responsive to local needs.”172 
In addition, localism concerns provided the foundation for many of the 
content-based requirements imposed on television broadcasters.  For example, 
the commitment to localism was reflected in the licensing criteria applied by 
the FCC, which has long emphasized the importance of local ownership173 and 
 
 169 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“Congress designed this system of alloca-
tion to afford each community of appreciable size . . . an outlet for exchange on matters of local concern.”); 
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (recognizing that the FCC and Congress 
had historically pursued policies designed to ensure that “‘all communities of appreciable size [will] have at 
least one television station’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3 (1962)). 
 170 Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. at 172 ¶ 79. 
 171 As explained later in greater detail, the number of networks is determined largely by the percentage of 
the country that could receive four broadcast signals.  See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.  The 
DuMont plans would have increased the population receiving four or more channels to nearly ninety-five per-
cent and increased the percentage of the population receiving technically comparable signals to ninety-three 
percent—levels that would have greatly increased the feasibility of a fourth network.  See Thomas L. 
Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications 
Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 891, 921-26, 929 tbl.10, 938-39 & 
tbl.16 (1981). 
 172 Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. at 171-72 ¶ 79. 
 173 The FCC has long exhibited a preference for licensees who will participate full time in station 
operations, on the grounds that full-time managers are more likely to exhibit “greater sensitivity to an area’s 
changing needs, and to programming designed to serve these needs.”  Policy Statement on Comparative Broad. 
Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965).  The FCC indicated that value of the integration of ownership in 
management “is increased if the participating owners are local residents.”  Id. at 396.  The FCC further 
indicated that “residence in the principal community to be served will be of primary importance,” especially if 
it is for several years.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit struck down the integration of ownership and management as 
arbitrary and capricious.  See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Flagstaff Broad. Found. 
v. FCC, 979 F.2d 1566, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Congress 
subsequently enacted legislation that eliminated the FCC’s discretion over new licenses and severely limited 
its discretion with respect to renewals.  See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)-(l) (2000).  For a review of the history of these 
regulatory provisions, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 256-60, and Lili Levi, Not with a Bang but a Whimper: 
Broadcast License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 258-63, 275-77 
(1996). 
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efforts to determine local tastes.174  The FCC has also repeatedly emphasized 
that license holders bear an obligation to broadcast local content and that their 
willingness to do so will affect the likelihood that their licenses will be 
renewed.175  While it was in force, the Fairness Doctrine required that 
television stations present news and programs devoted to public issues “of 
interest in the community served by the particular station.”176 
 
 174 Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, First Report & Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 418, 418-
19 ¶¶ 4-5, 423 ¶ 18 (1976) (requiring that ascertainment be a continuous process and requiring that station 
personnel confer with a designated list of community leaders); Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by 
Broad. Applicants, Report & Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 ¶¶ 17-20 (1971) (adopting interim measures 
requiring license applicants to conduct “ascertainment” efforts by consulting with community leaders and 
members of the general public six months prior to the filing of the application); En Banc Programming 
Inquiry, Report & Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2316 (1960) (calling the “diligent, positive, and continuing 
effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his community or service area” the 
“principal ingredient of the licensee’s obligation to operate his station in the public interest” and requiring the 
licensee to identify the measures taken to determine those tastes by canvassing the potential audience and 
consulting with community leaders) [hereinafter En Banc Programming Inquiry].  The FCC eliminated these 
ascertainment requirements in 1984.  Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, & Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report & Order, 98 
F.C.C.2d 1076, 1098-1101 ¶¶ 47-54 (1984) [hereinafter Television Deregulation Order].  The agency is 
considering reinstituting a weakened version of ascertainment.  Standardized & Enhanced Disclosure 
Requirements for Television Broad. Licensee Pub. Interest Obligations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 
F.C.C.R. 19,816, 19,826-27 ¶¶ 23-25 (2000) [hereinafter Pub. Interest Disclosure Requirements]. 
 175 See Cowles Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981), aff’d sub nom. Cent. Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 
F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (identifying service to the community of license as a consideration in determining 
whether a broadcast license should be renewed); Pub. Interest Disclosure Requirements, 15 F.C.C.R. at 19,816 
¶ 1, 19,818 ¶ 6 (noting that the public interest requires each television broadcaster to air programming 
responsive to the needs and interests of its community of license); Television Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 
at 1091 ¶ 32 (same), aff’d in part, Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); En 
Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at 2314 (identifying “opportunity for local self-expression” and the 
“development and use of local talent” as “major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest”); see 
also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(e)(11)(i), (13) (2003) (requiring that broadcasters maintain lists of recent programs 
that have provided the station’s most significant treatment of community issues and local public service 
announcements).  For earlier similar requirements, see, for example, Television Deregulation Order, 98 
F.C.C.2d at 1078 nn.3-4 (reporting that between 1961 and 1973 the FCC applied a processing guideline 
allowing for expedited renewal for licensees that proposed devoting at least five percent of its schedule to local 
live programming), and FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST 
LICENSEES (1946) (emphasizing the importance of local live programming). 
 176 Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the 
Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 ¶ 3 (1974) (citing Report on Editorializing by Broad. 
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)).  The FCC subsequently abolished the Fairness Doctrine.  Syracuse 
Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff’d, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
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The desire to promote local programming is also evident in the regulation 
of a new broadcast service known as low power television (LPTV) initiated in 
1982.  LPTV operates through micro-television stations that transmit at such 
low power that they do not interfere with existing full power stations.  As a 
result, LPTV stations typically have a range of no more than twenty miles, 
which makes them inherently well suited to further the important service 
objective of providing local programming.177  In addition, policymakers have 
regulated LPTV in a manner designed to promote locally oriented content still 
further.  For example, LPTV stations can obtain free carriage on cable systems 
only if they can show that their programming “would address local news and 
information needs which are not being adequately served by full power 
broadcast stations.”178  In addition, when Congress passed legislation strength-
ening the spectrum rights of LPTV stations in 1999, it did so only with respect 
to those stations that could demonstrate a commitment to locally produced 
programming.179 
Perhaps most tellingly, localism has become the primary justification for 
allowing television stations to use spectrum for free.  Currently, broadcasters 
are the only spectrum users who do not have to pay for their licenses.  Instead, 
television licensees receive six megahertz of spectrum for free, subject only to 
the requirement that they use their licenses in a manner that serves the “public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.”180  Although policymakers appear to 
have initially based their decision to give away spectrum for free on their belief 
that market-oriented distribution of spectrum was impossible,181 in subsequent 
years they have based the decision to give away spectrum on the broadcaster’s 
 
 177 Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l 
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,470 ¶ 12 (1982).  In contrast, full power stations 
typically have a range of up to eighty miles.  See Establishment of a Class A Television Serv., Memorandum 
Opinion & Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 8244, 8245-46 ¶ 2 & n.6 (2001).  For additional discussion 
of LPTV regulation, see infra notes 376-82 and accompanying text. 
 178 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (2000).  For a more complete discussion of must-carry, see infra notes 190-
201 and accompanying text. 
 179 Id. § 336(f)(2)(A)(i) (limiting new “Class A” licenses to LPTV stations who could show that they 
broadcast an average of at least three hours of locally produced programming per week during the ninety-day 
period preceding the enactment of the statute). 
 180 Id. §§ 307(c)(1), 309(a), 309(k)(1)(A). 
 181 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943).  See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 260, 
267-69, 348-49 (discussing controversy over whether Congress and the FCC understood that market allocation 
of broadcast licenses was possible); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum 
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 538-39 (1998) (same). 
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willingness to fulfill public interest obligations, including providing local 
programming.182  Estimates of the value of the spectrum given to conventional 
television broadcasters in return for these public interest obligations range 
from $20 billion to $132 billion.183 
b. Cable Television 
The emphasis on localism also underlay the FCC’s initial efforts to regulate 
cable television.  In a classic example of the type of implicit cross subsidy that 
Richard Posner has aptly dubbed “taxation by regulation,”184 the FCC 
attempted to promote local programming indirectly by imposing regulations on 
cable.185  For example, the FCC attempted to promote local content directly by 
requiring cable operators to create original programming186 and to “open[ ] . . . 
 
 182 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A licensed broadcaster is ‘granted the free and 
exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened 
by enforceable public obligations.’”) (quoting Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 
359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.)); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) 
(justifying public interest obligations in part by the government’s role in allocating frequencies); Hazlett, supra 
note 181, at 539-41.  For arguments by FCC personnel justifying the imposition of localism requirements by 
the fact that television broadcasters receive their spectrum for free, see Hundt, supra note 6, at 1095-96; Reed 
Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules 
for Children’s Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 16-19 (1996); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting 
Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 1687, 1725-34 (1997); and Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 686, 688-90 (1998). 
 183 See Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV 
Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 533 (1997); Logan, supra note 182, at 1728; Rubin, supra note 182, at 
694. 
 184 Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971). 
 185 See Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that beginning in 1966 
the FCC attempted to use cable regulation to promote localism). 
 186 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna 
Television Sys., First Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969), vacated sub nom. Midwest Video Corp. v. 
United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).  Programs originated by cable 
operators were subject to the Fairness Doctrine and were subject to the same sponsorship identification and 
equal access to political broadcasting requirements applied to broadcasting.  Id. at 218-22 ¶¶ 39-47.  The FCC 
consistently justified its program origination rules by the importance of “fostering local programming designed 
to cater to local needs and interests.”  Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Comm’n’s Rules & 
Regulations Relative to Program Origination by Cable Television Sys., Report & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 
1105 ¶ 32 (1974) [hereinafter Program Origination Repeal Order]; accord Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, 
of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Systems, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 421-22 ¶ 13 (1968) (mandated programming origination 
in order to “increas[e] the number of local outlets for community self-expression”) [hereinafter CATV NPRM 
& NOI]; Midwest Television, Inc., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 505 ¶ 62 (1968) (same); see also Midwest 
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new outlets for local expression”187 by devoting channels to public, 
educational, and governmental access.188  The FCC and Congress also 
attempted to protect the locally oriented content indirectly by restricting cable 
operators’ ability to import broadcast signals from other markets.189 
 
Video, 406 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (relying on the goal of “fostering local programming designed to 
cater to local needs and interests” to uphold the FCC’s jurisdiction to promulgate program origination 
requirements).  The FCC later stayed and subsequently repealed this requirement.  Program Origination Repeal 
Order, 49 F.C.C.2d at 1104-10 ¶¶ 31-45.  Some municipal licensing authorities have continued to impose local 
origination requirements.  See, e.g., Chi. Cable Communications v. Chi. Cable Comm’n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1549 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the encouragement of localism represents an important interest sufficient to 
justify upholding municipally imposed local origination requirement against due process, equal protection, and 
First Amendment challenges). 
 187 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna 
Television Sys., Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190 ¶ 121 (1972) [hereinafter Cable 
Television Report & Order], aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Amendment 
of Part 76 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity & Access 
Channel Requirements of Section 76.251, Report & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 ¶ 8, 298 ¶¶ 14-15 (1976). 
 188 The FCC first imposed these requirements in 1972.  Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 
190-91 ¶¶ 122-24.  Although these rules were originally supposed to go into effect in 1977, the FCC postponed 
their implementation.  Amendment of Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Postponing or 
Canceling Mar. 31, 1977 Date by Which Major Mkt. Cable Television Sys. Existing Prior to Mar. 31, 1972, 
Must Be in Compliance with Section 76.251(a)(1)-(a)(8), Report & Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 207 (1975).  The 
Supreme Court subsequently struck down the rules as being beyond the FCC’s jurisdiction.  FCC v. Midwest 
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).  Congress ultimately obviated the Court’s jurisdictional concerns in 1984 
by explicitly authorizing local franchising authorities to require applicants to provide public, educational, and 
governmental access channels.  47 U.S.C. § 531(a)-(b) (2000). 
 189 The regulatory history of these provisions is rather tortuous.  The FCC’s first step in restricting the 
importation of distant signals was to impose “network nonduplication” rules, which required cable operators to 
delete any programming that duplicated programming provided by a local network affiliate.  CATV First 
Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 719-30 ¶¶ 93-127 (1965).  The FCC then prohibited cable systems operating 
in the top one hundred major markets from importing signals from other markets without FCC approval on a 
case-by-case basis.  Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of 
Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna 
Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 ¶ 141 (1966) [hereinafter CATV Second Report & Order].  
The FCC reaffirmed the network nonduplication rules, but shortened it from the thirty-day window running 
from fifteen days before the network exhibition to fifteen days afterwards to a simple prohibition of same-day 
exhibition.  Id. at 788-89 ¶ 156, 746-50 ¶¶ 49-58. 
In 1968, the FCC began enforcing new interim rules requiring that cable systems in the top one hundred 
markets seeking to import distant signal obtain consent from the station originating the signal.  CATV NPRM 
& NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 437 ¶ 51.  The FCC later abandoned this approach in 1972 and instead authorized cable 
systems operating in the top one hundred markets to import up to two distant signals.  Cable Television Report 
& Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 171 ¶ 74, 177-78 ¶ 90.  In so doing, the FCC also instituted “leapfrogging” rules, 
which required operators that imported distant signals to do so only from the closest available source.  Id. at 
179 ¶¶ 92-93.  It also limited the network nonduplication rule to a ban on simultaneous transmission and 
created new “syndicated exclusivity” rules requiring cable operators who import distant signals to delete any 
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Most importantly, concerns about localism motivated the protracted 
campaign by the FCC and Congress to impose the so-called “must-carry” 
rules, which required cable operators to carry all television stations operating 
in their service area for free.190  The FCC consistently based must-carry in part 
on the need to preserve the local content provided by television 
broadcasters.191  After the D.C. Circuit thwarted the FCC’s attempts to impose 
 
syndicated programming to which a local station had acquired exclusive rights.  Id. at 165 ¶ 60, 166 ¶¶ 62-64, 
181 ¶ 98. 
The FCC subsequently repealed the leapfrogging rules in 1976.  Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76 of 
Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations with Respect to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage 
(Leapfrog Rules): § 76.59(b)(1) & (2), 76.61(b)(1) & (2) & 76.63, Report & Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1975) 
[hereinafter Leapfrogging Rules Repeal Order].  It also repealed the distant signal and the syndicated 
exclusivity rules in 1980.  Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report & Order, 79 
F.C.C.2d 663, 725-46 ¶¶ 148-91, 768-69 ¶¶ 241-43 (1980) [hereinafter Syndex Repeal Order], aff’d sub nom. 
Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).  Eight years 
later, the FCC reversed course and reinstated the syndicated exclusivity rules.  Amendment of Parts 73 & 76 of 
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in the Cable & Broad. Indus., Report & Order, 3 
F.C.C.R. 5299 (1988), aff’d sub nom. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  The 
network nonduplication rules remain in force.  47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92, 76.101 (2003). 
The FCC consistently based these carriage limitations in part on the need to preserve the local content 
provided by broadcasting.  Syndex Repeal Order, 79 F.C.C.2d at 725-26 ¶¶ 148-50, 744 ¶ 185; Cable 
Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1020 
¶¶ 45-46 (1979); Inquiry into Econ. Relationship Between Television Broad. & Cable Television, Report, 71 
F.C.C.2d 632, 645 ¶ 33, 658 ¶ 68, 661 ¶ 72 (1979); Leapfrogging Rules Repeal Order, 57 F.C.C.2d at 627 ¶ 6; 
Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 150 ¶ 15; CATV NPRM & NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 439 ¶ 56; 
CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 770 ¶ 114, 775 ¶ 124(iii), 788-89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report & 
Order, 38 F.C.C. at 699 ¶ 45, 700 ¶ 48; see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 
(1968) (upholding the FCC’s jurisdiction to prohibit distant signal importation in part because of the need to 
preserve “‘outlet[s] for local self-expression’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3 (1962)). 
 190 The FCC foreshadowed the imposition of must-carry in the very first decision in which it asserted 
jurisdiction over cable systems.  Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962), aff’d, 
321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).  The FCC later imposed must-carry on cable 
systems that received programming through microwave transmission, CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 
at 705 ¶ 57, 716-17 ¶¶ 85-90, and extended must-carry to systems that retransmitted over-the-air television 
broadcasts, CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 746 ¶¶ 48-49, 752-53 ¶ 66 (extending same rules to 
all cable systems).  See also Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 170-71 ¶ 74, 172-76 ¶¶ 78-87 
(reaffirming must-carry); Implementation of Provisions of Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 18,637 (1985) (same). 
 191 See, e.g., Inquiry into Econ. Relationship Between Television Broad. & Cable Television, Report, 71 
F.C.C.2d 632, 645 ¶ 33, 658 ¶ 68, 661 ¶ 72 (1979); Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 150 ¶ 15; 
CATV NPRM & NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 439 ¶ 56; CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 770 ¶ 114, 775   
¶ 124(iii), 788-89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. at 699 ¶ 45, 700 ¶ 48; see also Southwestern 
Cable, 392 U.S. at 174 (upholding the FCC’s jurisdiction to impose must-carry in part on the need to preserve 
“‘outlet[s] for local self-expression’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3). 
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must-carry as a regulatory matter,192 Congress intervened with legislation 
erecting a new regulatory scheme.  This scheme required all full-power local 
broadcast stations to decide every three years whether they wished to be 
governed by a “retransmission consent” regime,193 which allowed them to 
negotiate with cable operators over the terms and conditions of carriage, or by 
“must carry,”194 which required the cable operators to provide carriage for 
free.195 
Congress attached a series of findings to the must-carry legislation 
emphasizing that importance of preserving television broadcasting as the 
source of “the local origination of programming”196  and of “local news and 
public affairs programming.”197  The findings also emphasized that without 
must-carry, the ability of local broadcasters “to originate quality local 
programming w[ould] be seriously jeopardized.”198 
The emphasis on localism was further underscored by two provisions 
authorizing the FCC to extend must-carry beyond local full power stations.  
These provisions authorized the extension of must-carry to low power stations 
that the FCC determined “would address local news and informational needs 
which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast 
stations.”199  They also authorized the FCC to include stations operating 
outside of a community if justified by “the value of localism” as indicated by 
the provision of “coverage or other local service to such community” or “news 
coverage of issues of concern to such community or . . . carriage . . . of 
 
 192 The D.C. Circuit sustained a constitutional challenge to the FCC’s first attempt to impose must-carry.  
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  The FCC reinstated must-carry as a 
transitional measure, only to see it invalidated once again by the D.C. Circuit.  Amendment of Part 76 of the 
Comm’n’s Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broad. Signals by Cable Television Sys., Report & Order, 
1 F.C.C.R. 864 (1986), vacated sub nom. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). 
 193 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 194 Id. §§ 325(b)(1)(B), 534. 
 195 Id. § 325(b)(3). 
 196 Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(10), 
106 Stat. 1460, 1461. 
 197 Id. § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. at 1461; see also id. § 2(a)(8)(B), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that “public 
television is a local community institution . . . that provides public service programming that is responsive to 
the needs and interests of the local community”). 
 198 Id. § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462. 
 199 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B). 
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sporting and other events to the community.”200  The Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the preservation of locally oriented content in its landmark Turner 
Broadcasting decision upholding must-carry against a First Amendment 
challenge.201 
c. DBS 
Localism concerns also underlay the manner in which Congress and the 
FCC have regulated DBS systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish Network.202  
Initially, the FCC imposed only minimal regulation on DBS and in particular 
declined to subject DBS to access requirements designed to ensure that its 
programming would be responsive to community interests.203  In so ruling, the 
FCC emphasized the importance of allowing a new service to experiment with 
service offerings as well as technical and organizational characteristics.204  It 
also rejected arguments that the introduction of DBS would harm existing 
broadcasters by exposing them to greater competition, would reduce the 
availability of free television service, and would reduce the amount and quality 
of locally produced programming.  The FCC concluded that the prospect of 
providing television service to rural areas then unserved by broadcasting and 
cable, the increase in variety of programming throughout the country, and the 
potential for offering services not previously available, such as high definition 
television, stereophonic sound, and dual language sound tracks, justified the 
deployment of DBS.205  The D.C. Circuit sustained the FCC’s actions, 
 
 200 Id. § 534(h)(1)(C). 
 201 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-93 (1997) (upholding must-carry because 
of the government interest in “increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression” and “ensuring 
the continuation of the local origination of broadcast programming”) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. 
at 234, 244 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the government justified must-carry in part by the need to 
preserve “programming that is ‘responsive’ to the needs of the local community”) (citing Brief for Federal 
Appellees 13, 30). 
 202 For useful reviews of the history of DBS, see Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Con-
ventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1062-68 (1997), and Richard L. 
Weber, Note, Riding on a Diamond in the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside Provision of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1795, 1797-1800, 1806-10, 1813-27 (1999). 
 203 Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broad. Satellites for the Period Follow-
ing the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 714 ¶¶ 99-100 (1982) 
[hereinafter DBS Order], aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 
(D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 204 Id. at 707-08 ¶ 81. 
 205 Id. at 686-87 ¶ 32, 689-92 ¶¶ 38-44; Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct 
Broad. Satellites for the Period Following 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Notice of Proposed 
   
1650 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
concluding that “the Act does not entrench any particular system of 
broadcasting: existing systems . . . have no entitlement that permits them to 
deflect competitive pressure from innovative and effective technology.”206 
This attitude of regulatory forbearance would ultimately prove short lived.  
The first change arose through copyright law.  Although the Copyright Act of 
1976 had resolved questions surrounding cable operators’ ability to retransmit 
broadcast signals,207 it did not resolve whether DBS and other satellite carriers 
would be able to do the same.208  As a result, Congress addressed the issue 
directly by enacting the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA).209  The 
SHVA limited satellite transmission of broadcast signals to “unserved 
households” that could not receive acceptable signals from their local network 
affiliates through stationary rooftop antennas.210  By limiting the scope of this 
provision to unserved households, the SHVA had the effect of barring satellite 
providers from carrying programming provided by ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox 
to any household capable of receiving those networks over the air. 
Congress based its actions in part on the desire to “promote[ ] localism”211 
by preserving the role of the local television station in “decid[ing] which 
network programs are locally broadcast” and in ensuring the availability of 
“local news and other programs of special interest to its local audience.”212  
Congress also authorized the FCC to initiate proceedings to extend to DBS the 
 
Policy Statement & Rulemaking, 86 F.C.C.2d 719, 735-41 ¶¶ 43-59 (1981). 
 206 Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1198.  The D.C. Circuit did vacate the FCC’s actions in one 
respect.  It held the FCC’s attempt to exempt DBS from regulations imposed on broadcasters under Title III of 
the Communications Act of 1934 was inconsistent with the FCC’s previous decisions with respect to 
subscription television.  Id. at 1199-1206 (vacating DBS Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 708-11 ¶¶ 83-90).  The FCC 
cured the inconsistency not by altering its decision with respect to DBS, but rather by eliminating the conflict 
with its subscription television precedents by ruling that subscription television also fell outside of Title III.  
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the DBS rules.  Subscription Video, Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001 (1987), aff’d 
sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 207 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000). 
 208 Specifically, satellite carriers were concerned that scrambled transmissions might fall outside the 
“passive carrier” exemption, id. § 111(a)(3) (1994), under the 1996 revision to the copyright laws.  H.R. REP. 
NO. 100-887(I), at 11-14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5614-17. 
 209 The SHVA was enacted as Title II of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 
102 Stat. 3935.  After its initial authorization expired, it was renewed by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-369, 108 Stat. 3477. 
 210 § 202(2), 102 Stat. at 3957 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (2000)). 
 211 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(I), at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5617. 
 212 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 20 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5649. 
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existing syndicated exclusivity requirements that governed cable.213  
Enactment of this provision was similarly motivated by the perceived need to 
prevent changes in technology and regulation from “undermin[ing] the base of 
free local television service upon which the American people continue to 
rely.”214 
The inability to carry broadcast network programming became a major 
impediment to the growth of DBS and generated substantial litigation.215  
Congress therefore revised the copyright laws again by enacting the Satellite 
Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA).216  For the first time, the 
new statute authorized satellite providers to carry local broadcast signals, albeit 
subject to a fairly restrictive set of conditions.  First, the statute limited DBS 
providers to providing “local-into-local” service.  In other words, they could 
only provide subscribers with broadcast signals that originated locally.  
Importation of distant broadcast signals was prohibited unless the subscriber 
was located in an “unserved area.”217  These provisions had the effect of 
prohibiting DBS providers from satisfying a subscriber’s desire for one of the 
major broadcast networks (such as ABC, CBS, NBC, or Fox) by providing a 
signal from a station based in New York, Los Angeles, or any other distant 
city.  This left DBS providers who wished to provide broadcast network 
programming with no option but to carry only locally originated broadcast 
signals. 
In addition, the statute gave DBS providers two options to obtain the 
copyright licenses they needed to carry broadcast programming.  They could 
 
 213 § 203, 102 Stat. at 3958. 
 214 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5655. 
 215 See CBS Broad., Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998); ABC, Inc. 
v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 17 F. Supp. 2d 467 (M.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 184 F.3d 
348 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved Households for Purposes of 
the Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654, 2663-64 ¶ 21 (1999) (citing other 
litigation). 
 216 The SHVIA was enacted as Appendix I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
113 Stat. 1501, app. at 523 (1999). 
 217 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A)-(B) (2000).  The statute also required the FCC to simplify the process for 
determining whether a particular household qualified as unserved.  47 U.S.C. § 339(c)(3) (2000); see also 
Technical Standards for Determining Eligibility for Satellite-Delivered Network Signals Pursuant To the 
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,321 (2000); Establishment of an Improved 
Model for Predicting the Broad. Television Field Strength Received at Individual Locations, First Report & 
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,118 (2000); Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved Households for Purposes 
of the Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654 (1999). 
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negotiate retransmission consent agreements with individual stations.218  
Alternatively, they could invoke a newly created compulsory license219 
provided that they complied with a “carry one, carry all” provision, which 
required that they carry all of the full power signals available within its service 
area.220 
The SHVIA also directed the FCC to extend to DBS the network 
nonduplication, syndicated exclusivity, and sports blackout rules previously 
applicable only to cable television systems.221  In enacting this legislation, 
Congress “reassert[ed] the importance of protecting and fostering the system of 
television networks as they relate to the concept of localism” on the ground 
that “[i]t is well recognized that television broadcast stations provide valuable 
programming tailored to local needs, such as news, weather, special 
announcements and information related to local activities.”222  Other portions 
of the legislative history reiterated the same rationale.223  The Fourth Circuit 
mentioned these considerations in passing when sustaining the SHVIA against 
a constitutional attack, acknowledging the “distinctive value of local broadcast 
programming.224 
 
 218 47 U.S.C. § 325(b). 
 219 17 U.S.C. § 122(a), (c) (Supp. V 1999); 47 U.S.C. § 339(a)(1)(B). 
 220 See 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1).  The statute postponed the effective date of the must-carry requirements 
until January 1, 2002.  Id.  The must-carry requirements governing satellite carriers are in some ways broader 
than those imposed on cable operators.  For example, the statute limits the percentage of channel capacity that 
some cable systems must devote to must-carry, id. § 534(b)(1)(B), whereas the satellite must-carry provision 
imposes no such limit, id. § 338(a)(1).  Unlike the compulsory license for local broadcast signals, the 
compulsory license for distant broadcast signals requires royalty payments to the copyright holder.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 122(c) (2000).  Satellite providers carrying local programming pursuant to retransmission consent 
agreements are not subject to the carry one, carry all requirements.  47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338(a)(1). 
 221 47 U.S.C. § 339(b); see also Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: 
Application of Network Non-Duplication, Syndicated Exclusivity, & Sports Blackout Rules to Satellite 
Retransmissions of Broad. Signals, Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 21,688 (2000). 
 222 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 92 (1999); accord H.R. REP. NO. 106-86(I), at 9 (1999). 
 223 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101-02 (noting that carry one, carry all provision was enacted to 
allow satellite television viewers “the same range of choice in local programming they receive through cable 
service,” to “help[ ] viewers have access to all local programming,” and to “further[ ] the congressional policy 
of localism and diversity of broadcast programming, which provides locally-relevant news, weather, and 
information”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-79(I), at 15 (1999) (arguing that the legislation reaffirms the “historical 
commitment to localism”); S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 1 (1999) (identifying the protection of local over-the-air 
television as one of the SHVIA’s purposes); id. at 13 (same). 
 224 See Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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d. Digital Broadcasting 
The other major technological innovation that is currently transforming the 
television industry is the transition to digital broadcasting.  Unlike analog 
television systems, which encode programming onto electronic signals by 
varying the amplitude and frequency of electrical waves, digital television 
systems convert television signals into a series of ones and zeroes of the type 
employed by computer code.  By their nature, digital systems are not subject to 
the static interference that plagues analog systems, because the use of binary 
coding systems eliminates picture degradation and makes it considerably easier 
for television receivers to separate the desired television signal from the 
background noise.  Digital systems also avoid some of the flicker and scrolling 
problems unique to the particular format adopted for analog television.225  In 
addition, digital transmission allows television stations to operate at lower 
power, which in turn allows them to be spaced closer together without causing 
interference.  Furthermore, digital technologies also allow for the use of 
compression techniques that further increase the efficiency with which 
information can be conveyed.  Especially when combined with the overall 
technical improvements to receiver technology,226 the transition to digital 
television allows for a fairly significant increase in the intensity with which 
broadcasters can use the spectrum allocated to television. 
Shortly after the FCC began considering how to deploy digital television in 
1987, it quickly ruled that the best way to deploy digital television was to give 
each incumbent analog television station an additional six megahertz of 
spectrum in which to begin digital broadcasting.227  The FCC based its decision 
in part on concerns about localism, concluding that deploying digital television 
in this manner would preserve the system by which U.S. households receive 
 
 225 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of Inquiry, 
2 F.C.C.R. 5125, 5126-27 ¶¶ 8-17 (1987). 
 226 See id. at 5132-34 ¶¶ 59-79; Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on the Existing Television 
Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6529-30 ¶¶ 69-71 (1988) 
[hereinafter DTV Tentative Decision]. 
 227 DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6530 ¶¶ 73-74; see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their 
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342-43 ¶¶ 4-6 (1992) (reaffirming this decision); Advanced Television Sys. & 
Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report & Order, & 
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, 6930 ¶ 8 (1992) (noting that no parties 
objected to this decision).  See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 352-53 (reviewing the history of the decision 
to give a free digital channel to all current licensees). 
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“local and regional news, information, and entertainment.”228  The FCC also 
noted that digital broadcasters would be subject to the same public interest 
obligations as analog broadcasters, including the obligation to “air 
programming responsive to their communities of license.”229  The FCC is also 
entertaining a recommendation by the Gore Commission that digital 
broadcasters do even more to ensure that the programming they offer is 
responsive to the needs of the local community.230 
Congress gave its imprimatur to the FCC’s actions by including a provision 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring that in the event the FCC 
decided to issue digital television licenses, eligibility for such licenses would 
be limited to existing television broadcasters.231  Congress enacted legislation 
the following year in effect guaranteeing that the digital television licenses 
would be given for free by including a provision specifically excepting digital 
television from the FCC’s authority to auction new licenses.232  The result is 
what has been condemned by many as the largest corporate giveaway in 
history, with estimates of the value of the spectrum given away to digital 
broadcasters ranging from $11 to $70 billion.233 
In addition to affecting the decisions about how to deploy digital television, 
localism concerns have also arisen with regard to the question of whether the 
must-carry statute should be extended to digital, as well as analog, television 
signals.  The legislative history of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
 
 228 DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6525 ¶ 39. 
 229 Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,638 ¶ 11, 
21,640 ¶ 14 (1999) [hereinafter Pub. Int. Oblig. NOI]; accord Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on 
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking & Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,545-46 ¶ 33 & n.36 (1995); see also Advanced 
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 
12,809, 12,829-30 ¶¶ 48-50 (1997) (ruling that digital broadcasters are subject to the same public interest 
obligations as analog broadcasters). 
 230 Pub. Int. Oblig. NOI, 14 F.C.C.R. at 21,640-41 ¶¶ 14-17, 21,642-43 ¶¶ 20-22; ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING 
FUTURE 45-46 (1998) (proposing enhanced disclosure of, inter alia, local programming efforts by digital 
broadcasters), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom.piacreport.pdf [hereinafter GORE 
COMMISSION REPORT]; id. at 48 (proposing additional efforts by digital broadcasters to identify the 
programming needs of the community and minimum public interest obligations on local public affairs 
programming). 
 231 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (2000). 
 232 Id. § 309(j)(2)(b). 
 233 See Goodman, supra note 183, at 533; Logan, supra note 182, at 1728; Rubin, supra note 182, at 694. 
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the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 indicates that Congress did not intend to 
resolve whether the must-carry requirements should be extended to digital 
television.  Instead, Congress left that determination to the FCC.234 
This decision to commit the issues surrounding digital must-carry to the 
FCC gave rise to what then-FCC Chairman William Kennard called “one of 
the most contentious and fascinating debates in communications policy.”235  In 
issuing its initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on whether and how to 
extend must-carry to digital television, the FCC took as its starting point the 
general framework used to uphold must-carry with respect to analog 
broadcasting.236  These considerations included the need to preserve “the 
benefits derived from the local origination of programming from television 
stations” as well as the concern that the absence of mandatory carriage would 
jeopardize “the economic viability of local broadcast television and its ability 
to originate quality local programming.”237 
The FCC recognized, however, that if the extension of must-carry to digital 
television were to withstand a First Amendment attack, such a decision had to 
be based on a record establishing that the harms to local broadcasting were 
“‘real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.’”238  The FCC acknowledged the 
possibility that refusing to extend must-carry to digital television might 
represent the better way to promote local content.  As the FCC noted, 
“[b]roadcasting may not be the only source of local programming as cable 
operators have developed local news channels and public, educational, and 
governmental access channels, which provide highly localized content, have 
multiplied in the past six years.”239 
 
 234 Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,098 ¶ 8 (1998) [hereinafter Digital Must-Carry NPRM] (citing S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-
230, at 161 (1996)); id. at 15,100, 15,101 ¶¶ 12-13 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-217, at 577 (1997), 
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 198). 
 235 See Eric Glick, Digital Puzzle Frustrates Feds, CABLE WORLD, July 13, 1998, at 1, available at 
http://www.c-span.org/about/dmc/cworld071398.htm, quoted in Hazlett, supra note 161, at 199. 
 236 Digital Must-Carry NPRM, 13 F.C.C.R. at 15,101 ¶ 14. 
 237 Id. at 15,096 ¶ 5 (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(7), (10), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461). 
 238 Id. at 15,102 ¶ 15 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (internal 
citation omitted); accord id. at 15,102 ¶ 16. 
 239 Id. at 15,103 ¶ 16. 
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The issues surrounding digital must-carry would be particularly 
problematic prior to 2006, when broadcasters would be transmitting both 
analog and digital signals.240  The FCC exhibited uncertainty about whether 
must-carry required cable operators to transmit the analog signal, the digital 
signal, or both.  As a result, it sought comment on seven different digital must-
carry proposals, which ranged from immediate carriage of all signals to no 
carriage whatsoever.241  Much of the debate centered on whether cable 
operators must carry both the analog and digital signals (which the FCC called 
“dual carriage”) during this period.242 
The FCC’s First Report and Order in this proceeding ultimately ruled that 
cable operators must provide free carriage to television stations that transmit 
exclusively in an analog or digital format.243  Its resolution of the dual carriage 
issue was less definitive.  Although the FCC tentatively concluded that a dual 
carriage requirement would represent an impermissible burden on cable 
operators’ First Amendment rights, it found that the record before it was not 
sufficiently complete to determine the impact that dual carriage would have on 
local broadcast stations and cable operators.  It therefore requested further 
comment on the impact that imposing dual carriage would have on local 
broadcasters.244  In particular, the FCC sought comment on the extent to which 
local broadcasters would be able to obtain carriage of their digital signals 
through voluntary retransmission consent agreements.245  In addition, the FCC 
asked whether, in light of the paucity of original digital programming 
available, imposing dual carriage would in fact enrich the programming 
environment or simply duplicate existing offerings.246  Thus, although the FCC 
appears to have tentatively rejected dual carriage for the time being, it left open 
 
 240 Id. at 15,112-13 ¶ 39. 
 241 Id. at 15,113-17 ¶¶ 41-50. 
 242 Id. at 15,123-25 ¶¶ 69-71. 
 243 Carriage of Digital Television Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2605 ¶ 13, 2608 ¶ 21 (2001) [hereinafter Digital Must-Carry First Report & 
Order & FNPRM]; accord WHDT, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 2692, 2698 ¶ 12 (2001); 
Serv. Rules for the 746-764 & 776-794 MHz Bands, & Revisions to Part 27 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 
Memorandum Opinion & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,845, 20,872 ¶ 65 
(2000). 
 244 Digital Must-Carry First Report & Order & FNPRM, 16 F.C.C.R. at 2600 ¶ 3, 2647-49 ¶¶ 112-15. 
 245 Id. at 2648 ¶ 115, 2654-56 ¶¶ 128-31. 
 246 Id. at 2651 ¶ 120.  The FCC also sought information regarding cable operators’ channel capacity in 
order to evaluate the extent to which imposing must-carry would burden cable operators’ First Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 2649 ¶ 115, 2653-54 ¶¶ 123-27. 
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the possibility that it might reach a different conclusion if presented with a 
more complete record about the impact that failure to mandate dual carriage 
would have on local programming. 
2. Localism in the Face of Increasing Returns to Scale 
The promotion and preservation of local content has thus represented one 
of the cornerstones of U.S. media policy since the very beginning of the 
television industry.  Since that time, this commitment has continued to shape 
the way the FCC has responded to every subsequent television technology.  
The economic theories described above suggest that this regulatory 
commitment betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic economics 
of television programming.  Decreasing average costs are an inevitable feature 
of nonrival goods, because the existence of constant marginal costs causes the 
returns to scale resulting from the amortization of fixed costs over increasingly 
large volumes to be inexhaustible.247  They are also endemic to markets 
involving differentiated products that necessarily reach equilibrium on the 
declining portion of the average cost curve.248  Consequently, television 
programming will still exhibit a natural tendency toward an equilibrium level 
of distribution that is geographically quite broad.249  This is not to say that 
products directed at local markets will not exist in equilibrium.  Even though 
products directed at national markets will enjoy cost advantages over products 
directed at local markets, variations in local preferences may allow products 
directed at local markets to exist.250  As a theoretical matter, the combination 
of these considerations would lead to an equilibrium mix of nationally oriented 
and locally oriented products.  The greater the taste for locally oriented 
products, the greater the proportion of locally oriented products will exist at 
equilibrium.  In practice, even the most cursory review of any typical 
programming day reveals that, with the exception of local news and regional 
sports programming, local and national preferences do not differ sufficiently to 
 
 247 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
 248 See supra notes 55, 65-71 and accompanying text. 
 249 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 5-6; OWEN, supra note 51, at 100. Indeed, the existence of economies 
of scale may provide the greatest advantages to programs able to achieve distribution that is international in 
scope.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 7, at 222-26; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 49-52; W. Ming Shao, 
Is There No Business Like Show Business?  Free Trade and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 105 
(1995). 
 250 See OWEN, supra note 118, at 112. 
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overcome the substantial cost advantages that accrue to programming 
distributed on a national scale.  Indeed, it is particularly telling that 
independent stations unaffiliated with any broadcast network are the stations 
least likely to provide locally originated programming.251  The failure of these 
stations to provide local content underscores the dramatic cost advantages 
enjoyed by stations supported by programming produced for national 
audiences. 
This in turn suggests that regulations designed to favor locally oriented 
programming over nationally oriented programming only serve to limit the 
networks’ ability to take advantage of television’s natural economies of scale.  
Such limitations cause unit costs to increase, as the fixed costs are amortized 
over a market that is even smaller than the already inefficiently small volume 
at which these markets reach equilibrium.  As unit costs increase, networks 
that would have covered their costs had they been able to reach a broader 
market find themselves unable to break even.  Attempts to promote local 
programming thus have the paradoxical effect of reducing the economic 
viability of programming that appeals to relatively small audience segments 
(such as local content).  The ultimate result is to cause the total number of 
networks to drop below efficient levels and to reduce the quantity and diversity 
of product offerings available.  To the extent that quality is related to total 
expenditure, such limits would tend to reduce the quality of television 
programming as well. 
The current system of retransmission consent and must-carry provides a 
useful indication of the extent of these effects.  As noted earlier, broadcast 
stations have the option of either negotiating a retransmission consent 
agreement or of obtaining free carriage by invoking their must-carry rights.252  
The choice faced by the stations is fairly clear.  If a station is strong enough to 
command some degree of compensation in return for providing programming, 
it will rely on retransmission consent.  Only those stations whose bargaining 
position is so weak that they would have to pay for carriage will avail 
themselves of must-carry.  Analysis of the available data indicates that eighty 
percent of independent stations chose must-carry, whereas only ten percent of 
network affiliates made the same decision.253  This overwhelming indication of 
 
 251 Hazlett, supra note 161, at 178, 181-83, 195-96. 
 252 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. 
 253 Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
 
2003] RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION 1659 
the financial advantages that network affiliates enjoy over independent stations 
attests to the natural advantage that nationally distributed programming enjoys 
over locally distributed programming. 
3. Application to U.S. Television Policy 
a. Analog Broadcasting 
The analysis developed in Part I helps to explain why the efforts to use 
broadcast policy to promote localism have proven so unsuccessful.  Consider 
the seminal decision to allocate television to as many communities as possible, 
which established a basic structural framework that persisted for more than 
thirty years.  The idea was to provide communities with local outlets 
responsive to local needs.254 
Economic analysis reveals the inherent contradiction underlying this 
policy.  The decreasing cost structure of television programming discussed 
above255 gives rise to inexhaustible returns to scale that give a cost advantage 
to programming able to obtain national distribution over programming 
distributed on a smaller scale.  As a result, during the era in which 
broadcasting represented the dominant television distribution technology, 
stations able to affiliate with networks possessed a decisive advantage over 
those unable to do so,256 and the success of any particular network depended 
upon its ability to achieve as close to national distribution as possible. 
The net effect of the FCC’s station allocation policy, however, was to 
ensure that a significant portion of the country could receive no more than 
three television signals.257  As a result, the FCC’s attempt to promote localism 
 
13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,110 ¶ 33 & n.92 (1998) (citing Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission 
Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable 
Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 146 (1996)). 
 254 See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 255 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 256 As noted earlier, these economies of scale are bolstered by technological and transaction efficiencies.  
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
 257 Specifically, the FCC assigned television stations according to the following priorities: 
(1) To provide at least one television service to all parts of the United States. 
(2) To provide each community with at least one television broadcast station. 
(3) To provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United States. 
(4) To provide each community with at least two television broadcast stations. 
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by dispersing stations broadly had the effect of forestalling the emergence of a 
fourth network despite evidence that sufficient demand existed to support as 
many as six networks.258  It was not until cable emerged as a viable competitor 
in the 1980s that this logjam was broken.259  This effect was exacerbated still 
further by the Chain Broadcasting Rules, which were designed in part to 
preserve local autonomy by curbing the power of the networks.260  In so doing, 
the Chain Broadcasting Rules simply ignored the underlying economies of 
scale. 
Furthermore, the restrictions on the number of stations not only had the 
effect of reducing the total number of networks; it also reduced the diversity of 
programming available.  This is because the artificial restrictions on 
distribution caused by the reduction in the number of networks allowed 
programming to be crowded out by other programming that commanded a 
larger audience.  This could occur even when the program that was crowded 
out was able to cover its costs.  As a result, programming had to clear more 
than just the hurdle of economic viability; it also had to compete with other 
programs.261  Regulations requiring stations to carry nonremunerative content 
only caused the break-even audience to increase still further. 
 
(5) Any channels which remain unassigned under the foregoing priorities will be assigned to the 
various communities depending on the size of the population of each community, the 
geographical location of such community, and the number of television services available to 
such community from television stations located in other communities. 
Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167     
¶ 63 (1952).  See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 275-78 (reviewing the impact of the allocation decision on 
the number of networks). 
 258 FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, 35TH ANNUAL REPORT 135, 137 (1969); ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 116-20 (1973). 
 259 A fourth network would only be able to reach sixty-four percent of U.S. households.  In addition, it 
should be remembered that when a fourth station was available, it was not infrequently a UHF station.  UHF 
suffers from several technical disadvantages when compared with VHF.  As a result, UHF has largely failed as 
a service during its first several decades of existence.  These differences in quality make the gap even more 
severe.  When only signals of comparable quality are considered, the percentage of the country that a fourth 
network could reach drops to thirty-four percent.  See Yoo, supra note 117, at 276-77. 
 260 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.  Baker also recommends that regulatory authorities 
continue to give a preference for owners of television stations who live in the community being served and 
who are involved in management.  BAKER, supra note 7, at 101, 120.  Interestingly, Congress and the FCC 
have already rejected the last of these proposals after the D.C. Circuit struck down such preferences as 
arbitrary and capricious.  See supra note 173. 
 261 See Yoo, supra note 50, at 1940-41. 
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The aggregate effect of these requirements was to increase the size of the 
audience that a program had to command to obtain airtime.  This in turn 
reduced the diversity of programming available by forcing out a number of 
programs that were economically viable but not sufficiently popular.  
Somewhat paradoxically, this necessarily included a significant amount of 
local programming, which is one form of special interest programming.  Thus 
the government’s attempts to promote local programming might have had the 
perverse effect of making it more difficult for precisely that type of 
programming to appear. 
b. Cable Television 
My analysis also suggests that efforts to promote localism indirectly by 
attempting to regulate cable television in a manner that favors local content 
have been similarly counterproductive.  As discussed above, regulations such 
as must-carry have proven to be singularly ineffective in promoting the values 
of localism.  This is because only the weakest broadcasters that provide the 
least local content are the sole beneficiaries of must-carry.262  Even worse, 
carriage of broadcasters by cable operators crowds out additional cable 
networks, beginning with those serving the smallest audiences.  All too often, 
the cable networks in risk of being lost to mandatory carriage requirements are 
those providing news and public affairs programming, as evidenced by C-
SPAN’s vigorous opposition to any expansion of the current must-carry 
requirements.263  Indeed, one of the most striking developments in recent years 
has been the proliferation of cable channels devoted exclusively to local 
news.264  Must-carry threatens to squelch the emergence of locally oriented, 
all-news channels on cable by preempting channel capacity available for such 
services.  In short, must-carry promotes marginal broadcasters at the expense 
of marginal cable channels even though it is the marginal cable channels that 
are more likely to provide diverse (including local) programming. 
Indeed, there is a credible argument that locally oriented programming 
would be promoted more effectively if policymakers were to favor cable over 
 
 262 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 263 See Hazlett, supra note 161, at 175-76.  For a partial catalog of cable networks providing news, public 
affairs, documentaries, arts-related, and children’s educational programming threatened to be crowded out by 
must-carry, see id. at 185-92. 
 264 See id. at 192-94. 
   
1662 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
broadcasting instead of the other way around.  The leading economic models 
of program choice reveal that one of the primary obstacles to the emergence of 
diverse programming is the tendency toward duplication of existing program 
types that arises whenever products compete on product features as well as 
price.265  In other words, new entrants often find it more profitable to offer 
additional versions of existing programming rather than to direct their attention 
toward smaller audience segments.266  When channel capacity is constrained, 
this duplication crowds out the appearance of more diverse programming.  
This problem can be solved, however, by increasing the amount of channel 
capacity available.  If excess channel capacity exists, the minimum break-even 
audience size drops, and all commercially viable types of programming should 
eventually appear.267  The intuitions underlying these models should be 
obvious to anyone who has witnessed the explosion of niche programming that 
has accompanied the increase in cable systems’ channel capacity.  More formal 
empirical studies have corroborated these theoretical conclusions.268 
This reasoning suggests that encouraging increases in channel capacity may 
represent the best way to promote the emergence of programming, such as 
locally oriented content, that commands small audiences.  Since cable has 
greater channel capacity than broadcasting, localism would arguably be better 
served if cable were allowed to develop unfettered. 
 
 265 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 50, at 15-17; Noam, supra note 50; Steiner, supra note 50.  For reviews of 
this literature, see OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 64-92, 140-43; Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying 
Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304-17 (1991); Yoo, supra note 50, at 1936-42, 
1946-48. 
 266 The intuition underlying this effect is as follows: If the distribution of viewers is skewed toward a 
particular type of program, the new entrant may find it more profitable to split the audience for that program 
type with competitors than to serve a smaller audience segment, since a fraction of the largest audience 
segment may be larger than the entire audience for other program types.  The problem from a welfare 
standpoint is that under these circumstances a significant proportion of the viewers obtained by the new entrant 
are cannibalized from other stations, which does not cause aggregate welfare to increase.  The preferred 
outcome from a welfare standpoint would be for the new entrant to provide programming for audience 
segments that are currently unserved. 
 267 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 86-87; Beebe, supra note 50, at 30. 
 268 See Augustus E. Grant, The Promise Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on 
Television, 7 J. MEDIA ECON. 51, 59, 62 (1994); Noam, supra note 161, at 155-71. 
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c. DBS 
A similar critique would seem to apply to the restrictions on DBS imposed 
by the SHVIA.  The economic analysis developed above suggests that 
policymakers should be welcoming the advent of DBS rather than constraining 
it in the name of preserving local television stations.  DBS is the first television 
technology that naturally lends itself to national distribution of programming.  
In contrast to the geographic footprint of broadcasting and cable providers, 
which are inherently limited to a discrete geographic area, DBS can provide 
programming on a national and even continental scale.269  As a result, DBS is 
the technology best positioned to realize the economies of scale inherent in 
television programming.  Such gains are likely to be particularly pronounced 
with respect to DBS, because once the satellite is deployed and programming 
is made available to it, the marginal costs of allowing another household to 
view that programming should drop far below those associated with any other 
means of transmission. 
As a result, imposing an implicit cross-subsidy on DBS in favor of local 
broadcasting appears to be economically misconceived.  Not only would doing 
so bias the industry in ways that would prevent the market from realizing all of 
the available economies of scale, but requiring DBS to carry all local stations 
would cause it to waste valuable channel capacity.  This is because DBS can 
currently only target transmissions at the entire country.  Although the DBS 
providers are in the process of deploying “spot beam” technology that should 
allow them to reuse spectrum by restricting the geographic coverage of particu-
lar channels, such technologies are not likely to be operational until 2004 at the 
earliest.270 
 
 269 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 270 See Alicia Mundy, Charlie’s Angel, CABLE WORLD, Apr. 1, 2002, at 12, 15.  The FCC’s Media Bureau 
has recently invalidated EchoStar’s attempts to use satellites located in the “wing slots” to solve the capacity 
problems.  The problem is that use of these additional satellites requires the installation of a second satellite 
dish.  The Bureau ruled that EchoStar has not properly educated customers about the need to install the second 
dish, is not displaying the local channels carried on the second dish contiguously with the local channels 
provided through the main dish, and is not integrating the channels carried on the second dish into its 
electronic programming guide.  Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, DA 02-765, slip op. at 8-12 ¶¶ 12-28 (Media Bur. 
Apr. 4, 2002).  This ruling will not necessarily prevent EchoStar from using the second dish to provide local 
service.  The Bureau identified several steps that EchoStar could take that would bring its second-dish plan 
into compliance with applicable law.  Id. at 18-19 ¶¶ 31-33. 
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The limits on the geostationary orbit slots and the current unavailability of 
spot beam technology dictate that DBS providers are each restricted to between 
450 and 500 channels;271 the prohibition of distant signal importation requires 
providers to waste valuable capacity by dedicating channels to signals that only 
a small portion of the country would be able to receive.  Even worse, the carry 
one, carry all rule requires DBS to devote capacity to programming that is 
essentially duplicative, because the provision requires DBS providers to carry 
all of the ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox affiliates in the markets that they serve, 
despite the fact that the programming carried on those channels is identical 
during substantial parts of the day.  Given that the average U.S. household can 
receive thirteen local television signals,272 it is clear that the carry one, carry all 
rule will severely limit the number of cities in which DBS will be able to offer 
effective competition to cable. 
This analysis reveals the fundamental conceptual flaws underlying 
requiring DBS to carry locally oriented programming.  Indeed, it might be 
more economically beneficial if all national network programming were to 
migrate to DBS and for television broadcasting to abandon network affiliations 
and reposition itself exclusively toward local content.273  Instead, the carry one, 
carry all rule is preventing the networks from realizing the significant 
economies of scale associated with nationwide distribution.  The result is an 
inevitable reduction in the quantity, quality, and diversity of the available 
programming. 
d. Digital Broadcasting 
The economics of public goods reveal the misconceived nature of basing 
the decision to deploy digital television through existing analog broadcasters 
on the need to preserve the local content of television programming.  The 
approach taken by the FCC implicitly builds on the presumption that the 
preservation of incumbent analog broadcasters represents an effective way to 
promote local content.  As noted earlier,274 a brief review of the current 
 
 271 Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 272 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules & Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Biennial Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 
11,058, 11,064 ¶ 9 (2000); Yoo, supra note 51, at 212. 
 273 See Shelanski, supra note 202, at 1076-77. 
 274 See supra notes 161, 251 and accompanying text. 
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programming offered by local television stations belies this assertion.  The vast 
majority of local television stations are affiliated with national networks and 
fill their programming days with either network programming or nationally 
distributed syndicated programming.  Independent broadcasters rely even more 
heavily on national program sources (usually provided via syndication), 
because few independent stations have the resources to produce local content. 
The incongruity of attempting to promote localism in this manner becomes 
even more apparent when one closely examines the nature of the service being 
displaced by the decision to double the spectrum given for free to all 
incumbent television stations.  Much of the spectrum necessary to implement 
the current plan came at the expense of low power television stations275 and 
vacant noncommercial allotments.276  Even though this approach was 
supposedly designed to promote localism, it somewhat ironically did so at the 
expense of the television services believed to be particularly well suited to 
providing locally oriented programming.277 
Monopolistic competition and public good economics also reveal that 
requiring cable operators to provide dual carriage of both analog and digital 
broadcast signals is unlikely to prove effective in promoting local content.  As 
a general matter, nationally distributed programming has an inherent cost 
advantage over locally distributed programming.  As a result, attempts to 
promote locally oriented over nationally oriented programming are likely to 
prove ineffectual and will only serve to depress the quantity, quality, and 
diversity of television programming.  Indeed, previous experience indicates 
 
 275 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Sixth Report & 
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, 14,595 ¶ 11 (1997) [hereinafter DTV Sixth Report & Order]; Advanced Television 
Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report & 
Order, & Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, 6953 ¶¶ 37-39 (1992); Advanced 
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3350-51 ¶¶ 39-42 (1992) [hereinafter DTV Second Report 
& Order]. 
 276 See DTV Sixth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 14,639 ¶ 112; DTV Second Report & Order, 7 
F.C.C.R. at 3350 ¶¶ 37-38. 
 277 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,           
§ 2(a)(8)(B), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (recognizing that “public television is a local community institution . . . that 
provides public service programming that is responsive to the needs and interests of the local community”); 
Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l 
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,470 ¶ 12 (1982) (recognizing that LPTV is a medium 
particularly well suited to providing local programming). 
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that digital must-carry would only benefit those stations that are the least likely 
to provide locally oriented content.278 
As suggested in the discussion of cable television,279 it is arguable that the 
FCC would promote local content more effectively if it were to eliminate 
must-carry altogether, let alone extend it to digital television.  The wild card in 
this scenario is the uncertainty about the type of programming that will appear 
on digital television.  The increase in the number of available voices made 
possible by multicasting may well foster the emergence of local content in 
television broadcasting in much the same manner as freeing up channel 
capacity on cable did.  As a result, it would be improper to regard this as an 
argument for favoring cable at the expense of other media.  The better position 
is to remove implicit cross-subsidies running in either direction.  In that way, 
market forces, as well as the other economic considerations discussed below, 
will determine the final outcome. 
*  *  * 
The analysis I advance reveals that the FCC’s attempts to promote locally 
oriented content over nationally oriented content are inherently misguided.  
This commitment has only served to deprive television networks of resources 
by preventing the realization of the available economies of scale without 
generating any concomitant increase in locally oriented programming.  The net 
effect is to reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming without 
providing any compensating benefits. 
These problems become even worse when viewed from a longer-term 
perspective.  Not only does preventing program producers from realizing the 
available efficiencies create welfare losses in the here and now, it also deters 
the emergence of new programming and new television technologies in the 
future.  Viewing these problems from the perspective of dynamic efficiency, it 
becomes clear that any access requirements and other regulatory measures that 
artificially reduce the overall profitability of network operations have the 
inevitable effect of causing investment in new technologies and new 
 
 278 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra Part III.A.3.b. 
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programming options to drop below efficient levels.280  The localism-related 
commitments advanced by the FCC thus heighten the inefficiencies identified 
by public good economics. 
It thus seems clear that those who view the problems of localism in largely 
economic terms would conclude that economic welfare would increase if 
policymakers were to abandon the historic commitment to promoting local 
content.  I do not mean to suggest that the FCC should reverse this 
presumption and impose regulation favoring nationally oriented programming 
over locally oriented programming.  Such steps are unnecessary, because even 
without such regulation networks that are able to achieve national distribution 
will possess a natural advantage.  My point is rather that policymakers should 
eliminate implicit cross-subsidies running in either direction.  Doing so would 
appear to be a more effective way to promote economic welfare and, to the 
extent that local content appears to be economically viable, would likely be far 
more effective at encouraging local content to appear. 
Interestingly, my analysis should give even those who favor locally 
oriented programming for noneconomic reasons cause to reject the attempts to 
use explicit and implicit cross-subsidies to promote local content.  It suggests 
that these methods are particularly poorly designed to promote local content.  
On the contrary, attempts to promote localism by requiring other media to 
cross-subsidize television broadcasting are far more likely to reduce the 
amount of local content available by raising the break-even audience needed 
for a network to be economically viable.  As a result, the current policy 
approach simply increases the costs and the constitutional problems faced by 
those who would promote localism more directly. 
Those committed to localism for noneconomic reasons may find that 
implementation of the reforms I am suggesting would reduce the cost and the 
magnitude of the intervention required to achieve the results that they seek.  In 
the process, it would minimize any First Amendment problems raised by large, 
content-based government subsidies.  Simply put, even those who object to 
allowing economics to define the ends of television policy should nonetheless 
remain very interested in what economics can teach us about the likely efficacy 
of the various means available for pursuing noneconomic goals. 
 
 280 For an earlier discussion of the dynamic efficiency problems created by access requirements, see Yoo, 
supra note 51, at 246-47, 269. 
   
1668 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
In fact, if the definition of community is broadened to include communities 
of interest as well as geographic communities, existing attempts to promote 
local content necessarily create an inherent tradeoff.  Although fostering the 
availability of locally oriented programming may strengthen geographic 
communities, it does so at the expense of making nationally oriented 
programming more expensive and increasing the minimum audience size that 
national programming must command in order to cover its fixed costs.  Making 
nationally oriented programming more expensive in turn reduces television’s 
ability to serve communities of interest that are geographically dispersed 
across the nation, because any such increase in cost will cause programming 
designed to meet the needs of certain small groups to disappear even though 
such programming would have been economically viable had the regulatory 
measures that I have been criticizing did not exist.  In short, even those who 
reject viewing policy in terms of maximizing economic welfare must still heed 
the basic economic lessons about free lunches.  Any policy choice inevitably 
involves tradeoffs, and economic analysis almost invariably proves invaluable 
in understanding the relative costs and benefits associated with the available 
policy options. 
B. Advertising Support and the Maximization of Total Surplus: Free vs. Pay 
Television 
Just as with its commitment to localism, the FCC’s commitment to 
preserving free television has reduced the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
programming available.  Subsection 1 traces the extent to which attempts to 
protect free television have shaped television policy with respect to analog 
broadcasting, cable television, DBS, and digital television.  The balance of this 
section analyzes the ways that the commitment to free television has debased 
television programming by starving it of resources.  Subsection 2 analyzes the 
inherent inefficiencies of untargeted subsidy programs, such as those currently 
employed to promote access to television.  Subsection 3 addresses how 
reliance on advertising support interposes an intermediary into the economic 
relationship between viewers and the networks that interferes with viewers’ 
ability to signal their true preferences to the networks.  Subsection 4 identifies 
the ways that advertising support interferes with the networks’ ability to set 
prices that increase total surplus. 
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1. The Regulatory Commitment to Free Television 
After the commitment to localism, the next most significant sub-
commitment embodied in the regulatory approach taken by Congress and the 
FCC is the commitment to “free” (i.e., advertising-supported) television and its 
hostility toward “pay” television, which it defined as television for which an 
additional fee is charged on a per-program or per-channel basis.281  This 
subsection will trace how this subcommitment is reflected in the regulatory 
approach taken with respect to each major television technology. 
a. Analog Broadcasting 
The desire to preserve free television played a major role in shaping the 
way that the FCC regulated analog broadcasting.  The nature of the FCC’s 
commitment to free television can be discerned in its attempts to suppress the 
emergence of a technology known as subscription television (STV), which 
employed scrambling devices to make broadcast programming available only 
to those willing to pay for the right to view it.282  STV first emerged as a 
technology in 1950,283 and the FCC first addressed the regulatory status of 
STV when it issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1955.284  After 
several false starts,285 the FCC declined to authorize STV as a general service 
 
 281 As a result of this definition, pay television refers primarily to pay-per-view programs and premium 
movie channels provided by cable operators and other MVPDs.  It does not include programming provided 
through the basic tiers of cable television, even though viewers clearly pay a flat fee for access to basic cable 
networks. 
 282 See, e.g., Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335.  The FCC had authorized a trial subscription 
radio service in 1941, which eventually became Muzak.  Muzak Corp., 8 F.C.C. 581, 582 (1941). 
 283 Jill Abeshouse Stern et al., The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory 
Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 532 (1983). 
 284 Radio Broad. Servs., Subscription Television Serv., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988 
(Feb. 16, 1955). 
 285 See Second Report, 16 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1539 (1958); Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules & 
Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for Subscription Television Serv., First Report, 23 F.C.C. 532 
(1957); 22 Fed. Reg. 3758 (May 29, 1957) (notice of further proceedings). 
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in 1959.286  Instead, the FCC merely authorized it on an experimental basis,287 
which eventually led to the deployment of a single STV station.288 
When the FCC eventually authorized more widescale deployment in 1968, 
it saddled the technology with a wide range of restrictions.  For example, the 
regulations limited STV to communities that received at least five broadcast 
signals289 and required that STV stations broadcast at least twenty-eight hours 
of advertiser-supported programming each week.290  In addition, the FCC 
subjected STV to a complicated array of programming restrictions designed to 
ensure that STV did not siphon programming from conventional broadcast 
television.  Specifically, the FCC generally prohibited STV from broadcasting 
movies that were between two and ten years old (thereby limiting STV to 
offering movies that were very new or very old),291 prohibited STV from 
carrying any sporting event that had been carried on conventional television 
within the last two years,292 required that movies and sporting events together 
not comprise more than ninety percent of STV’s total programming 
schedule,293 prohibited STV from carrying any television series that normally 
appeared on conventional broadcasting,294 and prohibited STV from including 
any commercial advertisements.295 
The FCC eventually liberalized the rules relating to movies to exempt 
foreign language films, to allow movies to be shown for up to three years after 
their release rather than two, and to allow for the broadcast of a greater number 
 
 286 Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for 
Subscription Television Serv., Third Report, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959). 
 287 Id. at 265-66. 
 288 See Application of Hartford Phonevision Co. for Authority to Conduct Trial Subscription Television 
Operations over Station WHCT, Hartford, Conn., Report & Decision, 30 F.C.C. 301 (1961), aff’d sub nom. 
Conn. Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962). 
 289 Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for 
Subscription Television Serv., Fourth Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 507 ¶ 128, 518-19 ¶¶ 165-67 (1968), 
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
922 (1970). 
 290 Id. at 525-26 ¶¶ 190-92. 
 291 The rules made an exception when conventional broadcasters had been offered and refused those 
movies.  Id. at 508 ¶ 131, 556-57 ¶¶ 285-87, 569-71 ¶¶ 325-31. 
 292 Id. at 508-09 ¶ 132, 558-64 ¶¶ 289-305. 
 293 Id. at 564 ¶ 306. 
 294 Id. at 509 ¶ 132, 565 ¶ 309. 
 295 Id. at 565 ¶ 310. 
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of films that were more than ten years old.296  The FCC also eliminated the 
prohibition of series programming.297  Finally, following the 1977 judicial 
invalidation of the parallel restrictions on pay cable discussed below,298 the 
FCC eventually repealed the program restrictions on STV.299  Repeal of the 
regulations requiring particular programming and limiting STV to markets in 
which five or more broadcast channels were available followed four years 
later.300 
These deregulatory efforts were greeted by some initial growth in the STV 
market301 and a flurry of ambitious pronouncements about STV’s future.302  By 
this time, however, cable had emerged as a multi-channel platform for pay 
television, and the window of opportunity for STV had closed.  By 1986, only 
one or two STV stations were still in operation.303 
b. Cable Television 
The FCC also attempted to preserve advertising-supported television by 
imposing burdensome regulations on cable.  As noted above, the FCC imposed 
stringent regulations on cable programming that required payment of a per-
program or per-channel fee, only to see those restrictions invalidated by the 
D.C. Circuit.304  In addition, the must-carry, distant signal importation, 
network nonduplication, and syndicated exclusivity rules discussed above305 
 
 296 Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Pertaining to the 
Cablecasting of Programs for Which a Per Program or Per Channel Charge Is Made, First Report & Order, 52 
F.C.C.2d 1, 51 ¶¶ 165-66, 53-55 ¶¶ 172-77 (1975). 
 297 Id. at 65 ¶ 209. 
 298 The seminal judicial decision was Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
 299 Repeal of Programming Restrictions on Subscription Television, Report & Order, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,322 
(Apr. 7, 1978). 
 300 Amendment of Part 73 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations in Regard to Section 73.642(a)(3) & Other 
Aspects of the Subscription Television Serv., Third Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982). 
 301 See id. at 344 ¶ 8. 
 302 See, e.g., Stern et al., supra note 283, at 534; Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: 
Why Can’t Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 254 & n.186 (1987). 
 303 See Subscription Video, Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, 1005 (1987). 
 304 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna 
Television Sys., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 828-29 ¶ 6 (1970).  These rules were 
ultimately vacated by the D.C. Circuit.  See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
 305 See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text. 
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were motivated in large part by a desire to prevent those who are unable or 
unwilling to pay for television service from being deprived of it.306 
One of the most explicit endorsements of this position appeared in the 
legislative findings accompanying the 1992 Cable Act.  These findings 
asserted that broadcasting programming “is otherwise free to those who own 
television sets” and that there is a “substantial government interest in 
promoting the continued availability of such free television programming, 
especially for viewers who are unable to afford other means of receiving 
programming.”307  Without must-carry, “the economic viability of free local 
broadcast television . . . w[ould] be seriously jeopardized.”308 
The Supreme Court relied on these findings in upholding must-carry 
against constitutional attack.309  The Court specifically concluded that 
“Congress’s overriding objective in enacting must-carry was . . . to preserve 
access to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without 
cable”310 and “to ensure that every individual with a television set can obtain 
access to free television programming.”311  The Court’s ruling that “‘protecting 
noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due 
to competition from cable systems’ is an important federal interest”312 left little 
room for doubt that the desire to preserve free television represented one of the 
central forces animating federal cable policy. 
 
 306 See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report & Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 744   
¶ 185 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1143 (1982); Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91 to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern Grant of 
Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna 
Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 788-89 ¶ 155 (1966); Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to 
Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations 
to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Systems, First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699 ¶ 44, 700         
¶ 48(1) (1965). 
 307 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(12), 
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000)). 
 308 § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462. 
 309 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 191 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 646 (1994). 
 310 Turner, 512 U.S. at 646; see also Turner, 520 U.S. at 190; Turner, 512 U.S. at 663. 
 311 Turner, 512 U.S. at 647. 
 312 Id. at 663 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)); accord Turner, 520 
U.S. at 190 (reaffirming this finding). 
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c. DBS 
The preservation of free television has also shaped the way that 
policymakers have regulated DBS.  For example, the initial refusal to allow the 
importation of distant signals reflected in the SHVA of 1988 stemmed in large 
part from the need to preserve free over-the-air television.313  As one of the 
Committee Reports noted, 
Free local over-the-air television stations continue to play an 
important role in providing the American people information and 
entertainment.  The Committee is concerned that changes in 
technology, and accompanying changes in law and regulation, do not 
undermine the base of free local television service upon which the 
American people continue to rely.314 
Congress expressed similar sentiments when enacting the SHVIA in 1999.  
As the Conference Report noted, the carry one, carry all provision was 
“intended to preserve free television for those not served by satellite or cable 
systems” and to further “Congress’ interest in maintaining free over-the-air 
television.”315  The Fourth Circuit repeatedly invoked this legislative history in 
sustaining the SHVIA against constitutional attack316 and concluded that the 
carry one, carry all rule “was designed to preserve a rich mix of broadcast 
outlets for consumers who do not (or cannot) pay for subscription television 
services.”317 
d. Digital Broadcasting 
The commitment to free television also played a role in the way that the 
FCC has deployed digital television.  For example, the FCC has repeatedly 
justified the importance of deploying digital television through broadcasting 
rather than other television services on the grounds that broadcasting, unlike 
subscription services, represents a “free” service that is available to almost all 
 
 313 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5655. 
 314 Id. 
 315 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101 (1999); accord S. REP. NO. 106-51, at 1 (1999) (recognizing that 
the purpose of the legislation was “protecting the availability of free, local over-the-air television”); id. at 13 
(finding that “maintaining free over-the-air-television is a preeminent public interest” and identifying 
“protecting the viability of free, local, over-the-air television” as one of the statute’s purposes). 
 316 See Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 349, 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 317 Id. at 350. 
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U.S. households.318  Although Congress and the FCC authorized digital 
broadcasters to offer STV and other forms of pay television, they could do so 
only if they provided at least one over-the-air video program signal at no direct 
charge to viewers319 and if such services did not derogate from the provision of 
free television services.320  The FCC also required digital broadcasters to pay 
additional spectrum fees if any of the spectrum was used for pay television.321  
The FCC based these regulations on indicia in the legislative history 
suggesting that Congress wanted new television services and technologies to 
be provided under the leadership of the existing local television broadcasting 
system, which is available to all citizens and not only those who can afford 
subscription services.322 
Finally, concerns about preserving free television have also animated the 
FCC’s proceedings regarding the extension of the must-carry rules to digital 
programming.  As the FCC has noted, both the transition to digital television 
and the imposition of must-carry on analog broadcasters share the common 
purpose of ensuring “the continued availability of free over-the-air broadcast 
service.”323  As a result, the FCC sought comment on the impact that the 
various forms of digital must-carry under consideration would have on this 
 
 318 Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & 
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,811-12 ¶ 5, 12,820 ¶¶ 27-29 (1997) [hereinafter DTV Fifth Report & Order]; 
Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Further Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 6235, 6249 ¶ 36 (1996); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon 
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 
F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342 ¶ 4 (1992); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. 
Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6525 ¶¶ 38-39 (1988); see also 
Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Report & Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,787-88 ¶ 33 (1996) (noting that the goals of digital television deployment include 
preserving a free, universal broadcasting service); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing 
Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking & 
Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶ 6, 10,543 ¶ 22 (1995) (same). 
 319 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b) (2002).  The resolution of this signal must be comparable to or better than 
current analog service.  DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,812 ¶ 7, 12,820 ¶ 28. 
 320 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)(2) (2000); DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,820-22 ¶¶ 29-32. 
 321 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1); DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,823 ¶ 35.  The FCC later set this 
fee at five percent of gross revenues received from ancillary and supplementary uses.  Fees for Ancillary or 
Supplementary Use of Digital Television Spectrum Pursuant to Section 336(e)(1) of Telecomms. Act of 1996, 
Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259 (1998) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(g) (2002)). 
 322 See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995). 
 323 Carriage of Transmissions of Digital Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 
15,092, 15,114-15 ¶ 43 (1998) (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461; and H.R. REP. NO. 102-628, at 27 (1992)). 
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service.324  When the time came to issue the First Report and Order in the 
Digital Must-Carry proceedings, the FCC tentatively concluded that the 
governmental interests underlying digital must-carry, which included 
“preserving the benefits of free over-the-air local broadcast television,” did not 
justify requiring cable operators to transmit all of the program streams offered 
by digital broadcasters.325  The conclusion was tentative because the FCC 
believed that the record before it was not sufficiently complete to determine 
the impact that refusing to provide dual carriage would have on broadcast 
stations, cable operators, cable programmers, and consumers.  As a result, the 
FCC sought further comments on the extent to which imposing dual carriage 
would further the governmental interests underlying must-carry, including “the 
preservation of the benefits of free over-the-air television.”326  However the 
FCC finally decides to resolve this issue, it is clear that the commitment to 
preserving free television will play a key role in shaping the outcome. 
2. The Inefficiency of Untargeted Subsidies 
U.S. television policy has thus been shaped in no small part by a desire to 
preserve free television.  The most commonly asserted reason is to make sure 
that Americans have access to television without regard to the ability to pay.  A 
system that attempts to ensure access to television by providing it to every 
household without regard to means would seem to be poor policy.  It is far 
from clear that an economic case can be made to support the claim that people 
should be entitled to receive access to any particular type of communications 
for free.  Consumers place a high value on many other types of media, 
including newspapers, books, and the Internet, and yet no one expects to be 
provided with those materials without paying for them.327 
Indeed, because governmental interventions to promote free television have 
the inevitable effect of skewing demand away from other activities, supporters 
of free television must justify why society should subsidize the consumption of 
television programming rather than the consumption of other media.  If 
anything, it is arguable that doing so draws citizens away from other types of 
 
 324 Id. 
 325 Carriage of Digital Television Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2600 ¶ 3 (2001); accord id. at 2648 ¶ 113. 
 326 Id. 
 327 See Winer, supra note 302, at 253; Yoo, supra note 117, at 353-54. 
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information sources that would be far more effective in improving the quality 
of the processes of democratic self-governance.328 
In any event, even those who support promoting the ability of all 
households to obtain access to television should agree that adopting regulatory 
policies that in effect render television free for all households without regard to 
the ability to pay represents a distinctly inefficient way to preserve the viewing 
options of the poor.  As I have noted elsewhere, providing low-income 
households with discounts for pay television services in the manner currently 
used to promote indigent access to telephone service should promote access to 
television far more efficiently than the system of implicit cross-subsidies 
currently employed, which effectively lowers the price of television for all 
households regardless of ability to pay.329  Had policymakers opted to auction 
this spectrum rather than give it away, it would have likely generated more 
than enough revenue to support a telephone-style direct subsidy program 
aimed at low-income households.330 
More important for the purposes of this Article is the fact that the analytical 
framework developed above indicates that promoting free television exacts an 
even greater price by reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
programming available on television.  The problems are twofold.  First, 
reliance on advertising support interposes an intermediary into the economic 
relationship between viewers and the networks that interferes with viewers’ 
ability to signal their true preferences to the networks.  Second, advertising 
support limits the networks’ ability to set prices at levels that maximize total 
surplus. 
 
 328 Indeed, promoting “free” access to television may well be stimulating excess consumption of 
television programming.  If so, the predominant role that television plays in contemporary society may be the 
consequence of regulation rather than an empirical fact that should be remedied through regulation.  For a 
general discussion of this problem, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 342-44. 
 329 See Ross C. Ericksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from 
Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41 J.L. & ECON. 477, 481-82 (1998) 
(reporting empirical study finding targeted subsidies to be five times more effective than untargeted subsidies); 
Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55. 
 330 See Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55. 
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3. Distortions Resulting from Allowing Advertisers to Serve as 
Intermediaries 
One problem associated with relying entirely on broadcast television is the 
limitation it places on the viewers’ ability to signal the intensity of their 
preferences to program providers.  In a normal market, consumers who place a 
particularly high value on a good can use their willingness to pay high prices 
for that good to communicate that fact to the networks.  The availability of 
such price signals allows products that are only able to capture small volumes 
to generate revenues substantial enough to cover all of the fixed and variable 
costs needed to produce the product.  So long as their willingness to pay is 
high enough, even extremely small audiences can use price signals to obtain 
the programming that they seek. 
Reliance on advertising support interferes with consumers’ ability to send 
such price signals.331  In a system of advertising support, one would expect 
advertisers to increase their advertising spending until the marginal cost of 
placing additional ads equals the marginal revenue generated by those ads.  In 
short, the level of advertising spending (and thus the revenue generated by the 
networks through advertising support) depends on the return to advertising.332  
Although the returns to advertising are primarily a function of audience size,333 
they also depend on demographic characteristics, such as income, age, gender, 
and geographic location.334  Although these factors may reveal a great deal 
about whether a person who sees an advertisement will purchase the advertised 
product, they say little about the value that viewer places on the underlying 
 
 331 Timothy J. Brennan, Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 
128 (1983); Timothy J. Brennan, The Fairness Doctrine as Public Policy, 33 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 419, 
432-33 (1990). 
 332 Minasian, supra note 31, at 75. 
 333 The conventional wisdom is well captured by the testimony offered during the Turner remand stating, 
“Simply put, a television station’s audience size directly translates into revenue—large audiences attract larger 
revenues, through the sale of advertising time.”  Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Bus. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27 (1988) (statement of Gary Chapman), quoted in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 
U.S. 180, 208 (1997); accord Turner, 520 U.S. at 208-09 (citing empirical research confirming the “direct 
correlation between size in audience and station advertising revenues”) (alterations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
 334 See Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Audience-Revenue Relationship for Local Television Stations, 11 
BELL J. ECON. 694, 694 (1980). 
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program.335  One would not expect advertising revenue to represent an accurate 
reflection of viewers’ aggregate desire to view a particular network.  Although 
it is theoretically possible that this difference could cause advertising support 
to generate either too much or too little revenue when compared to actual 
intensity of preferences, an oft-cited empirical study estimated that advertising 
support understated viewers’ willingness to pay by a factor of seven.336 
The point can be illustrated by returning to the airline example.  Reliance 
on advertising support to finance television would be tantamount to financing 
flights between particular cities solely through the purchases of goods 
advertised in the airline’s in-flight shopping magazine and perhaps during 
periodic presentations during the flight.  The interposition of such an indirect 
pricing mechanism would no doubt cause the total amount of revenue 
generated through such sales to underestimate the value that passengers placed 
on the transportation services between those cities. 
The indirectness of the revenue signal is exacerbated still further given that 
advertising support provides viewers with only a single degree of freedom with 
which to respond to viewing, i.e., either purchasing or not purchasing the 
advertised product.337  Like all voting models, this has the effect of depriving 
people of the ability to signal the intensity of their preferences.338  As a result, 
viewers with a particularly strong desire for a particular type of programming 
have no way to signal that fact to program producers. 
The inability to derive greater revenue from those viewers with the most 
intense preferences increases the break-even audience size required for a 
network to generate sufficient revenue to cover its fixed costs.  This flattening 
of viewers’ ability to influence the behavior of program producers thus has the 
 
 335 See Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broad. Satellites for the Period Fol-
lowing 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 681-82 ¶ 17 (1982); 
Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 105, 123. 
 336 NOLL ET AL., supra note 258, at 23.  Although some have criticized the magnitude of this estimate, 
none has controverted the fundamental conclusion that consumers are willing to pay far more for television 
than are advertisers.  See Rolla Edward Park, New Television Networks: An Update, in 1 FCC NETWORK 
INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS 143, 149 & n.2 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION 
NETWORKS] (citing Stanley M. Besen & Bridger M. Mitchell, Economic Analysis and Television Regulation, 5 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 301 (1974); and Bryan Ellickson, Hedonic Theory and the Demand for Cable 
Television, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 183 (1979)). 
 337 See Minasian, supra note 31, at 75; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112 & n.12. 
 338 See Oakland, supra note 20, at 528. 
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greatest impact on networks that seek to offer programming that is intensely 
preferred by a relatively small segment of the audience.  Thus, reliance on 
advertising support is likely to reinforce and worsen the bias against special 
interest programs identified earlier.339  The indirectness of this signaling is also 
likely to impact most severely those networks catering to the audiences who 
are least likely to respond to advertising messages, such as networks offering 
children’s education television, because it is with respect to those networks 
that responsiveness to advertising and the willingness to pay (in this case the 
parents’ willingness to pay) are likely to diverge the most.340  A shift to pay 
television would similarly allow parents to have access to larger amounts of 
educational programming for their children in the most straightforward way 
imaginable.  It is no accident that much of the best children’s educational 
programming on commercial television appears on cable.341  To the extent that 
quality is correlated with the total amount spent on program production, the 
shortfall in revenue also causes the quality of television programming to 
decline as well. 
Reliance on advertising support also introduces another source of bias by 
allowing advertisers to introduce their own biases into program selection.  A 
number of scholars have suggested that reliance on advertising support has 
allowed advertisers to discourage programming that addresses controversial 
issues or that casts their products in a poor light.342  Although these scholars 
concede that this evidence is anecdotal,343 they nonetheless believe that it is 
representative of a broader pattern of underproduction of certain types of 
television programming. 
Both of these effects are demonstrated dramatically by HBO, which is 
generally regarded as the premier pay television service.  The ability to signal 
intensity of preference through direct payments allows HBO to generate one 
half the revenue of CBS even though its prime time audience is over five times 
 
 339 Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112-13, 122-23; see also Chae & Flores, supra note 126, at 50-51. 
 340 See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 
10,660, 10,675 ¶¶ 32-33 (1996). 
 341 See Yoo, supra note 117, at 327-28. 
 342 See BAKER, supra note 6, at 48, 54-56, 62-66; BAKER, supra note 7, at 24-30; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, 
at 63-65; Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689, 
696-713 (1994). 
 343 BAKER, supra note 6, at 49; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 216 (1993). 
   
1680 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
smaller.344  In addition, in sharp contrast to the difficulties that broadcasters 
faced in generating enough advertising to support their decisions to air 
programs on abortion,345 HBO faced little trouble in carrying a documentary 
on the same subject.  A similar scenario played out with respect to the planned 
CBS miniseries The Reagans.  After controversy about the way that the former 
President and First Lady were portrayed threatened to erupt into an advertiser 
boycott, Viacom opted to shift the program from CBS to Showtime, a premium 
movie channel that does not depend on advertising support.346  The key 
difference is, of course, that unlike advertising-supported television, the 
economic survival of pay television does not depend upon assuaging sponsors.  
As one HBO executive explained, “We’re not any braver than the networks.  
It’s just that our economic basis is different.”347 
It is thus likely that previous efforts to promote and preserve free television 
may have had the perverse effect of reducing the total resources available to 
fund television programming.  Some rough empirical studies from the 1970s 
suggest that the reduction in resources will reduce the overall quantity and 
diversity of programming produced.348  A pair of recent event studies 
comparing the demand and revenue generated by similar television programs 
financed by pay-per-view and by advertising support largely confirm that pay 
television appears to be considerably more effective at enabling program 
producers to capture a greater percentage of the available surplus.  Both studies 
concluded that shifting programs to pay-per-view would tend to cause total 
output to increase.349  The study that framed the issue in terms of total surplus 
also concluded that a shift to pay television transferred surplus from consumers 
to producers while simultaneously causing the total revenue and total surplus 
 
 344 See 25 Top Television Networks, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 27, 2000, at 54. 
 345 SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 65; Shiffrin, supra note 342, at 698. 
 346 See Meg James et al., The Vetoing of “Reagans”: How Protests and Bad Timing Led CBS to Cancel a 
Movie About the Former First Couple, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at E1; Emily Nelson & Joe Flint, CBS 
Pulls “Reagans” amid Opposition from Conservatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3. 
 347 Jan Hoffman, TV Shouts “Baby” (and Barely Whispers “Abortion”), N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at 
H1, quoted in Shiffrin, supra note 342, at 698. 
 348 Spence and Owen offer an empirical calculation indicating that reliance on advertising support is 
preventing the emergence of a fourth television network.  Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 118-19.  This is 
despite the fact that other studies indicated that sufficient demand existed to support up to six networks.  See 
supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 349 See Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 590, 601, 604; Steinar Holden, Network or Pay-Per-View?: A 
Welfare Analysis, 43 ECON. LETTERS 59, 62-64 (1993). 
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generated to increase.350  As a result, reliance on pay television made possible 
the production of programming that would not have existed had advertising 
support represented the only option.  Although one should take caution before 
generalizing from this result,351 it does add support for the position that a shift 
to pay television would be welfare enhancing.  The resulting increase in the 
surplus captured by producers lacks distributional implications, because free 
entry will dissipate any such profits and will increase consumer benefits in 
terms of increased product diversity. 
Economic theory and available empirical evidence would thus seem to 
indicate that removing the existing bias in favor of advertising support would 
allow television markets to come closer to the optimum.  When these 
considerations are combined with the difficulties that arise when advertisers 
are allowed to act as intermediaries in the economic relationship between 
viewers and the networks and the problems associated with calibrating 
subsidies discussed above,352 a powerful argument emerges against any 
attempt to favor either advertising-supported television or pay television. 
Simply allowing the networks’ attempts to maximize their profits resolves 
questions about the best way to maximize total surplus. 
Although some scholars have proposed retaining the system of advertising 
support and redressing these imperfections through targeted subsidies,353 a 
number of considerations would seem to make such a solution unrealistic.  
First, given that advertising support tends to understate overall demand for 
programming, any such subsidy would be massive.  In addition, an earlier 
discussion emphasized that anyone attempting to figure out how to allocate 
such subsidies to particular programs would need an unmanageably large 
amount of information concerning the utility that every person would derive 
 
 350 Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 590, 601, 604.  The results of the other study are thus consistent, 
concluding that a shift to pay television caused total revenue to increase and caused consumer surplus to 
decrease.  The key difference is that this study looked only at the impact on consumer surplus without going 
on to consider the effect on total surplus.  See Holden, supra note 349, at 62-64. 
 351 It should be noted that both studies focused on a single event and involved sports programming 
(specifically boxing matches) that may not be generalizable to other types of programming. 
 352 See supra notes 44-46, 342-43 and accompanying text. 
 353 See BAKER, supra note 7, at 98-99, 115-17; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 84-88. 
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from each network as well as all of the substitution effects.354  Lastly, such an 
intervention may raise serious First Amendment problems.355 
The more straightforward solution would be the elimination of the FCC’s 
current preference for advertising-supported television over pay television.  A 
shift to pay television would allow viewers to employ the conventional 
economic mechanism for signaling to the networks that preferences for 
particular networks are not uniform and that certain networks are particularly 
popular with smaller segments of the total audience.  Using prices thus allows 
smaller audience segments with particularly strong preferences to support 
programming that would not meet the minimum audience size required for 
economic viability under advertising support.  Although some degree of bias 
against special interest programming would remain, it will be less severe than 
the bias that exists under advertising support.356 
This is not to say that advertising-supported television will disappear.  It is 
conceivable that what would result is a mix of some networks that rely solely 
on direct payments, other networks that rely solely on advertising support, and 
still other networks that offer a mix of the two.  The eventual market could end 
up looking much like the current environment for printed newspapers, in which 
some charge for subscriptions and contain little advertising, others are given 
away free of charge and survive solely on advertising, and some depend on 
both subscription and advertising revenue.  Allowing such mixed regimes risks 
reintroducing the problems associated with permitting advertisers to serve as 
intermediaries.  Such problems, however, should not prove insuperable so long 
as advertising represents a relatively small percentage of total revenues, as 
seems to be the case with pay television.357 
C. Windowing as a Form of Price Discrimination: Protecting Incumbents vs. 
Promoting New Entrants and New Technologies 
The third policy commitment that has informed federal policy since the 
earliest days of the television industry is the willingness to protect incumbents 
 
 354 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
 355 Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112-13, 122-23. 
 356 Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 234; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 234. 
 357 See John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must-Carry Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 61, 96 (1998) (citing data indicating that local advertising represents less than five percent of 
the typical cable operator’s total revenue). 
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from the economic dislocation and disruption caused by the appearance of new 
entrants and new television technologies.358  At times this commitment appears 
to be nothing more than an incidental byproduct of policymakers’ attempts to 
favor local content and advertising-supported television technologies.  That 
cannot be said in all cases, however.  All too often, policymakers have 
regarded shielding the television industry from the disruption caused by 
competitive entry as an independent regulatory justification.  Subsection 1 
traces the extent to which this has been true in the regulation of conventional 
broadcasting, cable television, DBS, and digital broadcasting.  Subsection 2 
describes the problems that this commitment poses from the standpoint of 
competition policy.  Subsection 3 explains how favoring incumbents over new 
entrants and new technologies creates inefficiencies by reducing the ability to 
price discriminate. 
1. The Regulatory Commitment to Incumbents 
a. Analog Broadcasting 
The commitment to protect incumbents against the arrival of new entrants 
and new technologies first became evident in the FCC’s spectrum management 
policies.  At the risk of some oversimplification, it is useful to think of 
spectrum management as consisting of two separate functions.359  The first 
function is a determination of how much spectrum will be allocated to a 
particular service and how its frequencies will be partitioned.  The second 
function focuses on identifying those to whom the blocks of frequencies 
established by the first function will be licensed. 
The preference for incumbents is manifest in the way that the FCC has 
managed both of these functions.  Turning first to the second function, during 
the thirty-year period following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Carroll 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,360 protection of incumbents served as one of the de 
 
 358 In addition to protecting broadcasting from competition by new media, the FCC limited the 
competition within broadcasting by pursuing policies that prevented the entrance of additional television 
stations.  See Yoo, supra note 117, at 272-74. 
 359 This taxonomy is a modified version of the categories described in STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 62-64 (2001). 
 360 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  Although Carroll Broadcasting involved a radio license, the FCC 
extended the same principles to television licensing as well.  See, e.g., WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286 
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  The FCC ultimately 
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facto criteria used by the FCC when deciding whether to issue a new television 
license, as the FCC required that applicants for new licenses prove that their 
entry would not inflict so much harm to incumbent broadcast stations as to 
force them to stop providing service.  Similar considerations applied to license 
renewals.  The dominant consideration in license renewals was the “renewal 
expectancy,” which extended a preference to incumbent broadcasters that 
provided meritorious service in the past.361  Although the FCC based its 
decision in part on justifications that carry a great deal of economic 
credibility,362 it also relied on the more questionable justification that 
 
abandoned the Carroll doctrine in 1988.  Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broad. 
Stations on Existing Stations, Report & Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 639-41 ¶¶ 10-25 (1988).  In so ruling, the FCC 
recognized that “the Carroll doctrine may have the undesired effect of providing existing licensees with an 
anticompetitive tool to delay the entry of new stations.”  Id. at 640 ¶ 14. 
 361 The FCC initially attempted to codify the renewal expectancy in 1970 in order to quell industry 
reaction to its decision not to renew an incumbent broadcaster the previous year.  See WHDH, Inc., 16 
F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration denied, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969), aff’d sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. 
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).  The 1970 Policy Statement gave a 
renewal applicant a “controlling preference” if it could demonstrate substantial past performance without 
serious deficiencies.  Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal 
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), rev’d sub nom. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 
(D.C. Cir. 1971).  Despite the fact that it had previously recognized that “legitimate renewal expectancies 
[were] implicit in the structure of the Act,” Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 854, the D.C. Circuit 
struck down the 1970 Policy Statement, ruling that precedent prevented the FCC from elevating the renewal 
expectancy into an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the incumbent.  Citizens Communications Ctr., 447 
F.2d at 1210-14.  A later attempt to base a renewal expectancy upon average past performance similarly failed.  
Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977) (on reconsideration), rev’d sub nom. Cent. Fla. Enters., Inc. 
v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).  The FCC subsequently 
revised its position to make the renewal expectancy simply one of several factors weighed in a comparative 
hearing, with the weight accorded to it varying with the quality of the service rendered.  Cowles Fla. Broad., 
Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981).  This time, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s actions.  Central Fla. Enters. v. 
FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1084 (1983).  For overviews of the twists and turns 
on the road to the establishment of the renewal expectancy, see ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF 
BROADCAST REGULATION 206-32 (3d ed. 1982); Levi, supra note 173, at 253-69 (1996); and Jonathan 
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1120-24 (1993). 
 362 The FCC based its decision in part on the fact that applicants often make paper promises that they are 
ultimately unable or unwilling to keep, thereby recognizing that moral hazard problems surround any process 
that distributes licenses and does not require applicants to make any upfront investments.  It also 
acknowledged that strengthening the nature of the property interest conveyed by the license would provide 
licensees with better incentives to make efficient levels of investment.  Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 
at 1013 ¶ 62(1)-(2).  For a discussion of the economic benefits flowing from strengthening the property rights 
held by broadcast licensees, see Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond the Coasean Critique of Broadcast Regulation 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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comparing applicants as equals “could lead to a haphazard restructuring of the 
broadcast industry.”363 
The preference for incumbents is also reflected in the way that the FCC has 
allocated and partitioned-off the amount of spectrum devoted to television 
broadcasting.364  For example, the allocation principles followed by the FCC 
when first setting aside spectrum for television had the effect of ensuring that 
most communities would have access to no more than three television 
stations.365  Because of the inherent cost advantages resulting from 
networking,366 this regulatory decision had the effect of entrenching the 
triopoly of broadcast networks that dominated the first thirty years of the 
broadcast industry, because it ensured that a fourth network would be able to 
reach no more than sixty-four percent of the national audience with a 
technically comparable signal.367  In so ruling, the FCC rejected a proposal 
submitted by the nascent DuMont Network that would have made entry by a 
fourth network possible.368  Although the FCC based this rejection in part on 
the localism concerns discussed above,369 it also based its decision in part on 
the ground that the DuMont plan would have disrupted the then-emerging 
system of broadcasting by requiring some incumbent broadcasters to shift 
channel positions, which would in turn force them to abandon some of their 
investments in their existing facilities.370 
The FCC took the same approach when managing the spectrum allocated to 
UHF television.  The FCC had recognized since the earliest days of the 
television industry that the amount of spectrum available in the VHF band is 
insufficient to support a competitive national television service and that the 
best long-range solution was for television to reside entirely in the UHF 
 
 363 Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d at 1013 ¶ 62(3). 
 364 For additional discussion of this dynamic, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 272-74. 
 365 See Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. 
148, 148-53 ¶¶ 1-18 (1952). 
 366 See supra Part II.C. 
 367 1 NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 336, at 68 tbls.8-9.  A fifth network would reach less than 
forty-one percent of the country.  Id. 
 368 The DuMont plans would have increased the population receiving four or more channels to nearly 
ninety-five percent and increased the percentage of the population receiving technically comparable signals to 
ninety-three percent—levels that would have greatly increased the feasibility of a fourth network.  See 
Schuessler, supra note 171, at 891, 921-26, 929 tbl.10, 938-39 & tbl.16. 
 369 See supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. 
 370 Schuessler, supra note 171, at 909-10. 
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band.371  When widescale deployment of UHF became technologically 
feasible, however, the FCC declined to follow through with its plan to shift all 
incumbent VHF broadcasters to UHF on the grounds that doing so would force 
incumbent broadcasters and purchasers of television sets to abandon their 
investments in existing equipment.372  Instead, the FCC opted to “intermix” 
VHF and UHF stations into the same geographic markets, a decision which 
caused irreparable harm to UHF stations.  The problem is that UHF television 
has technical characteristics that make it difficult for it to compete directly 
with VHF.  The decision to protect incumbent broadcasters thus caused UHF 
to fail as a television service for more than a quarter century.373 
The same preference for incumbent broadcasters and technologies was re-
flected in the FCC’s reluctance to allow for more intensive use of the VHF 
spectrum.  For example, the FCC resisted all attempts to allow VHF “drop-ins” 
made possible by relaxing the geographic spacing normally required of VHF 
television stations.374  In addition, the FCC has consistently refused to reallo-
 
 371 See Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F)  1571, 1577-78 ¶ 18 (1956); Third Notice 
of Further Proposed Rule Making, 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3074 (Apr. 6, 1951); Allocation of Frequencies to Vari-
ous Classes of Non-Governmental Servs. in Radio Spectrum from 10 Kilocycles to 30,000,000 Kilocycles, 39 
F.C.C. 68, 129-30 (1945); Public Release, 39 F.C.C. 16, 16 (1939); see also United States v. Southwestern 
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (“[T]he Commission has held that an appropriate system of local broad-
casting may be created only if . . . significantly wider use [is] made of the available ultra-high-frequency chan-
nels.”). 
 372 See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1297, at 76 (noting testimony of FCC Commissioner Hyde that the refusal to 
reallocate television stations to the UHF band stemmed from “the fact that these stations were constructed, the 
investments made, [and] the public accustomed to listening to them”).  This decision also stands in stark 
contrast to the FCC’s near-contemporaneous willingness to strand investments in equipment made by 
broadcasters and listeners of FM radio by requiring the entire service to shift to a different portion of the 
spectrum.  See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction 
Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 410-11 (2001); Schuessler, supra note 171, at 910-11.  The two decisions can be 
reconciled when one notes that in each case the FCC’s decisions favored the incumbent broadcast networks. 
 373 For a more detailed review of these events, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 273-74. 
 374 See Channel Assignments at Sub-Standard Spacings, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1598, 1601 (1957); Second 
Report on Deintermixture, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1571, 1575 (1956).  In 1961, the FCC announced that it would 
entertain specific drop-in requests on an ad hoc basis.  Interim Policy on VHF TV Channel Assignments, 21 
Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1695, 1695 (1961).  It soon abandoned this policy, however.  VHF Drop-Ins, 25 Rad. Reg. 
(P&F) 1687, 1687 (1963).  The only subsequent attempt to revive the drop-in policy was quickly abandoned.  
Compare St. Anthony Television Corp., 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 348, 348-49 (1964) (authorizing a VHF drop-in 
in Baton Rouge, La.), remanded sub nom. La. Television Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 347 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
with St. Anthony Television Corp., 8 F.C.C.2d 294 (1967) (abandoning the drop-in proposal).  Thereafter, the 
FCC only granted drop-in requests in “highly unusual circumstances.”  Amendment of Section 73.606(b), 
Table of Allotments, Television Broad. Stations (Pueblo, Colo.), Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 7662, 7666-67      
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cate vacant television allocations to commercial service, notwithstanding the 
fact that hundreds of those allocations have never been economically viable 
and have lain fallow for decades.375 
The only significant broadening of the spectrum allocated to broadcast 
television was the initiation of low power television (LPTV) service in 1982.376  
Although the FCC promoted the deployment of LPTV by exempting it from 
many of the restrictions applicable to full power broadcasters,377 it ensured that 
the interests of incumbent broadcasters would predominate by designating 
LPTV as a “secondary service” that would have to cease operation whenever it 
interfered with the reception of full power stations.378  Widescale deployment 
of LPTV was further hamstrung by a series of administrative missteps, 
obstruction by full power broadcasters,379 and the failure to accord LPTV 
 
¶ 23 (1995) (citing Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Television Table of Assignments to Add New VHF 
Stations in Top 100 Mkts. & to Assure that New Stations Maximize Diversity of Ownership, Control & 
Programming, Report & Order, 81 F.C.C.2d 233 (1980)), vacated sub nom. Sangre De Cristo Communications 
v. FCC, 139 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  The FCC once again revived VHF drop-ins in 1980 only to terminate 
the proceedings a decade later without taking any action.  Compare Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 83 
F.C.C.2d 51 (1980), with Table of Television Channel Allotments, Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 398 (1990).  For reviews 
of the early history of VHF drop-ins, see BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 17-18, and Glen O. Robinson, The 
Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative 
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 533 & n.190 (1970). 
 375 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 73.606, Table of Assignments, Television Broad. Stations (Ogden, 
Utah), Report & Order, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,253, 25,253-54 (Apr. 30, 1979); Amendment of Section 73.606, Table 
of Assignments, Television Broad. Stations (Ogden, Utah), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 F.C.C.2d 142 
(1970).  See generally Deletion of Noncommercial Reservation of Channel *16, 482-88 MHz, Pittsburgh, Pa., 
Memorandum Opinion & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 11,700, 11,708 ¶ 18 (1996) (noting that the FCC has never 
eliminated a noncommercial allotment, even when vacant or proven not to be economically viable). 
 376 See Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l 
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (May 18, 1982) [hereinafter LPTV Final Rule].  LPTV 
broadcast at only three kilowatts of power on VHF frequencies and 150 kilowatts on UHF frequencies, which 
typically gives them a range of fifteen to twenty miles.  Full power television stations, in contrast, can transmit 
up to 316 kilowatts of power on VHF and 5000 kilowatts on UHF, which gives them a range of up to eighty 
miles.  For further discussion of LPTV, see supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
 377 LPTV was exempt from the ascertainment and local programming requirements applicable to full 
service television, because the limited coverage area would make LPTV inherently responsive to local needs.  
LPTV Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 21,491 ¶ 106.  It also was exempt from many of the ownership restrictions 
imposed on fullpower broadcasters, including the limits on the number of stations that fullpower broadcasters 
can own nationwide and the “duopoly” and the “one-to-a-market” rules, which restrict the number and types of 
stations that any one licensee can operate within any geographic area.  Id. at 21,487-89 ¶¶ 83-95. 
 378 Inquiry into Future Role of Low Power Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l Telecomms. Sys., 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 82 F.C.C.2d 47, 49-50 ¶¶ 6-7 (1980). 
 379 Specifically, the FCC rejected all applications that were not “complete and sufficient,” which was a 
standard that was considerably more stringent than the “substantially complete” standard applied to full-power 
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stations full must-carry rights.380  LPTV finally began to flourish after 1994 
when the FCC at last removed many of the procedural obstacles that had been 
restricting the development of LPTV,381 only to be devastated by the FCC’s 
decision to displace a multitude of LPTV stations in order to deploy digital 
television by doubling the amount of spectrum given for free to all incumbent, 
full-power broadcasters.382  The effect of these presumptions was to forgo the 
benefits of competition and to place a premium on industry stability for its own 
sake. 
b. Cable Television 
The desire to protect incumbents also determined the FCC’s response to the 
emergence of cable television.  After initially declining to assert jurisdiction 
over cable, the FCC subsequently decided to hamstring the cable industry with 
the series of regulations described at length above.383  Although enactment of 
these restrictions arose partly from the desire to preserve and promote locally 
oriented content and the availability of free television, the FCC also justified 
these regulations in part by the need to protect television broadcasting in 
general, and the weaker UHF stations in particular, from competition with this 
 
broadcasters.  LPTV Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 ¶ 51.  The FCC also confused the public by assigning 
LPTV stations five-digit call signs composed of both letters and numerals instead of the traditional four-letter 
call signs used by full-power television stations.  Id. at 21,490 ¶ 97.  See generally Andrew J. Kersey, 
Comment, Low Power Television in 1994: Outgrowing its Secondary Status, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 53, 
55-56 (1995). 
 380 See 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (2000) (requiring LPTV stations to establish that their programming 
“would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power 
broadcast stations” before receiving free carriage).  The irony is that LPTV and must-carry were both animated 
by the desire to promote the core policies of localism, diversity of information sources, and competition in an 
adequate manner.  If those concerns had been taken more seriously, one might have expected Congress to 
accord greater protection to LPTV than to conventional broadcasting rather than less, because LPTV stations 
were supposedly more likely to promote the statute’s stated goals. 
 381 Review of Comm’n’s Rules Governing Low Power Television Serv., First Report & Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 
2555 (1994). 
 382 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact Upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Sixth Report & 
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, 14,595 ¶ 11 (1997).  Congress subsequently mitigated the impact of the digital 
television rollout on LPTV by passing legislation in 1999 creating new “Class A” LPTV licenses that no 
longer had to yield to full-power stations.  In order to qualify for a Class A license, the LPTV must have 
broadcast for a minimum of eighteen hours per day, including an average of three hours or more per week of 
locally produced programming, during the ninety-day period preceding the enactment of the statute.  47 U.S.C.                
§ 336(f)(2)(A)(i); see also Establishment of Class A Television Serv., Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6355 
(2000) (implementing the statute). 
 383 See supra Parts III.A.1.b, III.B.1.b. 
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upstart technology.  For example, in the seminal decision in which the FCC 
asserted jurisdiction over cable television, the FCC denied an application for a 
microwave facility to distribute cable television programming in part because 
the additional competition threatened to inflict economic harm on a local TV 
station.384  Although the FCC explicitly disavowed any intention of protecting 
existing investments against new technological advances,385 it repeatedly 
prevented the importation of distant signals out of concern that allowing cable 
operators to do so would hurt incumbent broadcasters (UHF stations in 
particular)386 and would jeopardize the basic structure of over-the-air 
television.387  As FCC Chairman Dean Burch candidly admitted in 1971, the 
FCC had interpreted its public interest mandate to include the short-term 
“protectionism for over-the-air broadcasting” against incursions by cable 
television.388  The irony is that cable would ultimately prove to be UHF’s 
savior, because cable transmission is what finally allowed UHF stations to 
achieve technical parity with VHF stations.389 
Congress expressed similar considerations in the findings that accompanied 
the 1992 Cable Act, which emphasized the importance of protecting 
broadcasters’ ability to continue to provide certain services.390  As the Supreme 
Court ultimately concluded, the must-carry provisions “are designed to 
 
 384 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65 (1962). 
 385 Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91 to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern Grant of Authorizations in 
Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report & 
Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 788 ¶ 155 (1966). 
 386 See id. at 782 ¶ 141; CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 700 ¶ 48(I) (1965). 
 387 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna 
Television Sys., Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 164 ¶ 58 (1972), aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. 
FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 388 Cable Antenna Television (CATV): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications & Power of the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971); accord Community 
Antenna Television Problems, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on 
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1971), quoted in Stanley M. Besen, The Economics of the Cable 
Television “Consensus,” 17 J.L. & ECON. 39, 40-41 (1974). 
 389 See Rolla Edward Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J.L. & 
ECON. 207 (1972). 
 390 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(10), 
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000)) (finding a substantial government 
interest in “ensuring [the] continuation” of the local origin of programming provided by broadcasters);            § 
2(a)(12), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding a substantial government interest in “promoting the continued availability 
of . . . free television programming”); see also § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that broadcasters 
“continue to be an important source of local news and public affairs programming”). 
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guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s 
communication system.”391  In enacting them, “Congress sought to preserve 
the existing structure of the Nation’s broadcast television medium while 
permitting the concomitant expansion and development of cable television.”392 
c. DBS 
The desire to protect the economic interests and the existing structure of the 
broadcast industry has also shaped the regulation of DBS.  Most notable are 
the restrictions on the ability of DBS providers to carry programming from the 
major broadcast networks.  As noted earlier, the SHVA, which Congress 
enacted in 1988, prohibited satellite carriers from carrying broadcast signals 
(including, most importantly, signals provided by the major broadcast 
networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC), unless the household was unable to 
receive such programming over the air.  Congress based these restrictions 
explicitly on the need to promote “the public interest in protecting the network-
affiliate distribution system.”393  In addition, the SHVA prohibited the 
transmission of broadcast signals to any households that had received network 
television via cable within the previous ninety days,394 further insulating cable 
against the emergence of DBS. 
This commitment to protecting broadcast television was still evident when 
Congress passed the SHVIA in 1999, which imposed the carry one, carry all 
requirement on satellite carriers.395  The available legislative history indicates 
that Congress enacted these provisions in order “to hew as closely . . . as 
 
 391 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994). 
 392 Id. at 652; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 193 (1997) (quoting the same lan-
guage). 
 393 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 19-20 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5648; accord id. at 
20, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5649; H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(I), at 8, 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5611, 5617.  Congress added a further level of regulation to DBS in 1992 by subjecting 
DBS providers to the same political access requirements that applied to broadcasters and instructing the FCC 
to consider how DBS could best serve the principle of localism.  47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (2000).  It also required 
DBS operators to set aside four to seven percent of its channel capacity for noncommercial programming of an 
educational or informational nature.  Id. § 335(b)(1).  The D.C. Circuit rejected a facial challenge to these 
regulations in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 310-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 394 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 202(2), 102 Stat. 3935, 3957 (enacting 
17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(B)), repealed by Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I,            
§ 1005(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-527 (1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10) (2000)). 
 395 See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text. 
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possible” to the existing structure of broadcast networks.396  The SHVIA did 
eliminate the provision that created a ninety-day waiting period for DBS 
customers who currently subscribed to cable.397 
d. Digital Broadcasting 
Finally, policymakers’ commitment to favoring incumbents over new 
entrants and new technologies is reflected in the decision, made initially by the 
FCC and later endorsed by Congress, to deploy digital television by giving 
each incumbent station an additional television channel.398  Invoking a 
rationale strikingly reminiscent of the policies favored by then-Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover and the Federal Radio Commission during the 
nascent days of the radio industry,399 the FCC contended that current 
broadcasters were important sources of relevant expertise and experience and 
thus were in the best position to assure a prompt and orderly transition to 
digital broadcasting.400  Even more problematically, the FCC stressed the need 
to avoid the disruption associated with a change in the ownership structure of 
the broadcast industry.401  The FCC declined to revisit this decision even after 
it explicitly recognized that digital broadcasters could transmit SDTV in 
 
 396 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 92 (1999); accord S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 10 (1999); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-79(I), at 13 (1999) (noting that the DBS must-carry requirement was crafted so as to “protect the 
traditional network-affiliate relationship”); see also Implementation of Satellite Home Viewer Improvement 
Act of 1999: Broad. Signal Carriage Issues, Report & Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 1918, 1925 ¶ 13 (2001) (observing 
that Congress enacted the DBS must-carry requirement in part to “preserve free over-the-air broadcasting”). 
 397 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, § 1005(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-
527 (1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10) (2000)). 
 398 See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text. 
 399 Hoover and the Federal Radio Commission made experience and expertise major licensing 
considerations, in his case by emphasizing the importance of adequate financial backing and previous 
broadcast experience.  It goes without saying that such considerations have the inexorable effect of favoring 
incumbents over new entrants.  See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 128, at 22. 
 400 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024, 7025 ¶ 6 (1991) [hereinafter DTV Impact]; Advanced Television Sys. 
& Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 
F.C.C.R. 6520, 6537-38 ¶¶ 136-37 (1988) [hereinafter DTV Tentative Decision]; see also Advanced 
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 6926 ¶ 2, 6930 ¶ 8 (1992) (reaffirming the decision to limit 
eligibility for digital television licenses to existing license holders) [hereinafter DTV Second Report & Order]. 
 401 See DTV Impact, 6 F.C.C.R. at 7025 ¶ 6; DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6537-38 ¶ 136-137; 
see also DTV Second Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6926 ¶ 2, 6930 ¶ 8 (reaffirming the decision to limit 
eligibility for digital television licenses to existing license holders). 
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substantially less spectrum, again emphasizing the importance of ensuring an 
orderly transition.402 
2. An Aside on Competition Policy 
The decision to protect incumbents against incursions by new entrants and 
new technologies contradicts many of the most fundamental principles of 
competition policy.  The most important problem that any regulatory authority 
can face is excessive horizontal concentration in a particular market.  Although 
other regulatory responses exist, the best long-term solution to the problems 
resulting from such concentration is to encourage entry by new competitors. 
This suggests that Congress and the FCC should instead be taking steps to 
encourage the emergence of new market entry and new media technologies.  
All too often, however, U.S. television policy has had the effect of frustrating 
such entry.  Many of the key decisions made by Congress and the FCC have 
thus had the perverse effect of creating and preserving horizontal concentration 
rather than dissipating it. 
In each instance, Congress and the FCC justified their actions on two 
grounds, neither of which can withstand analysis.  The first is the desire to 
avoid short-term transitional costs.403  Needless to say, excessive concern over 
short-term losses to prevent the realization of sustainable long-term gains is 
incredibly short sighted, because the long-term benefits are almost certain to 
outweigh any short-term concerns.404  This result is rendered all the more 
unfortunate by the fact that the key decisions were made when the television 
industry was still in its infancy and the short-term transitional costs were still 
relatively low.405 
The other justification is a desire to avoid disrupting the existing 
industry.406  Put simply, this justification is an economic non sequitur.  As an 
 
 402 Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & 
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,814 ¶¶ 11-12 (1997); see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on 
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking & Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶¶ 7-8, 10,545 ¶ 27 (1995). 
 403 See supra notes 370, 372, 401 and accompanying text. 
 404 Hazlett, supra note 161, at 164-65. 
 405 See Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission, 
63 GEO. L.J. 705, 710-15 (1975). 
 406 See supra notes 363, 387, 396, 401 and accompanying text. 
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FCC working paper recognized, it is inevitable that the increased competition 
caused by the arrival of new television technologies would cause some 
television stations to exhibit distress and perhaps even cause some to fail.407  
Protecting broadcasters against such economic forces inevitably deprived the 
marketplace of the benefits that are supposed to flow from competition.  The 
price of adhering to this policy is likely to increase in the future.  Indeed, such 
Schumpeterian “gales of creative destruction” may well represent the norm of 
competition in the digital age.408  As a result, any attempt to shield the 
television industry from such disruption simply blinks reality. 
a. Analog Broadcasting 
Consider first the structure of the television industry as it existed before the 
emergence of cable as the dominant means of transmission.  During this era, 
policymakers regarded concentration at the wholesale (i.e., network) level of 
the chain of distribution to be the television industry’s central problem.  As a 
result, over the years the FCC launched a series of initiatives designed to 
redress the dominance of the three major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and 
NBC),409 which in the 1970s commanded ninety percent of the prime time 
viewing audience.410 
The irony is that the dominant position of ABC, CBS, and NBC the FCC 
was attempting to redress was itself the creation of FCC policy.411  As noted 
earlier,412 the failure of a fourth network to emerge was largely a product of the 
FCC’s allocation policy and its hostility toward pay television.  The FCC 
compounded this problem by adopting additional measures to reduce the 
 
 407 Florence Levy & Jonathan Setzer, Broadcast Television in a Multichannel Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 
3996, 4001, 4097-98 (OPP Working Paper No. 26, June 27, 1991). 
 408 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942). 
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FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971); 1 NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 336; see also FED. 
COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 164, 30-34 (addressing the dominance of radio networks); 2 NEW 
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 410 Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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networks’ profitability.413  These efforts were worse than useless, because 
limiting network revenues had two perverse effects.  First, the artificial limits 
on network revenue depress investment in new programming, which in turn 
reduces the diversity of programming and starves the program producers of 
investment resources.414  Second, reducing the profitability of network 
operations deters entry by new networks and thus tends to entrench the very 
network oligopoly that lies at the heart of the competitive problem.415  The 
lessons are quite simple.  Attempts to promote certain values through implicit 
cross-subsidies may actually have the unintended effect of entrenching the 
existing, uncompetitive market structure. 
b. Cable 
When cable television emerged as a technology, the relative scarcity of 
broadcast frequencies and the concomitant restrictions on channel capacity 
were generally regarded as one of the central regulatory challenges facing tele-
vision.416  As a result, one might have imagined that policymakers would have 
welcomed cable with open arms.  Unfortunately, nothing could have been fur-
ther from the truth.  Even though cable television simultaneously eliminated 
the handicap in signal quality suffered by UHF and drastically expanded the 
channel capacity available to television viewers, the FCC initially responded to 
cable television with considerable hostility.417 
It was therefore not until cable made it possible for the networks to reach 
households without having to rely on local television stations for carriage that 
real network competition began to emerge.  But rather than embrace cable as a 
solution to the inability of a fourth network to reach substantial portions of the 
country, the FCC instead chose to impede cable’s emergence in the name of 
protecting incumbent (and particularly the weaker UHF) broadcasters.418 
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In addition, the subsequent history raises serious doubts about the 
credibility of the FCC’s justification for suppressing cable.  Ironically, cable 
would ultimately prove to be UHF’s savior, because cable transmission is what 
finally allowed UHF stations to achieve technical parity with VHF stations.419  
In retrospect, the idea that the FCC restricted the growth of the cable industry 
in order to protect UHF broadcasters appears ludicrous.  In the end, true 
competition among television networks developed more from successful 
judicial challenges to the FCC’s cable regulations420 than it did from FCC 
policies. 
Although the advent of cable as the primary means for household 
distribution of television programming did alleviate the horizontal 
concentration of the wholesaling functions provided by the networks, it 
simultaneously increased the concentration of the retail distribution functions 
performed by the cable operator.  Because of the large, up-front fixed costs 
associated with connecting entire neighborhoods with coaxial cable, 
policymakers believed that direct competition between cable television 
systems was impossible.  Despite the existence of some evidence that this was 
not the case,421 regulatory authorities began to undertake a series of steps that 
only served to entrench the monopoly.  For example, municipal licensing 
authorities began to make the licenses issued to cable systems exclusive ones 
for the supposed reason that doing so would avoid the waste of resources 
associated with the establishment of duplicative networks.422  Although 
Congress eventually passed legislation prohibiting the issuance of exclusive 
licenses,423 the practice has continued. 
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Such exclusivity terms appear to be useless at best.  If cable truly were a 
natural monopoly, incumbent cable operators would have little fear that direct 
competition would emerge, because no rational company would try to enter the 
market.  Even if entry were to occur, the resulting competition would create 
considerable, albeit temporary, benefits for consumers.  In the absence of any 
constructive purpose, the only possible effect of such a restriction is to become 
a de jure barrier to entry that cannot be unjustified in terms of static 
efficiency.424  The imposition of legal restrictions on entry has implications for 
dynamic efficiency that may be even more important, because entry 
restrictions may frustrate investment in, and the emergence of, alternative 
network facilities that represent the only long-term solution to the problems of 
horizontal concentration.  This effect is further exacerbated by the fact that 
such de jure restrictions may continue to exist long after technological 
developments have undercut the factors that caused policymakers to view the 
technology in question as a natural monopoly in the first place.425  
Unfortunately, policymakers do not appear to have learned from their previous 
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mistakes.  As noted earlier, the commitment to these policies appears to be 
retarding the deployment of 3G wireless devices.426 
c. DBS 
The way that DBS is regulated also reflects the principle of favoring 
incumbents against competition from new entrants and new media 
technologies.  As noted earlier, the dearth of facilities-based competition 
among alternative television providers has long represented one of the central 
problems in television policy.  Viewed from this perspective, DBS represents 
something of a policy godsend.  It has emerged as the first viable competitor to 
cable, having reached penetration levels identified as representing effective 
competition,427 and it is starting to impose price discipline on cable.428  DBS 
systems are also providing greater viewing options and innovative products.429  
Even more important is the prospect of allowing rural areas to obtain access to 
multi-channel television and high-speed Internet service for the first time.430 
Instead, policymakers have taken steps to stifle the development of DBS in 
order to protect the economic interests and the existing structure of the 
broadcast industry.  The most egregious provision is the now-repudiated 
provision banning customers from subscribing to DBS if they had subscribed 
to cable within the past ninety days.431  The most problematic constraint 
currently in force is the restriction on DBS providers’ ability to carry 
programming from the major broadcast networks.  As noted earlier, the SHVA, 
which Congress enacted in 1988, prohibited satellite providers from carrying 
broadcast signals, including the signals provided by the major broadcast 
networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), unless the household was unable to receive 
such programming over the air.  Congress based these restrictions explicitly on 
the need to protect existing broadcast stations,432 while the ninety-day waiting 
 
 426 See infra Part IV. 
 427 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 428 Implementation of Section 3 of Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992, 
Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48, 4364-65 ¶ 53 (2001). 
 429 Of particular note are DirecTV’s sports packages.  See DirecTV Programming and Channels, Sports 
Subscriptions, at http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/see/SportsSubscriptions.jsp (last visited Dec. 10, 2003). 
 430 Yoo, supra note 51, at 257. 
 431 See supra note 394 and accompanying text. 
 432 See supra notes 393, 396 and accompanying text. 
   
1698 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52 
period served to protect cable.433  Although the SHVIA allowed satellite 
providers to begin to offer broadcast signals to all of its customers, it continued 
to prohibit distant signal importation and to subject satellite carriers to a wide 
variety of other restrictions designed to protect the incumbent broadcasters.434 
d. Digital Broadcasting 
Finally, the decision to deploy digital television by giving each incumbent 
an additional channel contradicts the fundamental economic principles of 
competition policy.  The decision to double the amount of spectrum devoted to 
television without diversifying the ownership structure of the broadcast 
industry was one that stunned those who had long complained about the 
excessive concentration and lack of diversity in broadcast ownership.435  The 
fact that Congress and the FCC were able to do so without displacing a single 
other service came as a shock to those who lived through the protracted battles 
over attempts to squeeze in a handful of additional channels into the table of 
allocations436 as well as those who had long supported attempts to 
deconcentrate and diversify broadcast station ownership.437  Admittedly, some 
of the more intensive uses of the spectrum were made possible by the nature of 
the digital medium.  That does not fully explain the FCC’s ability to double the 
amount of spectrum given to the industry that is already the heaviest user of 
the electromagnetic spectrum.  Indeed, the FCC itself acknowledged that many 
of the efficiencies resulted from improvements in receiver technology that had 
been available for quite some time, but had never before seemed sufficient to 
prompt the FCC to liberalize its licensing policies.438 
Equally troublesome is the existence of other options that could have 
reduced the amount of spectrum needed to deploy digital television.  The FCC 
could have adopted an HDTV format that required considerably less than six 
megahertz of spectrum.439  Moreover, the FCC could have favored 
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multicasting several streams of SDTV rather than a single stream of HDTV, 
which would have dramatically increased the number of voices in each 
market.440  Alternatively, the FCC could have reduced the amount of spectrum 
allocated to each incumbent broadcaster to that needed to transmit a single 
stream of SDTV.  Doing so would have benefited consumers by freeing up 
substantial amounts of spectrum for other uses. 
All of these implications raise serious doubts about the sincerity of the 
policy commitments supposedly espoused by Congress and the FCC.  Indeed, 
there are significant indications that the decision to deploy digital television in 
this manner was driven by far baser motives.  It has long been understood that 
the existing allocation of television stations creates substantial monopoly rents 
for incumbent broadcasters.441  Broadcasters have been careful to protect their 
privileged position by opposing any regulatory reforms that would have 
dissipated these rents by allowing new entry or by allocating more spectrum to 
commercial broadcasting.  The arrival of digital television threatened to upset 
the status quo.  The only way that broadcasters could ensure that they would 
not lose their privileged position would be to ensure that digital television was 
deployed in a manner that allowed them to continue to receive their spectrum 
for free without increasing the number of channels available or the number of 
competing voices. 
The FCC’s approach to deploying digital television solved all of these 
problems.  After years of being unable to justify permitting more intensive use 
of the available spectrum or reallocating spectrum from other uses when doing 
so would have hurt incumbent television stations,442 the FCC was able to find 
sufficient spectrum within the bands already committed to television 
broadcasting to double the number of signals that could operate without 
interfering with one another.  Restricting eligibility for those additional stations 
to current license holders ensured that no new entrants would gain access to 
broadcast facilities.  And the emphasis on HDTV offered the promise of 
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ensuring that the transition to digital broadcasting would not cause a 
concomitant increase in the number of voices. 
Under the standard public choice analysis, the regulated entities generate 
political support for this state of affairs by allowing policymakers to redirect a 
certain portion of the rents created in directions that they find politically 
beneficial.443  In this situation, the key television-related policy issues that 
concerned legislators arose around additional restrictions on indecent and 
violent programming, increased support for children’s educational 
programming, and the provision of free air time for political candidates—
matters that broadcasters had consistently opposed on First Amendment 
grounds.444  Just as the television industry’s protracted lobbying campaign in 
favor of providing incumbent broadcasters with additional spectrum for free 
was about to come to fruition as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
it was placed in jeopardy by a bipartisan group led by Senate Majority Leader 
and Presidential candidate Bob Dole, who condemned the impending license 
giveaway as an unsupportable act of corporate welfare.  This group held up the 
enactment of the 1996 Act until it was agreed that the FCC would not award 
any digital television licenses until Congress had enacted spectrum reform. 
At this point, the broadcast industry began a series of high-level meetings 
during which, in the words of one FCC official, broadcasters began “tripping 
all over themselves to give up their First Amendment rights.”445  A few days 
after Dole resigned from the Senate to campaign for the Presidency full time, 
the leadership in the House and Senate sent a letter to the FCC rescinding the 
Dole agreement.  Significant concessions by the industry with respect to 
indecency and violence on television, children’s educational programming, and 
candidate access soon followed.  Congress eventually enshrined this final 
resolution in a provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 explicitly 
forbidding the FCC from auctioning digital television licenses.446  The entire 
episode thus appears to be yet another example of how the regulations posing 
as remedies to the problems caused by barriers to entry in maintaining market 
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concentration are, in fact, revealed to be the means by which those 
anticompetitive structures are created and maintained. 
Similar issues are raised by the principle against favoring incumbents over 
new entrants and new technologies.  In this case, digital television is the new 
technology that promises to provide increasingly diverse services.  From this 
perspective, it is arguable that policymakers should take steps to encourage its 
deployment, even when doing so would burden established players, such as 
cable operators. 
3. Windowing and Imperfect Price Discrimination 
Although the foregoing discussion focusing on competition policy provides 
sufficient reason to advocate abandoning policymakers’ historic commitment 
to protecting television broadcasting against the emergence of horizontal 
competition, such arguments draw further support from the economic analysis 
that forms the heart of this Article.  In addition to raising concerns relating to 
competition policy, the decision to deploy digital television through incumbent 
broadcasters is also somewhat problematic from the standpoint of public good 
economics in that it has also had the unfortunate effect of limiting the ability of 
the networks to price discriminate.  Not only did the FCC’s commitment to 
free television deprive consumers of the ability to signal differences in the 
intensity of their preferences, obstructing the emergence of new media also had 
the effect of frustrating a form of price discrimination known as 
“windowing.”447  The best-known example of windowing occurs when a movie 
is initially released in first-run theaters, where prices are the highest.  
Eventually, the movie is re-released through a series of lower-revenue 
channels, including second-run theaters, pay-per-view on cable television, 
premium cable movie channels such as HBO and Showtime, prime-time 
network television, and then syndication.448  The available empirical studies 
confirm that the imperfect price discrimination made possible by release of 
television programs through both pay television and advertising-supported 
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television increases both the total revenues generated by the program and the 
total surplus.449 
The ability to employ windowing as a form of price discrimination would 
thus appear to depend in part on the emergence of pay television and the ability 
to make direct charges for television programs, without which price 
discrimination would appear to be impossible.  Windowing depends on the 
availability of different television technologies with different cost structures 
and different abilities to sort customers.  It is thus conceivable that the 
emergence of additional media will allow for even finer segmentation of the 
market.  For example, it is noteworthy that DBS has been able to offer 
programming that is not available on cable.450 
That said, the primary way that the emergence of cable television appears 
to have facilitated price discrimination has more to do with its ability to serve 
as a platform for pay television than it does with the increased opportunities for 
windowing provided by the arrival of a new medium.451  The similarity in the 
pay-per-view events, premium movie channels, and basic cable networks 
offered on cable and DBS also suggests that the additional benefits provided 
by the emergence of additional television technologies may be limited.  Still, 
the possibility remains that the emergence of different media with different 
underlying cost structures and audiences may make new windows possible.  In 
any event, the competitive concerns described above provide ample reason for 
encouraging the emergence of new media apart from public good economics. 
It bears emphasizing that my point is not that policymakers should impose 
cross-subsidies to favor one type of television service over the other.  My point 
is rather that policymakers should forgo imposing cross-subsidies running in 
either direction and should instead allow the marketplace to settle debates 
about the relative merits of the various technologies.  This position thus 
counsels in favor of eliminating must-carry altogether or, failing that, to limit 
its scope as much as possible.  It does not provide any support for imposing 
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dual carriage or for requiring cable operators to carry multiple program streams 
provided by digital broadcasters. 
The question whether the FCC should reverse its current presumption and 
instead begin adopting policies that promote the emergence of new entrants 
and technologies at the expense of the incumbent players is somewhat more 
difficult.  When horizontal markets are relatively concentrated, stimulating 
new entry would clearly create significant welfare gains.  In addition, new 
entrants and new technologies frequently face different risk profiles and costs 
of capital than do established players, which may in turn make it difficult for 
them to compete on an equal footing.  Although such considerations arguably 
support policies favoring new entrants and technologies at the expense of 
incumbents, I am somewhat chary of regulatory intervention in the process of 
picking technology winners and losers.452  Thus, absent a more compelling 
demonstration that government intervention would be more effective at 
compensating for these shortcomings than would private ordering, I remain 
reluctant to reverse the presumption embodied in past FCC policy and believe 
the better policy is to allow the market to resolve the role that each technology 
will occupy in the end. 
D. Bundling as a Form of Price Discrimination: Single-Channel vs. Multi-
Channel Television 
The fourth and final basic commitment that I believe has animated U.S. 
regulatory policy with respect to television has been a preference for single-
channel technologies over multi-channel technologies.  In many cases, this 
commitment has been an inadvertent side effect of policymakers’ attempts to 
promote local content and advertising-supported television technologies by 
favoring broadcast television.  In other cases, such as the deployment of digital 
television, the commitment has been quite conscious and explicit.  My analysis 
suggests that the preference for single-channel television has exacerbated the 
welfare losses that arise in the market for television programming.  As the 
discussion that follows explains, discouraging the development of multi-
channel television options inhibits the ability of the program providers to use 
bundling to minimize the welfare losses through price discrimination. 
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1. The Regulatory Commitment to Single-Channel Television 
The FCC’s commitment to single-channel television over multi-channel 
television has long been implicit in its attempts described above to require 
cable television to cross-subsidize broadcast television.453  It is also implicit in 
the decision to require that DBS systems that wished to provide programming 
by the major broadcast networks carry all full-power local television stations 
broadcasting in that service area.454 
The preference for single-channel over multi-channel television became 
most explicit during the debates surrounding the deployment of digital 
television.  From 1987 until 1995, the FCC presumed that digital broadcasters 
would use their additional spectrum to simulcast a single stream of HDTV, 
which uses the greater efficiency of spectrum usage to double the number of 
vertical and horizontal lines used to comprise a television picture so that the 
picture quality approximates the resolution of thirty-five millimeter film.455 
It has long been apparent, however, that rather than using the increased 
efficiency of spectrum to improve the resolution of television images, 
broadcasters could instead use the increased efficiency provided by digital 
transmission to multicast up to six streams of SDTV.456  Despite this fact, the 
FCC initially signaled its intention to adopt a simulcast HDTV system457 and 
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took steps to discourage multicasting.458  Although the FCC eventually 
removed its bias against multicasting,459 congressional pressure forced digital 
broadcasters to abandon attempts to multicast and to commit instead to 
providing a single stream of HDTV.460  The FCC reinforced this conclusion by 
requiring digital television stations to simulcast on both their digital and analog 
stations during the last years of the transition to digital.461  Furthermore, 
drawing on the recommendations of a prominent presidential advisory 
committee,462 the FCC has requested comments on whether broadcasters who 
multicast should be required to bear additional public interest obligations or 
pay additional fees.463  The FCC raised a similar possibility in its proceeding 
regarding digital broadcasters’ obligations with respect to children’s television 
programming.464 
There is one way that the FCC has deviated from its tendency to favor 
single-channel television technologies over multi-channel television 
technologies.  In its Digital Must-Carry proceedings, the FCC determined that 
 
 458 See DTV First Report & Order, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5627 ¶ 1, 5629 ¶ 12 (ruling that resolution of the issues 
surrounding HDTV take priority over SDTV proposals); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the 
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 
F.C.C.R. 3340, 3355-56 ¶¶ 58-60 (1992) (requiring that broadcasters simulcast the same programming on their 
analog and digital channels) [hereinafter DTV Second Report & Order]. 
 459 DTV Fourth FNPRM, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,541-42 ¶¶ 8-11, 10,544 ¶ 23, 10,546 ¶¶ 34-36, 10,547 ¶¶ 39-
43; accord Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Report & 
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774 ¶ 5 (1996); DTV Fifth FNPRM, 11 F.C.C.R. at 6246 ¶ 28; DTV Fourth 
FNPRM, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,541 ¶ 4; see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing 
Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,826-27 ¶¶ 41-44 (1997) (declining to 
require digital broadcasters to transmit a minimum number of hours of HDTV) [hereinafter DTV Fifth Report 
& Order]. 
 460 Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 23, 99-100 (2001) (citing Joel Brinkley, Under Pressure, 2 Broadcasters Decide They Will Now Run 
HDTV, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at D1). 
 461 See DTV Second Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 3355-57 ¶¶ 58-62 (initially requiring one hundred 
percent simulcasting); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., 
Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report & Order, & Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 
F.C.C.R. 6924, 6970-77 ¶¶ 64-70 (1992)  (reaffirming one hundred percent simulcasting phased in over two 
years).  The FCC retained its simulcast requirement even after it dropped its insistence that digital stations 
transmit a single stream of HDTV.  DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,832-33 ¶¶ 54-56 (retaining 
the simulcast requirement, but lengthening the phase-in period). 
 462 GORE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 230, at 55. 
 463 Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,635-36 ¶ 
6, 21,637-38 ¶¶ 10-11 (1999). 
 464 Children’s Television Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
15 F.C.C.R. 22,946, 22,952-56 ¶¶ 15-24 (2000). 
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cable operators need not carry all of the program streams offered by digital 
broadcasters who choose to multicast.  The FCC reasoned that the must-carry 
statute only requires cable operators to provide carriage of a broadcast station’s 
“primary video.”465  In the FCC’s opinion, the plain meaning of the term 
“primary” and the legislative history both indicated that Congress intended the 
must-carry provision to apply only to a single program stream.466 
2. Bundling as a Form of Imperfect Price Discrimination 
As noted earlier,467 price discrimination offers the promise of bringing the 
supposedly conflicting considerations surrounding static and dynamic 
efficiency into alignment.  It is now generally recognized that bundling 
represents one way to effect imperfect price discrimination.468  The seminal 
analyses focused on two-product bundles in which the demand for the bundled 
products was negatively correlated.  In such cases, producers can use the 
consumer surplus associated with one of the products to fund the purchase of 
the other product, which in turn allows the producer to capture a greater 
percentage of the total surplus.  The greater the negative correlation of 
reservation prices, the more likely that bundling will be profitable.469 
This effect can be illustrated with a simple numerical example.470  Assume 
that a firm is offering two products to two buyers who both may want to 
purchase one or both of the products.  The buyers’ reservation prices are noted 
in Figure 12. 
 
 465 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3) (2000). 
 466 Carriage of Digital Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2620-22 ¶¶ 54-57 (2001). 
 467 See supra Part 1.E. 
 468 For recent reviews of this literature, see Gregory S. Crawford, The Discriminatory Incentives to 
Bundle 2-4 (June 25, 2001), at http://eller.arizona.edu/~crawford/research/bundling.html, and Barry Nalebuff, 
Bundling 1-5 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 99-14, Nov. 22, 1999), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? 
abstract_id=185193. 
 469 The seminal analysis is George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152.  Stigler’s work was extended by William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, 
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475 (1976), and Richard Schmalensee, 
Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70-71 (1982). 
 470 The example is taken from Stigler, supra note 469, at 153. 
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Figure 12 
Bundling of Two Products with Negatively Correlated Demands 
 Buyer A Buyer B 
Product 1 $8.00 $7.00 
Product 2 $2.50 $3.00 
The key feature is that the buyers’ demands for each product are negatively 
correlated, i.e., Buyer A values Product 1 more than Buyer B, with the 
opposite being true with respect to Product 2.  If the producer sells the products 
separately, it will maximize profits by pricing Product 1 at $7 and pricing 
Product 2 at $2.50.  It would sell two units of each product, earning $19 in 
revenue.  But if the distributor bundles both products into a single package, it 
can sell two such bundles for $10, thereby increasing its revenue to $20. 
Subsequent work has revealed that bundling can facilitate price 
discrimination even when the buyers’ demands for the bundled products are 
independently rather than negatively correlated.  In effect, the law of large 
numbers dictates that aggregating larger numbers of products lowers the 
variance of consumers’ valuations for individual goods when measured on a 
per-good basis.471  By reducing the heterogeneity of customers’ preferences, 
bundling flattens the aggregate demand curve, which in turn reduces 
deadweight loss and makes it easier for the producer to use linear pricing to 
capture a larger proportion of the available surplus.472  As Figure 13 indicates, 
 
 471 This is because (σ1+2)2 = (σ1)2 + (σ2)2 + 2ρσ1σ2, where (σ1+2)2 represents the variance of a bundle of 
goods 1 and 2, and (σ1)2 and (σ2)2 represent the variance of each component.  Since (σ1 + σ2)2 = (σ1)2 + (σ2)2 + 
2σ1σ2, this implies that σ1+2 ≤ σ1 + σ2.  So long as the demands for the components are not perfectly correlated, 
the standard deviation of the bundle will be less than the sum of the standard deviations of the components.  
See Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and Commodity Pricing, 57 J. BUS. S211, S219-21 (1984). 
 472 See Mark Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 151 
(1999); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, 45 
MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1614, 1616, 1619 (1999); Crawford, supra note 468, at 4; R. Preston McAfee et al., Multi-
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the variance narrows and the demand flattens still further as the number of 
products added to the bundle increases.473 
Figure 13 
Bundling of Products with Independently Correlated Demands 
Put in terms of a simple numerical example, assume that a firm produces 
two products.  Assume also that individual customers’ willingness to pay for 
each product may vary up or down by any amount up to $1, with the price that 
the average customer is willing to pay for the first product being $5 and the 
price that the average customer is willing to pay for the second being $2.  If the 
firm offers each product on an unbundled basis at $5 and $2, a person who 
valued the first product at $5.50 and who valued the second product at $1.75 
would purchase the first product, but not the second.  This person would, 
however, purchase both products if they were bundled together and offered at a 
price of $7.  This is because the extent to which this person’s valuation of the 
 
product Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372, 377-80 (1989); 
Michael A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J. BUS. 85, 86, 92-93 (1995); Schmalensee, supra 
note 471, at S220, S228. 
 473 The source for Figure 13 is Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1617 fig.1.  Note that Figure 13 
represents the aggregation of goods whose demand is uniformly distributed across the price space, as 
represented in the left-most graph denoting the demand for a single, unbundled good.  The effect of 
aggregation on the shape of the demand curve of the overall bundle should be the same regardless of the shape 
of the demand curve for the component products. 
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first product exceeded $5 (i.e., $0.50) was greater than the extent to which their 
valuation of the second product fell short of $2 (i.e., $0.25).  The net result of 
bundling is to allow the producers to use the excess surplus associated with the 
first product to help fund the purchase of the second product.  This in turn 
allows producers to capture a greater proportion of the available surplus. 
In contrast to other forms of imperfect price discrimination, which must 
satisfy a relatively restrictive set of preconditions (including a fairly high 
degree of knowledge about customer preferences, some mechanism for 
segregating different classes of consumers into different price points, and the 
ability to prevent arbitrage through resale), bundling permits producers to 
reduce deadweight loss and maximize producer surplus in a much simpler 
manner.  Sellers need only charge a single price without identifying different 
types of consumers.474 
It should be noted that bundling introduces a possible source of economic 
loss that is not possible in single-product sales.  As noted earlier,475 
maximization of total surplus requires that consumers be able to purchase a 
product only when the value that they would derive from consuming it exceeds 
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the good.  In other words, 
they should only be able to purchase the good if their reservation price exceeds 
marginal cost.  Using the consumer surplus from one product to fund the 
purchase of another may induce some consumers to purchase a bundle even 
though their reservation price for a particular component falls below the 
marginal cost of that component.476  Such an outcome is, of course, impossible 
if the marginal cost is zero, as is the case when consumption of a good is 
nonrival.  Stated more generally, bundling is more likely to be welfare 
enhancing in markets in which marginal costs are relatively low and the spread 
between marginal cost and the consumers’ mean reservation price is large.477 
 
 474 See id. at 1619. 
 475 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 476 See Adams & Yellen, supra note 469, at 492; Nalebuff, supra note 468, at 3. 
 477 Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1617; Salinger, supra note 472, at 92-95; Schmalensee, 
supra note 471, at S228-29; see also Suchan Chae, Bundling Subscription TV Channels: A Case of Natural 
Bundling, 10 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 213, 219-20, 226-27 (1992) (concluding that pure bundling represents the 
optimal strategy when costs are low, while mixed bundling represents the preferred strategy when costs are 
high). 
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The theoretical literature has often cited television as a prime example of 
an industry in which bundling could be employed as a form of imperfect price 
discrimination.478  Although some of these analyses have suggested that the 
welfare impact of bundling television programming is ambiguous,479 there are 
aspects of the television industry that make it more likely that bundling 
television network channels would enhance total surplus.  By providing 
producers with an effective means for capturing surplus that is relatively easy 
to administer, bundling promises to increase dynamic efficiency.  So long as 
program producers have the option to bundle or not to bundle as they see fit (or 
alternatively to engage in a practice called “mixed bundling” in which 
consumers are free to choose from a menu that includes options to purchase 
both bundles or individual components), they will do so only when the practice 
increases revenue and, by extension, is most likely to increase total surplus.  In 
addition, the fact that marginal costs associated with the television industry are 
so low as to approach zero makes it unlikely that bundling television networks 
will give rise to the unique type of welfare loss that occurs whenever 
customers are forced to purchase products even though their reservation price 
for those goods falls below the marginal cost of producing them.480 
These theoretical results have recently been confirmed by an empirical 
study of the impact of bundling in the cable television industry.  This study 
tested the impact of the addition of each of the top fifteen cable networks to the 
bundle of networks that comprised the basic programming package offered by 
various cable operators.  Although these results are still preliminary, this study 
found that, consistent with the theory described above, bundling of cable 
television networks caused demand to flatten, with the effect being particularly 
pronounced with respect to special-interest networks when compared with 
general-interest networks.481  Some rough welfare calculations based on this 
data revealed that, again consistent with the theoretical predictions, bundling 
 
 478 See, e.g., BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 539-40; CHURCH & WARE, supra note 47, at 
169; Chae, supra note 477, at 214-15; Salinger, supra note 472, at 97 n.17; Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, 
at 255-58. 
 479 See Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 257-58.  This is because bundling can cause another source of 
welfare loss resulting from the reduction in the number of instruments available to extract consumer surplus.  
If consumer preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, producers will find that they can extract surplus more 
effectively by pricing the goods separately.  See Crawford, supra note 468, at 6. 
 480 See Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1626. 
 481 Crawford, supra note 468, at 14-17, 19. 
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causes consumer surplus to fall, while causing total surplus to rise.482  Thus the 
belief that bundling will tend to cause total welfare to increase is based on 
more than just theory.  It is confirmed by empirical data as well. 
The implication is that the overall hostility toward multi-channel 
technology reflected in current television policy may be exacting a significant 
price in terms of the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of television 
programming.  It also has implications for the efforts undertaken by the FCC 
and Congress to impel digital broadcasters to forgo multicasting in favor of 
transmitting a single stream of HDTV.  The approach taken by the FCC in 
rolling out digital television, however, only serves to frustrate the networks’ 
ability to price discriminate, both by discouraging digital broadcasters from 
focusing their efforts on pay television and by placing burdens on the 
deployment of multi-channel service, which limits the networks’ ability to use 
bundling as a form of imperfect price discrimination.  Removing such a bias 
would thus be more likely to promote the maximization of both static and 
dynamic efficiency. 
Perhaps the most complex consideration is whether the principle 
disfavoring the promotion of single-channel television over multi-channel 
television also supports requiring cable operators to carry all of the program 
streams offered by digital broadcasters who choose to multicast.  It is arguable 
that this principle has no application to what amounts to a tradeoff between 
two multi-channel media.  Particularly when combined with the general 
principle favoring the emergence of new technologies,483 this consideration 
would arguably support requiring cable operators to carry all such streams. 
Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes clear that favoring multi-
channel broadcast television over multi-channel cable television cannot be 
justified.  This is because the welfare losses associated with the producers’ 
inability to capture the entire surplus are likely to be worse under advertising-
supported television than under pay television.484  In addition, the bundling 
analysis advanced above suggests that the providers that are able to bundle 
 
 482 Id. at 17-19.  These findings contradict Chae’s conclusions that economies of scope, rather than price 
discrimination, represent the primary motivation for bundling cable channels and that consumer surplus and 
total surplus tend to move together.  Chae, supra note 477, at 219-20, 226-27. 
 483 See infra Part IV. 
 484 See supra Part III.B.3-4. 
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relatively large numbers of networks are likely to be able to extract a higher 
proportion of the available surplus than providers limited to smaller-sized 
bundles.485  Although the magnitude of this effect depends somewhat on the 
structure of viewer demand, this consideration would tend to disfavor efforts to 
impose carriage burdens on cable television in order to advantage digital 
broadcasters who multicast. 
The more fundamental problem with this argument is that it is not my 
position that policymakers should reverse their previous willingness to require 
multi-channel television services to cross-subsidize single-channel services.  
My point is that policymakers should eliminate cross-subsidies altogether.  
Thus my criticism of past policy does not in any way suggest support for 
imposing an implicit cross-subsidy running in the other direction.  On the 
contrary, the economic analysis suggests that multi-channel television needs no 
such cross-subsidy, because the ability to price discriminate through bundling 
will give multi-channel technologies a natural advantage over single-channel 
technologies by allowing them to capture a greater proportion of the available 
surplus to cover fixed costs.  Nor do I mean to suggest that regulators should 
force television providers to bundle their networks.  Indeed, the theoretical 
literature suggests that requiring the bundling of all television networks in all 
circumstances may actually cause total welfare to fall.486  It should be 
sufficient to eliminate the cross-subsidies running in either direction and to 
allow television providers either to bundle their networks or sell their networks 
as individual components as they see fit. 
IV.  ASSESSING THE SECONDARY DISTORTIONS RESULTING FROM THE 
COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how the commitment to free, local 
television has had the direct consequence of reducing the overall quantity, 
quality, and diversity of television programming available.  It is equally 
important to recognize that in addition to these primary effects, these 
regulations cause important secondary effects that make the welfare losses still 
greater.  Some of these secondary effects stem from the fact that all of these 
 
 485 See supra note 473 and accompanying text. 
 486 See Adams & Yellen, supra note 469, at 483; McAfee et al., supra note 472, at 374; Schmalensee, 
supra note 471, at S228-29. 
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policies have tended to preserve and increase the amount of electromagnetic 
spectrum devoted to broadcasting.  Even when taken by itself, analog 
broadcasting represents the single largest commitment of spectrum.  Estimates 
of the combined value of the spectrum committed to analog and digital 
broadcasting run from $32 billion to $202 billion.487 
This decision has obvious collateral supply-side consequences on all other 
spectrum-based media products.  The enormous commitment of spectrum to 
the various forms of television broadcasting (especially when combined with 
the limitations on broadcasters’ ability to transfer that spectrum to alternative 
uses) inevitably increases the cost of all other spectrum-based technologies.  
As a result, the public bears the costs by paying higher fees for cellular 
telephony, 3G, and other spectrum-based technologies.488 
These effects are exacerbated by the cross-subsidy implicit in the other 
regulatory features designed to promote broadcasting at the expense of cable 
and DBS discussed above.  By reducing the revenue generated by cable and 
DBS systems, these regulations cause the price of subscribing to cable and 
DBS to rise.  Thus, not only does the decision to promote free, over-the-air 
broadcasting exact costs by reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
television programming available, it also reduces the accessibility of television 
programming and in so doing works to thwart one of the justifications that un-
derlay the enactment of many of these regulations in the first place.489 
In addition to these static efficiency considerations, the secondary 
distortions resulting from the promotion of free, local television have effects 
on dynamic efficiency as well.  The burdens placed on the cable industry 
inevitably slowed the buildout of the nation’s broadband infrastructure by 
retarding the implementation of cable modem service.  The increase in cost has 
also slowed the deployment of 3G.  Furthermore, the amount of spectrum 
 
 487 See supra notes 183, 233 and accompanying text. 
 488 Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55; see also Hazlett, supra note 372, at 504 (offering a similar observation 
with respect to unlicensed spectrum). 
 489 See Ericksson et al., supra note 329, at 499.  Cross-subsidies that penalize one subsector of an industry 
to benefit another are also somewhat problematic from the standpoint of fairness, in that rarely is the penalized 
subsector responsible for creating the problem being redressed.  Doing so makes about as much as sense as 
taxing cable operators to pay for the construction of new public schools.  To the extent that general concerns of 
public welfare form the basis for the subsidy program, those subsidies should be financed out of general 
revenues. 
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committed to broadcasting has also created administrative problems.  In 
contrast to European nations, which have already deployed 3G (albeit with less 
success than they hoped),490 the FCC remains embroiled in administrative 
controversies over which services will be relocated in order to make way for 
this new technology.491 
The policies designed to promote free, local television have caused 
secondary distortions on the demand side as well.  Altering the relative prices 
of the various spectrum-based services makes broadcast television artificially 
attractive and makes cable, DBS, and spectrum-based technologies look 
artificially unattractive from an economic standpoint.  Because these prices do 
not reflect the true costs of these goods, these differences will inevitably cause 
consumers to deviate from the most efficient product mix.492 
Examination of these collateral consequences further underscores the fact 
that there is nothing “free” about free, local television.  Although individual 
consumers do not have to pay for television services directly, such services 
depend on the availability of the massive direct subsidy associated with the 
spectrum giveaway as well as the massive cross-subsidies implicit in the 
overall regulatory scheme.  As a result, consumers must pay for free television 
in other ways, either through higher prices, reduced product offerings 
associated with other spectrum-based services, or both.  Such indirect pricing 
mechanisms are unlikely to lead to efficient allocation in the primary market 
and inevitably create secondary distortions in other markets, as producers 
respond to the artificial prices set by such subsidies by combining substitute 
inputs in combinations that are less economically efficient. 
CONCLUSION 
The classic approach to television regulation frames the basic policy issue 
as an irreconcilable conflict between two countervailing forces.  On the one 
hand are considerations of static efficiency, which demand that price be set as 
 
 490 See Almar Latour & David Pringle, Europe Gets 3G Phone Service, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at 
B4; David Pringle & Evan Ramstad, European Telecoms Face Price War from 3G Cellphones, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 13, 2003, at C1. 
 491 See Yochi J. Dreazen, Space Wars: The Future of Wireless Depends on Companies Getting More 
Room on the Spectrum; But Who’s Going to Give It Up?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at R9. 
 492 See Ericksson et al., supra note 329, at 478. 
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low as possible.  On the other hand are considerations of dynamic efficiency, 
which require that price be set high enough to generate sufficient revenues to 
cover the fixed costs of producing the television program in the first place.  
Any single-part price chosen would generate too much revenue from the 
standpoint of static efficiency and too little revenue from the standpoint of 
dynamic efficiency.  Thus any resolution of this conflict allegedly necessitated 
a choice from among second-best outcomes. 
The integrated analysis developed in this Article offers a way to bring these 
supposedly opposing forces into alignment.  Both static and dynamic 
efficiency can be maximized if the producer is able to appropriate the entire 
surplus created by its product.  A producer that is able to capture the entire 
surplus achieves static efficiency by allowing every person who places a 
positive value on the product to purchase it.  Indeed, even the marginal 
customer who places only a nominal value on the product is able to consume it 
for free.  Producers who appropriate the entire surplus also achieve dynamic 
efficiency by allowing products to be produced whenever the total benefits 
created by the product exceed the costs associated with creating it (which in 
the case of nonrival goods consist solely of fixed costs).  So long as the 
revenue generated exceeds the fixed costs, the product will be made, and 
revenue represents a good proxy for the total benefits created by the product so 
long as the proportion of surplus appropriated by the producer remains 
relatively high.  The amount of the surplus that the producer is unable to 
capture will determine whether a socially beneficial product does not get 
produced.  Although enhancing the appropriability of surplus may allow some 
producers to earn short-run profits, the free entry made possible by the 
nonexistence of barriers to entry ensures that any such profits will not be 
sustainable. 
This transformation has profound economic and policy implications.  It 
makes room for policy decisions by identifying ways to promote static and 
dynamic efficiency simultaneously.  In so doing, it reveals the supposedly 
irreconcilable conflict between static and dynamic efficiency to be a false one.  
Furthermore, it transforms the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers 
from a consideration that has no effect on efficiency into a necessary condition 
for efficiency.  In any event, whatever distributional consequences that may 
have been thought to exist will be limited by the fact that free entry will 
dissipate supra-competitive profits in most cases. 
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Appropriability of surplus in turn depends on two considerations.  First, 
consumers must be able to use prices to signal the intensity of their 
preferences.  Second, producers must be able to engage in price discrimination.  
The standard model of perfect competition has long regarded price 
discrimination with suspicion, taking it as evidence of monopoly or oligopoly 
power.  Price discrimination takes on a far different cast in the context of 
public good economics, because it is a common feature of competitive markets 
whenever products are differentiated and whenever joint costs are spread over 
multiple purchasers.  In neither case is it necessarily evidence of substantial 
monopoly power. 
The power of the analysis is demonstrated quite persuasively by applying it 
to the market for television programming to evaluate the longstanding policy 
of attempting to promote free, local television, which I suggest should be 
disaggregated into four smaller subcommitments.  What emerges is a 
theoretical explanation for why these historical efforts have failed to produce 
the desired results.  The theory reveals how past attempts to promote free, local 
television might well have reduced the overall quantity, quality, and diversity 
of television programming and made it harder for any programming that 
appeals only to small audiences (such as locally oriented programming) to 
survive.  It also demonstrates how the market for television programming lends 
itself to a technique known as bundling, which represents a form of price 
discrimination that is relatively easy to implement.  These theoretical results 
are backed up with empirical findings with respect to each of the 
subcommitments. 
Finally, my analysis shows how the commitment to free, local television 
has had the inevitable consequence of artificially raising the prices of other 
spectrum-based communications media and of impeding the deployment of 
new spectrum-based services, such as 3G wireless devices.  Consequently, the 
fundamental policy commitments identified above have caused economic 
harms in the here and now and have harmed dynamic efficiency by artificially 
discouraging investment in new programming and new television technologies. 
This analysis should be of obvious interest to those inclined to define the 
goals of television policy exclusively in economic terms.  There are also two 
reasons why it should also be of interest to those who would define these goals 
in noneconomic terms.  First, my analysis shows how elimination of the 
historical policies designed to promote free, local television should allow a 
richer variety of programming to appear, which should reduce the need to 
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promote directly many of the types of merit programming usually advanced by 
commentators who have adopted noneconomic approaches.  Indeed, those who 
value diversity for its own sake would find it best promoted if producers were 
able to capture as much revenue as possible.493 
As a result, allowing the market to function more efficiently will both 
lower the cost and minimize the First Amendment concerns associated with 
any such programs by narrowing the extent to which the government will need 
to intervene in order to further these goals.  In addition, this Article 
underscores the extent to which the economic analysis points out the price 
exacted by the traditional forms of regulatory intervention and underscores the 
importance of determining whether a particular regulatory device is likely to 
promote or frustrate policymakers’ goals. 
Ever since Newt Minow’s classic speech condemning broadcast television 
as a “Vast Wasteland,”494 it has been fashionable to disparage the quality of 
television programming and to use its poor quality as justification to call for 
more regulation.  My analysis indicates that, somewhat ironically, the relative 
mediocrity of the current programming environment may in part be the result 
of regulatory decisions rather than a problem that must be redressed.  A better 
understanding of the distinctive economic characteristics of television 
programming reveals that in this instance regulation is the cause rather than the 
consequence of this phenomenon.  The insights provided by my analysis 
should also help us avoid the pitfalls of the past and design regulatory steps 
that are less likely to be part of the problem and more likely to be part of the 
solution. 
 
 
 
 493 See supra note 86. 
 494 Minow, supra note 6. 
